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“To the vegans who fly every week. 
To the meat eaters who only shop local. 
To the DIY mums who use disposable nappies. 
To the electric car owners who don’t compost. 
To the zero wasters who eat fast food. 
To the gardeners who buy fast fashion. 
And to the recyclers who have long showers. 
To all of those who are making a difference…” 
 
(Unknown Source) 
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Abstract 
 
Political consumerism refers to citizens’ use of boycotting and buycotting as they seek to 
influence political outcomes within the marketplace, rather than through more traditional 
routes such as voting. It has been widely theorised as a lifestyle form of political participation, 
which reflects the progressively converging roles of the citizens and the consumers. Young 
people in particular, are increasingly harnessing their individual consumer power to collectively 
express their political, ethical, and environmental considerations through their consumer 
choices. However, the perceived persistence of such a market-oriented form of political 
participation despite the ongoing financial crisis, calls for a re-evaluation of the underlying 
motivations, values and orientations of young political consumers.  
Given the susceptibility of political consumerism to a neoliberal modus operandi, the 
lack of literature problematising its emergence in response to the tenets of neoliberalism is 
somewhat surprising. The present study will thus address this gap by distinguishing between 
two antithetical, yet complimentary effects. Firstly, the internalised neoliberal critique of 
democracy emphasises a ‘push’ effect out of the political, and into the commercial sphere. 
Secondly, the neoliberal emphasis on the effectiveness of the markets, advanced by young 
people’s postmaterialist sensitivities, calls attention to the existence of a parallel ‘pull’ effect 
into the marketplace as a locus of political participation.  
The overarching aim of this study therefore is to identify and interpret the key drivers 
underpinning the persisting patterns of political consumerism among young people in Greece 
and in the UK, using a mixed-methods, paired-country research approach. It initially develops 
a Political Consumerism Index, a new theoretical tool for the measurement of the phenomenon. 
It subsequently uses a primarily quantitative research approach, in conjunction with young 
people’s own insights from a series of focus groups, to provide a comprehensive picture of 
young people’s political consumption in times of austerity.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1. Political consumerism past and present 
 
At the time this doctoral thesis was being written, the UK Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Secretary, George Eustice, at the daily coronavirus briefing on March 21, 2020, urged British 
citizens to “Be responsible when [they] shop and [to] think of others' (BBC News, 2020). The 
phrasing of this address frames consumption as an individual act, albeit with collective 
implications, embedded with political meaning. However, the act of consumption as an action 
imbued with political meaning is hardly a new phenomenon. 
Captain Boycott – from whom ‘boycotting’ got its name - was originally an Irish land 
agent, against whom the peasants organised in 1880 (Gabriel and Lang, 2015, p. 154). However, 
the practice of consumer activism which came to be known under this name, may be as old as 
the boycotts of British goods as part of the Boston Tea Party protest on December 16, 1773 
(Ulrich, 2013), which provides one of the first instances of consumer citizenship in recent 
history. The American revolutionary John Adams writes in his diary in 1773, “This destruction 
of the tea is so bold, so daring, so firm, intrepid and inflexible, and it must have so important 
consequences, and so lasting, that I can’t but consider it as an Epocha in History” (Ulrich, 2013, 
p. 66).  
Bruni and Zamagni (2016, p. 137) note that John Stuart Mill’s insight on “consumer 
sovereignty” in the late 19th century found its application almost one century later, since 
“consumers potentially have the ability to send messages to producers to persuade them to 
take into account the values they, as consumers, believe in”. By spending their money in a 
certain way instead of another “they send a very precise signal to producers”, which 
communicates not only what they would like them to produce, but also the way they would 
like them to produce it. Consumer citizenship, or as it has been often described “voting with 
your wallet” (Bruni and Zamagni, 2016, p. 138; Stolle et al., 2005), becomes thus a notable 
example of social and political innovation. 
The concept of consumer citizenship has been in evidence ever since. It was prominent 
in the Civil Rights movements of the 1960s. Following the arrest of Rosa Parks for refusing to 
give up her seat on a Montgomery City Line in 1955, a by-stander casually proposed that, “every 
Negro in town should stay off the buses for one day in protest” (Vogel, 1978, p. 21). Examples 
of political consumerism during the 1980s and 1990s included high-profile campaigns against 
Nestlé, and even boycotting whole countries like France or the USA against their position on 
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the Gulf War (1990-1991), as this was considered an effective means of influencing political 
decisions through the use of the market.   
At the wake of the Global Justice Movement in the late 1990s, political consumerism 
exhibited a sharp increase across all Western democracies (Grasso, 2018). Although in the 
previous decades consumerism was primarily perceived as the “very paradigm that is fuelling 
our eco, social and political decline” (Schossboeck, 2012), the social movements that emerged 
after the widespread mobilisation against the WTO in Seattle in 1999 recognised the 
opportunity of harnessing this individual consumer power towards collective ethical, political 
and environmental concerns, and thus utilising the marketplace as an arena of political activism 
(Della Porta, 2006). Political consumerism therefore, was re-introduced in the vocabulary of 
several grassroots civic initiatives that flourished in the same period.  
More recently, it resurfaced in particularly visible fashion through the demands of the 
2011 Occupy movement, enriched with discursive actions such as flash mobs, mall sit-ins, 
community events or ‘walks of shame’ as additional methods of raising awareness against 
certain consumer brands (Cloke et al., 2016). Even more recent examples include the 
boycotting of the NFL League, in response to Colin Kaepernick’s exclusion from the league, 
which followed his attempt to draw attention to racial inequality (McNeal, 2017); or Starbucks 
facing boycotts after barring its employees from wearing logos in support of ‘Black Lives Matter’ 
movement (Ortega, 2020). 
On the production side, several corporations have responded to these consumption 
trends by developing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) schemes, which seek to monetise 
on consumers’ demand for ethical and political responsibility (Soulas and Clark, 2013). Latest 
figures for the value of all ethical purchases in the UK recorded an 8.5% growth during 2018 to 
an impressive £38 billion of overall value, whereas consumers’ ethical spending in their local 
community surged by 11.7% (Triodos, 2018). These figures exhibit a continuous growth trend 
for the thirteenth consecutive year, reflecting the persisting appeal of political consumerism, 
despite the ongoing global financial crisis. 
Simultaneously however, political consumerist initiatives have shifted away from the 
mainstream business sector, so as to include local-based exchange networks, alternative 
currency systems and time-banks (Sotiropoulou, 2012); that is, grassroots civic initiatives that 
seek to experiment in practice with the theoretical frameworks of Economies of De-growth and 
the Transition Movement (Schneider et al., 2010). Although the expansion of such initiatives 
can be observed all around Europe, they are particularly prominent in the European South since 
they are being perceived as alternative, inclusive and participatory ways of withstanding the 
disproportionately adverse effects of the 2008 global financial crisis, both on practical 
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(Petmesidou, 2016), but also ideological terms (Kousis, 2017). It can be argued therefore that 
the crisis may have served as a catalyst for the emergence of grassroots, bottom-up, 
participatory initiatives which involve the use of the market as an arena for collective action 
(D’Alisa et al., 2015; Kousis, 2017; Lekakis, 2015), and which seek to “simultaneously foster and 
facilitate a new form of political engagement/participation aimed to strengthen open, 
democratic forms of governance” (Kousis and Paschou, 2017, p. 142).  
  
Figure 1: ‘Have engaged’ or are ‘willing to engage’ in boycotts among young people up 
to 29 years of age (World Values Survey, 2017-2020, N = 62,703).  
Resource link: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp  
These trends are particularly evident among the young (Nonomura, 2017; Ward and de 
Vreese, 2011; Wicks et al., 2014). Stolle et al. (2010) report that boycotting was the form of 
political participation that demonstrated the greatest rate of growth over time by the end of 
the 20th century, with young people being four times more likely to engage in it in 1999 as 
opposed to 1974. Survey data from the World Values Survey (WVS) reports that several lifestyle 
forms of political participation – such as buycotting and boycotting - have visibly been on the 
rise among the younger generations in many European countries. Although the Scandinavian 
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countries remain consistently the world leaders in political consumerist practices (Stolle et al., 
2010), similar trends are also discernible both in Greece (Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis, 2018) and 
in the UK (Pickard, 2019c). The 2017-2020 wave of the WVS (see Figure 1) reports that young 
people up to 29 years of age, have engaged or are willing to engage in boycotts, by 61.4% in 
Greece and by 55.6% in the UK; whereas 15.8% and 10.2% of the same age category had already 
done so in each country respectively, in the previous 12 months.  
As a consequence, the consumer-citizen has re-emerged in the spotlight of political 
action. Instilled with the postmaterialist values of their affluent socialisation before the 
outbreak of the ongoing global economic recession (Copeland, 2014b; Henn et al., 2017; 
Inglehart, 2018), the consumer-citizen aspires to become a key figure of the globalised market. 
 
2. Research Aims and Objectives 
 
Motivated by the perceived persistence of political consumerism, despite the ongoing financial 
crisis, the overarching research aim of the present thesis therefore, is: 
1. to identify and interpret the key drivers underpinning the changing patterns of political 
participation amongst young people, with particular emphasis on political 
consumerism, using a paired-country comparison research approach, among young 
people in the UK and in Greece. 
In order to achieve the overarching aim of the thesis however, the following research 
objectives needed to be addressed: 
2. Firstly, to gain insights concerning young people’s motivations for, and patterns of, 
political consumerism, through a series of focus groups conducted in the two countries; 
3. secondly, to inform the design of a unique survey questionnaire with the insights gained 
from the focus groups, and devise an innovative measurement instrument for political 
consumerism; and, 
4. finally, to analyse data from the survey, to identify the key drivers underpinning young 
people’s decisions to engage in political consumerism in the UK and in Greece. 
 
3. Thesis Outline 
 
Given the focus of this thesis on political consumerism as a lifestyle form of political 
participation, which is particularly prominent among the young, it is crucial to commence by 
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providing definitions of the main concepts. This is the main focus of Chapter 2, which takes the 
position that young people do not constitute a homogeneous demographic collective, with 
identical backgrounds, life-stories, values or political behaviour. This chapter therefore, 
delineates whom exactly we mean when we refer to ‘young people’ in political participation 
research. Given the continuous emergence of alternative, more intuitive, creative and lifestyle 
forms of participation, election-focused definitions of political participation are unable by 
themselves to fully capture the changing patterns of what is now being understood as ‘political’ 
by young people themselves (Pontes et al., 2018). Instead, this chapter will provide a purposely 
wide working definition, which will be able to accommodate political consumerism as a lifestyle 
form of political participation. It will introduce its two main variants, namely positive 
(buycotting) and negative (boycotting) political consumerism. The definitions provided in this 
chapter will form the basis upon which the following chapters will be built.  
Chapter 3 outlines some of the most widely used theoretical models in political 
participation research. These models will be then used throughout the present research as the 
basis of analysis, seeking to trace the shaping factors of political consumerism among young 
people in Greece and in the United Kingdom. It will start by laying out the Socio-Economic Status 
(SES) model of political participation, which focuses on the expressions of individual 
socioeconomic status as the key predictor of political participation. It will then discuss the 
Mobilisation model, which emphasises the existence of opportunity structures behind citizens’ 
political participation patterns. In turn, the Rational Choice model assumes that citizens will 
calculate the costs and benefits behind their political behaviour. This will be followed by the 
Social Capital theory, which highlights the relationships between individuals and their 
community. Finally, it will investigate the role of the prevalent economic conditions during 
one’s socialisation as factors behind the rise of postmaterialist value orientations; these may 
also influence the preferred styles of political participation of young people, in a continuously 
evolving socio-political context.  
 Chapter 4 discusses how the consumption of goods and services in late modernity has 
instilled products with political meaning. It will commence by illustrating consumption as 
identity and responsibility. As a result of these developments, it will argue that late modernity 
has brought about the convergence of the previously distant notions of the citizen and the 
consumer, by using the market as an alternative political arena (as opposed to the predominant 
electoral arena).  
As a market-oriented form of political participation, political consumerism is particularly 
susceptible to the ideological framework that pertains the markets. Chapter 5, therefore 
discusses the effects of neoliberalism, as an overarching contextual factor which may influence 
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young people’s decisions to engage in political consumerism. It posits that the neoliberal 
critique of democracy may ‘push’ young people away from electoral politics into alternative 
political domains. Conversely, the internalisation of neoliberal principles is likely to influence 
young people’s market behaviour, and thus may also ‘pull’ them into the market as an 
alternative political arena within which they may express their political concerns.  
Chapter 6, provides the theoretical background for the study of political consumerism 
on the country level. With regards to the use of the market for political purposes, Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) theory suggests that young people in the UK, having been socialised within a 
Liberal Market Economy (LME), will be more likely to be influenced by the neoliberal conviction 
in favour of the ‘invisible hand’ and therefore be ‘pulled’ to express their political concerns 
within the market. By way of contrast, having been socialised in a Mixed Market Economy 
(MME), young people in Greece are expected to adopt more collective, bottom-up approaches 
to political consumerism. The chapter then delivers an empirical overview of the expressions 
of political consumerism in Greece as opposed to the UK. Finally, the observation that political 
consumerism is often measured with market indicators such as volume of sales of ethically-
sourced products, points towards the need for the development of a unified measure  for the 
study of political consumerism.  
 Chapter 7 therefore, presents the rationale behind the need for such a measure in the 
study of political consumerism as a form of political participation. The inconsistent measures 
used elsewhere in the relevant literature, along with the differing motivations behind positive 
and negative consumerism, expose the need for the development of a unified measure of 
political consumerism which will be able to capture not only its behavioural aspects, but also 
the responsibility and the frequency behind the actions. The chapter proposes such a 
methodological instrument, in the form of the Political Consumerism Index (PCI). The PCI will 
be subsequently tested for validity and reliability, providing in this way an original contribution 
to knowledge in the form of a comprehensive, but intuitive instrument for measuring political 
consumerism.   
Having thus defined the dependent variable of the study (the PCI), Chapter 8 discusses 
the methodology of the analytical part of the thesis. It will commence by laying out the aim and 
the objectives of the study, and introduces its main research questions. It proceeds by 
establishing the philosophical assumptions of the study, which in turn have dictated the 
methodological approach adopted. The chapter concludes by outlining the independent 
contribution to knowledge, derived from this research.  
Chapter 9 presents the findings from an exploratory study on the motivations of young 
political consumers in the UK and Greece, which have informed the survey questionnaire. The 
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insights derived from the thematic analysis of the focus groups point towards the 
understanding that young people in Greece are being pushed away from institutional forms of 
political participation, such as voting in elections. Instead, the insight from the focus groups 
indicate that young people in the UK are being primarily pulled into the market as an arena for 
political participation.  
The subsequent chapters will therefore be categorised according to this distinction. 
Firstly, Chapter 10 will examine the demographic variables of the survey and will then explore 
a variety of push factors that are associated with the institutional political domain. Similarly, 
Chapter 11 will in turn, discuss the market-oriented factors that may be ‘pulling’ young people 
to express their political considerations within the market. The findings of these two chapters, 
will provide further valuable insights in the study of political consumerism among the young 
people in the UK and Greece. 
Ultimately, Chapter 12 will employ the PCI to conclusively identify the factors correlated 
with young people’s decisions to engage in political consumerism in the UK and in Greece. The 
chapter will conclude by outlining, discussing and problematising the main findings of the 
thesis, while at the same time providing directions for future research on the topic of political 
consumerism as a lifestyle form of political participation of young people in the UK and in 
Greece. 
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Chapter 2: Defining Young People, Political Participation and Political 
Consumerism 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Social sciences refer to the study of human society and social relationships. But as these evolve, 
so should our definitions of the key terms involved in their study. Nevertheless, a great part of 
the available research on youth political participation neglects to define whom exactly we mean 
when we refer to ‘young people’. Similarly, political participation itself, remains to this day an 
evolving (Theocharis and van Deth, 2018), and often contested term (Pontes et al., 2018). 
However, the working definitions of both ‘youth’ as a sociological category, and ‘political 
participation’ as a field of study may significantly impact the pertinent measurements and thus 
the findings of relevant research. For example, the more narrow definitions of youth political 
participation, as well as the persistence on election-centred definitions of the term, especially 
since electoral participation has traditionally been lower among the young (Kyranakis and 
Nurvala, 2013), are likely to result in portrayals of young people as inherently ‘apathetic’ 
(Quaranta, 2016). Instead, the use of wider definitions that move beyond solely electoral 
expressions of youth political participation usually deliver quite different, and - for some - more 
pragmatic accounts of young people’s political engagement (Cammaerts et al., 2014; 
Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis, 2018; Pickard, 2019a; Sloam and Henn, 2018).   
Pickard (2019a, p. 57) argues that the available definitions of what constitutes political 
participation are both ‘period sensitive’ and ‘beholder sensitive’. In other words, they depend 
on when they were devised and by whom. Moreover, the often subjective binary 
categorisations in the available academic typology of political participation, such as for example 
conventional/unconventional or traditional/untraditional, although convenient for academic 
research,  may lead to simplistic or imprecise analyses of the subject.  
Furthermore, the continuous creative and imaginative expansion of the repertoire of 
political participation of young people, influenced by a series of factors like the advent of digital 
technologies (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012), globalisation (Sloam and Henn, 2018), 
postmaterialist values (Henn et al., 2017) or disillusionment from institutional politics (Hay, 
2007; Henn et al., 2005) makes the study of political participation based on anachronistic 
definitions almost impossible. For this reason, new typologies are constantly emerging in an 
attempt to capture these creative expressions of youth political participation, such as a new 
taxonomy of political participation proposed by Theocharis and van Deth (2018), or the concept 
of ‘Heteropolitics’, proposed by Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis (2018).  
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Recent research (Sloam and Henn, 2018) points to the direction that despite the 
portrayal of young people as inherently disinterested or even apathetic (Eliasoph, 1998; Galais, 
2012; Putnam, 1995; Quaranta, 2016), they have recently become increasingly active and 
engaged in both electoral politics (Cammaerts et al., 2014; Sloam and Henn, 2018) as well as in 
lifestyle forms of non-electoral participation (Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis, 2018; Pickard, 2019c). 
Young people’s political participation is therefore not only increasing, but also diversifying. 
The present chapter therefore, will seek to problematise the issue of the definitions in 
the study of the political participation of young people. Given the varying conceptualisation of 
‘young people’, coupled with the variety of electoral and non-electoral repertoires of political 
participation, it is unrealistic to anticipate an exhaustive coverage of the research published on 
the subject. For the scope of this thesis however, this chapter will firstly focus on a) defining 
whom we mean by young people. It will then b) argue that the available definitions of political 
participation are often subject to the historical period of their emergence and by whom they 
were developed. It will subsequently proceed with c) the coverage of the most common 
conceptualisations and definitions of political participation, and it will d) introduce more 
contemporary conceptualisations of political participation, in the form of life politics, 
subpolitics and lifestyle politics. These concepts will form the basis of the conceptualisation of 
political consumerism as a form of political participation. The next section will e) advocate for 
a working definition of political participation which will be used throughout this thesis. Finally, 
the chapter will f) conclude by introducing political consumerism as a form of political 
participation which falls within this purposely wide definition. 
 
 
2. Who are the ‘young people’ in contemporary Political Participation research? 
 
For Brunet and Pizzi (2013), the existing conceptualisations of ‘youth’ as a sociological category 
may be summarised as follows. Firstly, the essentialist standpoint implies that ‘young people’ 
constitute a homogeneous demographic collective, with identical backgrounds, life-stories, 
values or political behaviour. However, Bourdieu (1980), contests this essentialist view, 
asserting instead that ‘youth’ is – and has always been - an evolving concept; layers upon layers 
of values which echo the often contradictory moral, social and political concerns of their 
respective times. 
The functionalist perspective instead, understands the concept in relation to one’s life-
cycle. Functionalism pertains that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are being defined 
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exclusively by their functionality; that is their causal relations with other mental states, 
behavioural outputs and external conditions. On these grounds, the biographical standpoint 
rose in prominence amidst the economic crisis of the 1970s and the resulting backwardness of 
stable employment prospects, which to some extent redefined who could be considered as 
young. This perspective is being emphasised under the ‘markers of adulthood theory’ 
(Shanahan, 2000), which examines the active struggles of young people to shape their 
biographies, given the socially structured limitations and opportunities that define their 
pathways into adulthood. Likewise, ‘transitions theory’ (Furlong, 2013; Heinz, 2009) suggests 
that this extended period of precarity and dependency for many contemporary young people, 
whereby they generally spend an increasingly longer time in education, and are entering stable 
employment much later in life than their predecessors, will also define their attitudes towards 
certain policies that may be perceived as responsible for their condition. For instance, the 
expansion of neoliberal policies has been considered responsible for an increasing rejection of 
electoral politics in the UK (Hart and Henn, 2017) or the rise of alternative forms of participatory 
practices in Greece (Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis, 2018) 
Class nominalism instead, proposes class membership as the precondition for 
relationships between objects with different characteristics. For example, just like any two blue 
spheres share the property that they both ‘belong’ in classes inclusive of these properties - that 
of being blue and being spherical - so should any two young citizens belong both in the 
categories of ‘young’ and that of ‘citizens; each defined by a different set of nominal 
characteristics (Quinton, 1957). On these grounds, generational labels such as ‘Generation Z’ 
or ‘Millennials’  are being often used to broadly refer to those young people who were born 
between 1997 and 2012. However, Pickard (2019e, p. 28) rightfully advises that the use of 
generational labels in academic research is inherently problematic. Firstly, the precise years of 
birth for these generational cohorts are rather vague and imprecise and this lends to the 
unscientific nature of these monikers. Furthermore, the essentialist connotations behind their 
use, imply the existence of a clearly demarcated set of attributes and outlooks that the 
members of each cohort share with each other.  
Nevertheless, generational categories have been used in Political Sciences to designate 
cohorts which have been socialised in a particular point in history and/or who may display 
similar social and political traits. Mannheim (1998) has used his concept of ‘generational units’ 
to examine political behaviour, referring however to a set of idiosyncratic social and political 
traits of young people, as a result of the distinctive social, political and economic characteristics 
prevalent at the time of their socialisation. In this respect, generational cohorts such as the 
‘Thatcher Generation’ can be used in a meaningful way to denote the effects of a certain set of 
economic and social policies, such as those introduced by successive UK Governments in the 
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1980s (Gewirtz et al., 1992). Instead of attributing an essentialist set of characteristics intrinsic 
to these cohorts, the term is being used to signify a set of socioeconomic conditions which were 
imposed on them, like for example economic inequality, precariousness, or austerity.  
Similar conditions were arguably the ones enforced on the young people born from 
1990-2001 in both the UK and Greece, coupled with an intensified social and political 
polarisation, during the Grexit referendum in Greece on the 29th June 2015 (Boukala and 
Dimitrakopoulou, 2017) and the Brexit referendum on the 23rd June 2016 (Hobolt, 2016), in 
Britain respectively. In ‘Britain after Brexit: A nation divided’ Ford and Goodwin (2017, p. 17) 
write that “The result of the EU referendum was the latest and most dramatic expression of 
long-term social changes that have been silently reshaping public opinion, political behaviour, 
and party competition in Britain and Western democracies”. Similarly, Galbraith, in his essay 
‘Grexit, Brexit, Fixit: The dynamics of division in the age of Trump’ (2017) discusses the drift 
towards European dissolution, in the wake of the Athens Spring in 2011 and its subsequent 
repression in Greece, all the way to the Brexit referendum in the summer of 2016; within a 
political context  of social and attitudinal shifts that made the rise of the right-wing, populist 
UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the extreme-right political construct of Golden Dawn in 
Greece, possible. They  both discern “a certain dynamics of division” (Galbraith, 2017, p. 381), 
which apply in both of the populist-induced polarisations of the Brexit, and the Grexit 
referendum before it. 
In such contexts therefore, generational labels can be used in a meaningful way to 
denote a set of social and economic conditions prevalent during one’s socialisation. Similar 
categorisations have been previously used effectively to measure a process of materialist to 
postmaterialist generational displacement (Inglehart, 1977, 1997), or as a way to understand a 
given generation’s drivers of political participation (Grasso, 2018; 2016; 2014)1.  
  
a. Age brackets and thresholds 
Age, just like gender, serves as one of the primary bases on which people classify one another. 
It thus serves as a perceptual indicator of skills, abilities, competences, experience and even 
health status. The lack of clarity of the generational labels discussed above, makes the analysis 
of the political participation of young people particularly difficult. An even further complication 
 
1 Throughout this thesis, the terms ‘Brexit Generation’ and the ‘Grexit Generation’ will thus be 
used to signify a set of economic and political conditions imposed on these generations, 
including but not limited to austerity, employment precariousness, political polarisation and 
neoliberal cuts in both countries.  
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arises from the fact that there is not a consensus on a fixed age bracket, neither any established 
legislative boundaries defining ‘young people’.  
The first complication stems from the assumption that all the young people within a 
certain age bracket may be treated as a homogeneous group, with analogous views and 
political behaviour. It is through such use of generational age brackets that the essentialist 
standpoint is being reproduced. Intragroup heterogeneity is therefore often overlooked, since 
for example, not all 18-24 years-old voted for Britain to remain in the European Union in 2016, 
nor all 18-24 years-old voted for SYRIZA in the Greek Parliamentary Elections in 2015.  
Secondly, it is also easy to overlook that these age brackets include young people from 
broad socio-economic and cultural contexts. Likewise, gender, and social class are also often 
ignored, in favour of an inclusive categorisation of young people. For example, in the 2017 UK 
General Election it was particularly young females of semi-skilled and unskilled manual 
occupations and those unemployed, who broadly voted for Labour, and not young people in 
general as it was often reported. Yet the discussion over the ‘Youthquake’ that followed the 
2017 General Election, overshadowed these specific findings (Sloam, 2017).   
Finally, the use of age brackets implies that the transition from one age category to the 
next one happens overnight, and the use of age brackets can therefore seem arbitrary and 
unscientific. According to Statista Market Forecast (2020), population by age in Greece for the 
15-24 years-old group amounts to 10.1% of the overall population and 10.8% for the 25-34 age 
bracket. The same figures for the UK are 11.4 % for the 15-24 years-old, and 13.5% of the 25-
34 age bracket, respectively. However, it is arguable that even within the same age category, a 
25 year old person who works in the docks of Piraeus shares little in common with the 34 year 
old single parent from Greece who only recently moved abroad as a result of the precarious 
economic environment; other than that they are both broadly socialised in similar 
socioeconomic and political environments, in the same country, in a given period in time. Their 
individual experiences however, remain unique and the categorisation under the same age 
bracket has little to offer as a signifier of common attitudes, values or political behaviour.  
Moreover, the arbitrariness of the age brackets from one institution to the other adds 
to the comparability issues in the study of political participation. As mentioned above, Statista 
Market Forecast makes use of the 15-24 and 25-34 age brackets. In contrast, the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) uses 5-year divisions (15-19, 20-24, 25-29), whereas the British 
Election Study (BES) uses the 18-25 and 26-35 age brackets. The polling agencies Ipsos MORI 
and SKY Data in turn, use the 18-24 and 25-34 age brackets, whereas YouGov distinguishes 
between the 18-19 age bracket and continues with a 10-year sequence (18-19, 20-29, 30-39) 
(Pickard, 2019e, p. 47).  
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With regards to the different membership criteria for the youth wings of different 
political  parties in the UK, Mycock and Tonge (2012) explain that these may range from an 
upper limit of 26 years for the Young Labour and Liberal Youth, to an upper limit of 35 years for 
UKIP. But such arbitrariness among the youth wings of certain parties is not exclusive in the UK. 
For example, in Greece different parties have established different age criteria for their youth 
wings. According to the founding statute of Young SYRIZA (Νέοι–Νέες ΣΥΡΙΖΑ), any young 
person from 14 to 32 years of age may become a member (Νεολαία ΣΥΡΙΖΑ, 2014); whereas 
the youth wing ‘ΟΝΝΕΔ’ of the right-wing New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία) expands the age 
bracket by one year (13-32). Complicating the conceptualisation of young people even further, 
the official site of the far-right extremist group Golden Dawn2 (Χρυσή Αυγή) describes young 
people as those who are young “not only in terms of age, but also in disposition”. 
The cultural subjectivity of the term ‘young people’, complicates the issue of defining 
young people with a single, clear-cut age bracket even further. The latest round of the European 
Social Survey (ESS) (European Social Survey, 2018) includes the question “At what age do you 
think people generally stop being described as young?”.  
 
 Figure 2: Age people stop being described as young (European Social Survey, 2018, N = 1,133). 
The ESS Online tool reveals that 81.6% of the respondents in Greece said that “It 
depends on the person”, as opposed to only 10.8% in the UK. Over a quarter (27.9%) of the UK 
respondents suggested people should stop being considered as young at the ages 18, 19, 20, 
and 21, with only 19% stating the same in Greece. Instead, most of the responses in the UK 
suggested the age of 30 as the cut-off point for ‘youth’ with 61.3% of the responses, as opposed 
to only 14.2% in the case of Greece. It seems therefore that not only is there no fixed threshold 
 
2 http://www.xrisiavgi.com/en/ 
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according to which people stop being considered as ‘young’, but this also varies widely from 
country to country and from one cultural context to the next one. In the case of Greece, it 
seems that the age at which people stop being described as young is much more subjective 
than in the UK, where instead, the concept of “youth” seems to have a wider definition. 
Despite the problems described above, social sciences rely heavily on age brackets as a 
convenient method to empirically quantify age-based patterns of political participation, to then 
be able to analyse them statistically. However, this is the case predominately when it comes to 
electoral participation. The wide availability of data on electoral rounds in the majority of 
western democracies, which are then easily subdivided according to age brackets, render the 
study of electoral political participation much more easily quantifiable, and may thus explain 
the tendency within Political Science to focus on voting and turnout in elections or referendums 
as representative indicators of young people’s political engagement.  
Instead, although available data on other forms of political participation, such as 
political consumerism, may also appear on many prominent, large-scale quantitative social 
surveys such as the ESS or the WVS, these are not always consistent between different rounds 
of the same survey, or from one survey to the next one. For example, the question about 
buycotts in the ESS featured only in the 2002 round; but it was dropped thereafter, keeping 
only the one about boycotts. Likewise, although the UK features prominently in all of the 
rounds of ESS from 2002 to 2016, this is not the case for Greece, which did not take part in the 
rounds after 2010. Such omissions and inconsistencies are making large-scale comparative 
studies on political consumerism, particularly difficult3.  
 
b. Working definition of ‘young people’ 
The previous section has addressed the importance of definitions in the study of the political 
participation of young people. As there is no widely accepted definition of the term ‘young’, 
several researches on the topic will either succumb to generational labels, like the ‘Millennials’ 
or ‘Generation Z’, or will treat young people as an age bracket within their respective research 
designs. The use of generational categories, although widely used in popular media and 
everyday conversations, lack both scientific precision and theoretical grounding. Instead, 
 
3 Moreover, the difficulty with which political scientists draw their primary data, especially with 
regards to lifestyle forms of political participation, means that a big part of work on the subject 
is often based on unrepresentative samples, which are however subsequently presented as 
‘scientific facts’. Pickard (2019d) discusses the claims of Prosser et all. that their findings from 
the British election study 2017 were “as close to the truth about who turned out to vote as is 
possible to get” (2018, p. 2), despite the use of a relatively small sample size of face-to-face 
interviews.  
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although the use of age brackets to denote young people may be equally arbitrary (and often 
inconsistent across countries and institutions), it allows for direct comparisons between certain 
age-cohorts across countries. For the study of political consumerism among young people in 
the UK and in Greece, it is thus preferable to use consistent age boundaries that are clearly 
defined.  
For this reason, throughout the present thesis, following the suggestion of Pickard 
(2019e) I will abstain from the use of generational labels, in favour of the consistent use of the 
more neutral term ‘young people’. The term will be commonly employed to refer to the young 
(18 to 29 years of age) respondents of my survey questionnaire and the focus groups in both 
the UK and Greece, unless where it will specifically refer to a set of socioeconomic conditions 
imposed on the young people at the time of their socialisation, in the two countries under 
consideration. In this latter case, the terms ‘Brexit Generation’ and ‘Grexit Generation’ will be 
cautiously employed to signify an inclusive categorisation of the young people who were 
around the age of 18 at the time the referendums took place in the respective countries, and 
who were subjected to a set of conditions such as precarious life prospects, neoliberal cuts, 
austerity and most importantly an environment of political polarisation. 
Having therefore already defined whom exactly we mean with the term ‘young people’, 
the sections that follow will proceed to conceptualise what we mean by ‘political participation’. 
The following sections will thus provide a purposely wide definition of the concept, so as to 
encompass its lifestyle variants, such as political consumerism. 
 
3. Problems in defining political participation. 
 
Within the disciplines of political and social sciences a plethora of definitions have been 
proposed which seek to capture and accommodate the changing political participation patterns 
of young people at any given time. Pickard (2019a) argues that these are bound to be both 
period and beholder sensitive. With regards to the former, the way political participation is 
being defined is contingent on the prevailing social, economic, political as well as technological 
contexts of their time. The expansion of educational attainment (Henn and Foard, 2014), 
globalisation (Sloam and Henn, 2018), neoliberal policies (Allsop et al., 2018), postmaterialist 
value orientations (Henn et al., 2017), technological progress (Gotlieb and Cheema, 2017) or 
trust in politicians and the electoral establishment (Henn and Foard, 2012), have all been widely 
examined as motivating factors behind the changing patterns of the political participation of 
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young people. As the repertoire of political action is expanding however, so should our 
definitions of what constitutes political participation.  
Definitions are also beholder sensitive, depending on who is formulating them. 
Different scholarly traditions will often conceptualise political participation in their own terms 
(Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis, 2018. However, these are not always consistent with the 
definitions of the politicians, which are often dependent on the objective circumstances but 
also on their subjective political orientations (Lamprianou, 2013). Moreover, neither the 
academic conceptualisations, nor the ones of the politicians necessarily coincide with the 
conceptualisations of the young citizens themselves (Pontes et al., 2018; Sant, 2014). For 
example, the differing and often contradicting conceptualisation of the recent Black Lives 
Matter mobilisations, in Minnesota but also around the globe, are characteristic of these 
developments. The Republican US president Donald Trump, tweeted that these were merely 
an act of “thuggery” (CBS News, 2020), whereas the democratic leader Joe Biden portrayed the 
mobilisations in response to George Floyd’s death “just the latest in a series of injustices 
stemming from racism against black people” (Mangan, 2020), and called for institutional 
reforms in the police forces. However, none of these standpoints may fully capture the 
motivations and value priorities of each individual protestor. 
Pickard (2019a) posits in the words of Schwartz (1984, p. 1118) that “whether 
something counts as being political participation depends on our point of view, our 
interpretation, our conceptual template […]. Participation is subjective contingent on the 
conceptual lens of the observer”.  As a result, the study of political participation will reflect the 
historical conditions of their time, in conjunction with the conceptual framework of the 
researcher. In turn, the selection of the working definition of each study will influence the 
collection, operationalisation and interpretation of the respective findings. 
According to Brady (1999, p. 739) virtually all available definitions of political 
participation comprise of four basic  and interconnected elements: a) activities or actions, b) 
intended to influence a desired outcome, c) by ordinary citizens, and/or d) by politicians, 
government personnel, or decision-makers. The first element a) is often referred to as the 
praxial4 element of political participation, whereas b) is being referred to as the teleological5 
element. According to these two elements therefore, political participation comprises of 
‘actions for desired change’. In turn, the third element (‘by ordinary citizens’) points towards 
the legitimising component of popular engagement in western liberal representational 
democracies. These three components therefore epitomise - in the famous words of Abraham 
 
4 Deriving from the Greek word ‘praxis’ meaning ‘action’. 
5 Deriving from the Greek word ‘telos’ meaning ‘goal’ or ‘outcome’. 
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Lincoln in the Gettysburg Address - the necessary requirements of democratic 
governance:  “…government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from 
the earth” (Oppenheimer and Edwards, 2012, p. 232) 
The fourth component however (that political participation should also involve 
politicians and decision-makers) is more problematic to capture objectively. For example, both 
the UK and Greece have recently witnessed a series of riots of young people in London and all 
around the UK in August 2011 (Lightowlers, 2015) and the Athens Spring riots earlier that same 
year (Lyrintzis, 2011). Should one classify these riots as a form of political participation? After 
all, they adhered to the first three components of Brady’s conceptualisations of political 
participation, insofar they involved a) actions, b) by ordinary people, in order c) to bring about 
desired change. Although the Labour Party condemned the acts of violence across Britain, it 
recognised that there was an “inconvenient truth” in the form of a message passed by the 
rioters, which should be addressed by politicians (Lamprianou, 2013, p. 23). As a result, the 
riots were perceived by the Labour Party as actions (albeit admittedly unlawful) by ordinary 
citizens charged with a discernible political message. In other words, the praxis of the riots was 
an unlawful, but symbolically effective political way of expressing the ordinary citizens’ 
demands for change. On the other hand however, the UK Prime Minister at the time, David 
Cameron, on the 15 of August 2011 in Oxfordshire, dismissed the London riots as acts of “pure 
criminality” (Lamprianou, 2013, p. 23), on the grounds that they were not involving the 
mainstream political sphere; in essence, their telos was not achieved through a narrow set of 
‘prespecified’ and ‘lawful’ praxis, in order for it to be considered political as conventionally 
defined. Such a narrow interpretation however, would exclude even the French Revolution as 
the par-excellence symbolic manifestation of popular political participation, since the activities 
involved were ‘unlawful’ and not ‘political’ insofar they did not involve the powerful elites of 
the time.  
Hay (2007, p. 23) upholds that scholars “with the most restrictive and conventional 
conceptions of political participation identify a strong and consistent pattern of declining 
political participation and engagement over time, whilst those with a more inclusive conception 
discern instead a change in the mode of participation”. A working definition of what is ‘political’ 
in political participation therefore remains essential before moving on to conceptualise political 
consumerism as such. The section that follows will provide an overview of the evolving and 
widening definitions of political participation, and will make the case for a deliberately wide 
working definition which will be able to accommodate such citizen-led actions as political 
consumerism. 
 
32 | P a g e  
 
4. The evolving and widening definitions of political participation. 
 
In – maybe - the most commonly cited starting point in the study of defining political 
participation, Almond and Verba (1963) found that the political culture of a nation influences 
the political behaviour of the individuals who are prone to adapt to and follow the prevailing 
participatory norms of that nation. For Almond and Verba (1963) therefore, political 
participation refers to the actions of regular citizens, either individually or collectively, whereby 
these actions target the government, either through elections or non-electoral means (Fox, 
2014, p. 498). 
In an almost contemporaneous study on political participation in the US, Milbrath  
(1965) discerned a cumulative effect of political participation, as any citizen will become 
increasingly engaged in more, but also in more intensive political activities. Consequently, for 
Milbrath there exists a hierarchy of political participation, with more and progressively more 
intensive forms of participation added to the previous ones. As a result, for Milbrath (1965, pp. 
16-22), people may be categorised in different types according to the degree of their 
engagement, namely the ‘apathetic’; the ‘spectators’ and the ‘gladiators’. Moreover, he also 
discerned a ‘life cycle’ effect, according to which people will accumulate knowledge and 
experience over time, peaking their political participation by the time they reach adulthood, 
only to then gradually decrease it as they grow old. Milbrath’s later definition of political 
participation thus (1977, p. 2) was formulated as “those actions of private citizens, by which 
they seek to influence or to support government and politics”, which thus, includes all four 
elements of Brady’s (1999) definitional conceptualisation. 
Subsequent understandings of political participation have since evolved to 
conceptualise it as an even more multi-dimensional phenomenon. In their widely cited work, 
Verba and Nie (1987, p. 2) defined political participation as “those activities by private citizens 
that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel 
and/or the actions they take”. Their definition places emphasis on a) the praxial component, b) 
by ordinary people with c) teleological objectives, d) addressed towards government 
personnel. However, their conception of what is deemed as political was particularly restrictive, 
as they included four non-hierarchical modes: a) voting, b) campaigning for political parties, c) 
partaking in communal activities, and d) contacting decision makers, such as elected 
representatives and officials. It is noteworthy that all these four modes involve an interaction 
with the state in a conforming and lawful way. Almost two decades later, Verba et al. (1995, p. 
42) utilised an equally restrictive definition, according to which political participation “affords 
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citizens in a democracy an opportunity to communicate information to government officials 
about their concerns and preferences and to put pressure on them to respond”.  
The momentous surge of youth-led political protests across several western 
democracies in the 1960s and early 1970s led Barnes and Kaase et al. (1979, p. 42) to employ a 
significantly wider definition which could reflect the societal changes of their time. Their 
definition therefore involved “all voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to influence 
either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system”. Under this 
working definition they proceeded to analyse the differences and similarities of the political 
participation of young people and their parents. For their analysis, they further subdivided 
political participation into two categories, conventional and unconventional. The former 
comprised of voting in elections and other activities directly linked to elections, campaigning 
and political parties (such as working or volunteering for a party or a candidate; being part of a 
trade union; contacting officials in public bodies), to more nuanced participatory activities such 
as reading about, or discussing politics with others. In a similar vein, unconventional forms of 
political participation involved actions intended to contest and influence political decision-
makers and elites (Barnes et al., 1979). Such actions included among others signing a petition, 
taking part in protests, marches, sit-ins or demonstrations, involvement in new social 
movements, as well as even more non-conventional activities, like refusing to pay taxes or 
rents, occupying buildings, blocking the traffic, to damaging property. Prominent among their 
list of non-conventional political participation methods stood the engagement in boycotts. The 
conceptualisation of non-conventional political participation by Barnes and Kaase et al. (1979) 
therefore, sought to encapsulate instances of civil disobedience, including political violence and 
market-oriented forms of dissent, such as boycotts, which they found were particularly 
widespread among the young.  
The widening of the definitions of political participation continued to evolve as a 
response to the similarly evolving forms of political participation. For example, Conge (1988) 
supported an even more comprehensive definition. He thus, initially proposed the following: 
“political participation is any kind of action (or inaction) of an individual or a group of individuals 
that intentionally or unintentionally oppose, support, or change any or some characteristics of 
a government or a community” (Conge, 1988, p. 246). Responding to the criticisms that such a 
definition was “so broad as to be virtually meaningless and incapable of any concrete 
application” (1988, p. 246) he subsequently eliminated all the passive and inactive forms, such 
as attitudes, sentiments, intentions and political awareness. However, he insisted that if any 
activity is not oriented towards local or national state structures, authorities and decision-
makers regarding the allocation of public goods, then it cannot be considered as political 
participation. 
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In turn, Inglehart (1990, p. 335), in response to the political developments of his time, 
attempted to position political participation in the context of the plethora of new social 
movements that emerged after the 1960s, which were perceived to deviate significantly from 
the conventional political participation paradigm. He hypothesised firstly, that the rise of the 
post-industrial economy has caused the emergence of new forms of political participation and 
secondly, that these were significantly different from the prevalent forms under the industrial 
economic structure. Their primary difference laid in their teleological goals, as these new forms 
of participation focused not on issues of materialistic concern (such as economic wellbeing), 
but more on – what he termed - postmaterialist issues related to human rights, such as LGBTQ 
rights or pacifism. In parallel to his teleological distinction from materialist to postmaterialist 
goals (see Chapter 3), he also formulated the terms ‘elite-directed activities’ and ‘elite-directing 
activities’. The former include activities like voting, party-membership and running for office. 
The latter instead, include the participation of people in new social movements, demonstrating, 
signing petitions, occupying public spaces, and finally boycotting. For Inglehart, due to the 
increase in postmaterialist value orientations, western democracies have become progressively 
more likely to engage in elite-challenging forms of political activities, particularly among the 
younger people. It follows therefore, that if these forms of political participation cannot be 
encompassed by the working definitions of contemporary political participation then our 
accounts of the political participation of the younger people will be particularly erroneous 
(Pickard, 2019a, p. 67).  
Of particular interest to the present thesis on political consumerism as a form of political 
participation, is the work of Pattie et al. (2004) on citizenship, due to their conceptualisation of 
political participation as inclusive of ‘micro-politics’ and ‘consumer-citizenship’ (2004, p. 267). 
They posit that the conservative neoliberal agenda of former UK Prime Ministers Margaret 
Thatcher and John Major between 1979 and 1997 endorsed the notion of ‘active citizenship’. 
Empowered by the rolling back of the state and the progressive marketisation of society in all 
its facets, evidenced by the wide-scale privatisation reforms that followed, it has encouraged 
ordinary citizens to assume greater individual and collective responsibility with regards to 
issues previously understood as responsibilities of the state. 
However, conceptualising consumer citizenship posits the challenge of distinguishing 
between the individual as a citizen of a state and as a consumer-citizen. For Kneip (2010) these 
two roles will inevitably overlap, as she exemplifies with regard to citizens’ rights. For example, 
the right to product-related information can be conceived as both a right of the consumer and 
of the citizen of a state. Moreover, the dual role of the citizen-consumer becomes particularly 
apparent in the case of economic-political regulations. In order to influence those regulations, 
the citizen-consumer may resort either to traditional repertoires of the citizen (voting for a 
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specific party, for example) or to consumer-oriented repertoires (for example, engaging in 
boycotts of products and/or services).  
Consumer citizenship therefore, places emphasis on citizens’ duties. These in turn, are 
predominately framed in terms of responsibility: ‘The ethic of responsibility is geared […] to the 
consumer who is urged to buy socially conscious goods’ (Baxter, 2003, p. 13). When outlining 
the duties of a consumer-citizen, literature on consumer citizenship focuses on those 
responsibilities stemming from consumption decisions. Thus, responsibility is traced back to 
the assumption that choosing certain products bears societal relevance and it reinforces the 
structural background of these products, for example in terms of ecological consequences of 
production or consumption or labour conditions (Gabriel and Lang, 2015; Micheletti, 2003). The 
debate on consumer citizenship, which has resulted in an even wider repertoire of micro-
political actions and a consumer-oriented understanding of citizenship, has therefore resulted 
in the need of an even wider definition of political participation.  
Political actions therefore, can now be defined as those actions by ordinary citizens 
which aim to influence state or non-state actors (such as corporations) to change their 
economic and social practices (Micheletti, 2003). Attempting to change social practices, by 
influencing state and non-state actors through consumption, politicises the actor even further, 
following Milbrath’s (1965) rationale discussed above. The consumer thus, becomes 
progressively the bearer of political responsibility, not only within the economic, but also within 
the social and political arenas. Among these new forms of consumer oriented participation that 
have recently attracted reinvigorated scholarly attention, are those that involve the 
politicisation of consumer choices (such as political consumerism) which are addressed not only 
towards the traditional political sphere, but also towards the wider social context by influencing 
the systematic patterns of social behaviour (Copeland, 2014a; Koos et al., 2016; Micheletti and 
Stolle, 2010).  
The revival of neo-Tocquevillian thought (Lane and Ersson, 1999) in social sciences 
during the 1990s, and the corresponding communitarian emphasis that it inspired, underlined 
the need for an even wider definition. As a critic of individualism, Tocqueville believed that 
through associations, that is the coming together of people for common goals, Americans in 
the 19th century were able to overcome their individualistic desires, creating thus both a self-
conscious and active political society and a vibrant civil society, functioning in unison and 
complimenting each other. In that respect, the individualistic consumption patterns of 
vegetarians for example, may indeed be interpreted as a political consumerist form of political 
participation insofar they are intended towards influencing national and international policies 
with regards to the production processes of meat and dairy products. However, they may also 
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be addressed (at least initially) as a form of civic engagement intended towards altering the 
systematic consumption patterns of what is deemed as ‘accepted’ social behaviour; attempting 
to influence not the government directly, but the behaviour of other citizens, so as to reach a 
critical mass which in turn will exert further influence on the state to alter its policies 
accordingly. 
A further widening of the conceptual area of political participation was thus offered by 
Norris (2002, p. 16), who asserts  that activities “…which attempt to alter systematic patterns 
of social behaviour” can be valid examples of political participation, in addition to the activities 
dealing with government and institutional politics. The definition suggested by Norris 
therefore, moves away from the teleological emphasis of previous definitions in relation 
primarily to electoral processes (Milbrath and Goel, 1977), influencing elected representatives 
and officials (Verba et al., 1995), local or national state structures and authorities (Conge, 1988), 
or democratic ‘elites’ (Inglehart, 1990). Instead, Norris (2002) places emphasis on the 
teleological influence of patterns of social behaviour. As a result this latter definition 
encapsulates all those individual acts which aim to alter collective social behaviour, as for 
instance vegetarianism or veganism.  
As a consequence of the expansion of the definitions of political participation from the 
strictly political sphere towards the social context of the polity, the term ‘political participation’ 
has been often used interchangeably with the term ‘civic engagement’ (van Deth, 2014). 
Macedo et al (2005, p. 16) clarify that they do not draw a sharp distinction between ‘civic 
engagement’ and ‘political participation’ since they recognize the interconnectedness between 
civil society and the mainstream political sphere.  In a similar vein, Zukin et al (2006, p. 52) 
highlight the broad repertoire of engagement among young people in the US, given which 
“…the boundaries between political participation and civic engagement are not clear ones”. 
Their definition of ‘civic engagement’ highlights the arbitrariness of a clear distinction between 
the two. Although with regards to political participation they follow the definition of Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady (1995) as any “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing 
government action” (Zukin et al., 2006, p. 6); civic engagement instead is being defined as  
“organised voluntary activity focused on problem solving and helping others, a definition that 
obviously encompasses a vast range of settings, goals, and behaviours” (Zukin et al., 2006, p. 
61).  
Despite the alleged interconnectedness of the terms political participation and civic 
engagement, two elements seem to be emerging from this discussion: Firstly, the term ‘civic 
engagement’  is being used primarily in relation to the associations between the individuals of 
any given society, as opposed towards addressing elected officials, elites and the state as 
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political actors. Secondly, and as a result of the above, the term civic engagement has a wider, 
communitarian and social connotation, than the more individualistic and state-oriented term 
‘political participation’. Throughout this thesis therefore, the term ‘civic engagement’ will be 
used to denote any ‘…activity, individual or collective, devoted to influencing the collective life 
of the polity’ (Macedo et al., 2005, p. 6).  
 
5. Subpolitics, Life politics, and Lifestyle politics 
 
The definitional widening of political participation discussed in the previous section reflects the 
complexity of political actions in a changing world (see Chapter 4). A variety of terms has been 
used to encompass the increasing complexity of contemporary political actions. Giddens’ 
(1991) ‘life-politics’, and Beck’s (1992) ‘subpolitics’, have been proposed among others, both of 
which are often captured by the more general term ‘lifestyle politics’ (De Moor, 2017). Lifestyle 
politics thus consists of the politicisation of everyday life and includes ethical, moral and 
political decisions about a variety of subjects which pertain to everyday-life decisions and 
attempts to influence political outcomes (Bennet, 1998; Giddens, 1991; Micheletti, 2003). 
Lifestyle politics “…depart from a realisation that one’s everyday decisions have global 
implications, and that global considerations should therefore affect lifestyle choices” (De Moor, 
2017, p. 4).  
Against the academic viewpoint that political participation is in decline (Putnam, 1995), 
Ulrich Beck (1992, 2002, 2018) contests that such a perspective  is  predicated  upon  a  
misapprehension  of  the current  political and social  environment in late modernity (Holzer 
and Sørensen, 2001). Instead, Beck claims that the observation that interest in institutional 
politics appears to wane in many liberal democracies should not be understood as an indication 
of political disengagement, since as he posits, focussing  on  the traditional arenas and forms 
of politics alone would be looking for politics in the wrong places (Beck et al., 2003). Therefore, 
instead of understanding politics in terms of parliamentary debates or elections, he advises we 
should be looking  for  politics hiding in  alternative political  arenas, as  for  example  in  the 
everyday actions and choices of people and in the spontaneous and often informal expressions 
of the ‘political’, whether collectively (as for example in social  movements), or more privately 
(as in political consumerism). To denote these new ways of doing politics and to distinguish 
them from the traditional ones, he coined the term ‘subpolitics’, which he associates primarily 
with ecological concerns. He thus posits that: 
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In the world risk society, politics is made in various realms of subpolitics, whether it is 
in the laboratory, at the gas station, or in the supermarket. New types of conflict emerge 
and new coalitions become thinkable. Subpolitics thus questions the status of existing 
systems, calls for a rethinking of the various schemes of classification according to which 
people are accustomed to perceive their organizational environment, and asks for the 
invention of new institutional ways to deal with environmental risk. (Beck, 1997, p. 1) 
Generally speaking, subpolitics refers to small-scale, or even  individual  decisions-
making that “either have a direct political frame of reference or achieve political significance  
by way of their aggregation (…).The prefix ‘sub’ is not to indicate that this form of politics is less 
important than formal politics but that it is less institutionalised” (Holzer and Sørensen, 2001, 
p. 3). It may thus be understood as a way of doing politics outside of the institutional framework 
of the formally defined political system of the state, and it therefore has implications on 
transnational politics across the globe. For Beck therefore, ‘subpolitics’ is  placed beneath the 
nation-state but this does not mean that it is not in a position to influence and even challenge 
it from below, further widening the definitional conceptualisation of politics in late modernity. 
Foreign and domestic policies, or policies related to environmentalism and technology have 
been significantly influenced from grassroots peace, women’s and environmental movements 
and as such their objectives are partially designed from below. Subpolitics therefore for Beck is 
a form of bottom-up politics rather than top-down (Pickard, 2019c, p. 383). This particular 
conceptualisation will be utilised in this thesis to capture young people’s own conceptualisation 
of  politics and its effect on their political consumerism behaviours.  
Giddens’ concept of ‘life politics’ has been often used interchangeably with Beck’s 
concept of subpolitics. However, Giddens introducing the concept of ‘life politics’ further 
expands on Beck’s definition. Although he shares the basic assumptions of Beck’s position, his 
concept of life politics is even more general - and illustrates an unlimited and constantly 
evolving conceptualisation of the ‘political’ that expands in almost every area of contemporary 
life. In  his seminal work ‘Modernity and Self Identity’, Giddens (1991) argues that traditional 
politics are losing prominence and discerns a progressive shift towards what he terms ‘life 
politics’ instead. By ‘traditional politics’ Giddens refers to what he calls ‘emancipatory politics’, 
which have dominated political thought throughout modernity. For Giddens, whether one took 
a radical, liberal or a conservative ideological standpoint with regards to politics, they operated 
within the framework of emancipatory politics. For example, both radical and liberal politics 
have been historically associated with liberating people, and their discourse often revolved 
around class or social groups, whether those were the bourgeoisie, the working class, racial 
minorities or women. On the other hand, all conservative politics should be understood as 
reactions to these attempts at liberating these social groups. In ‘Beyond Left and Right’ (1994), 
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Giddens extends this argument by claiming that the old political cleavage of ‘left’ and ‘right’, 
dating as far back as the French Revolution, is a rather outdated conceptualisation and no 
longer reflects contemporary political reality. Holzer and Sørensen (2001, p. 8) explain that: 
Today the traditional left, the traditional radical political position, is getting more and 
more conservative in trying to hold on to the established welfare state, whereas the 
traditional conservatives, the right, to a large extent have turned in to neo-liberals 
arguing in favour of the free market and thereby contributing to the erosion of tradition. 
The distinction between left and right in politics is therefore no longer helpful.  
Of course, both emancipatory politics, as well as the traditional left/right cleavage, are 
still relevant in contemporary postmodern societies, but the overall political reality can no 
longer be fully captured by these traditional definitions of politics. Instead, Giddens posits that 
contemporary politics is both emancipatory politics and life politics and that life politics is 
getting increasingly important. Consequently, we should start thinking of politics beyond these 
traditional distinctions. One way to so, is to focus more on life politics, as this thesis will be 
doing with regards to one of its expressions, namely political consumerism.  
For Giddens therefore, the ‘political’ within life politics is associated with  the impact 
that our everyday individual (and collective) decisions have on others, the environment and the 
world as a whole. Giddens’ understanding of social change refers therefore to our choice to act 
in different ways than we used to. If enough people change their behaviour accordingly, that is 
if we reach a critical mass, institutional change and change of the structures of society may also 
be attainable. Moreover, as people are progressively faced with more life choices as Beck’s risk 
society thesis asserts, then our institutions and fundamental societal structures are constantly 
changing. This assumption reflects the fluidity of postmodernism and will be further discussed 
in Chapter 4. For now, the major implication of both Beck’s and Gidden’s analysis could be 
summarised in the claim that the choices we make as individuals in our everyday life matter 
politically, since they have the power to “preserve, renew or change” (Holzer and Sørensen, 
2001, p. 9) the structures and institutions of the society as a whole. This is exactly why Giddens 
urges us to place more emphasis on the politics of everyday life. 
Despite the  inexorable significance of Beck’s subpolitics and Gidden’s life politics in the 
study of political consumerism, the present thesis will adopt the more contemporary and even 
more general term ‘lifestyle politics’ as introduced by De Moor (2017), and defined at the 
beginning of this section. Recent developments under postmodernism have augmented the use 
of lifestyle politics especially among young people. Indeed, several studies demonstrate that 
lifestyle politics are on the rise (Bartolini, 2011; Fox, 2014). The globalisation of governance that 
follows the postmodern social processes has rendered decision-making at the governmental 
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level a less obvious target of political action. Moreover, the emerging power-shift towards 
international political and economic organisations and multinational corporations (Bartolini, 
2011; Fox, 2014) has resulted in an unprecedented democratic deficit where ordinary citizens 
lack the opportunity to influence decisions (Fox, 2014; Norris, 2011). Lifestyle politics have thus 
become “one of the most emblematic types of political action in the era of late modernity” (De 
Moor, 2017, p. 4) allowing political and social challenges to be addressed at the global level 
directly through the politicisation of individual everyday life-choices (Bennett and Segerberg, 
2012).  
The idea of addressing collective concerns through individual life choices is often 
exemplified in popular proverbs like ‘think global, act local’, or ‘be the change you want to see 
in the world’ (De Moor, 2017, p. 4). For example, environmental lifestyle politics are based on 
the premise that “reversing the degradation of the environment depends upon adopting new 
lifestyle patters (…) [since] the greatest amount of ecological damage derives from the modes 
of life followed in the modernized sectors of world society” (Giddens, 1991, p. 221). Other 
ethical or political considerations are similarly linked to individual lifestyle choices, as for 
example animal welfare or ethical modes of production. In this way, vegetarianism for instance, 
becomes such a lifestyle form of political participation which seeks to address these ethical 
considerations on the global level by altering individual consumer and behavioural practices 
(Balsiger, 2013; Micheletti and Stolle, 2010). What all these practices have in common is that 
they use private life choices in order to influence collective attitudes with respect to public 
matters and causes. According to Micheletti and Stolle (2011), it is this individual and collective 
interplay that renders them political.  
Therefore, the political impact of individual behaviour in an attempt to influence 
collective decisions becomes the foundation of lifestyle political participation. The 
simultaneous coexistence of these two dimensions – the individual and the collective - of 
lifestyle politics reflects on the one hand, the politicisation of individual lifestyle choices and on 
the other, the mobilisation of others into making lifestyle choices with an ethical and political 
compass (see Chapter 4). In other words, on the one hand, it refers to the use of one’s individual 
decisions in their private life towards the “allocation of common values and resources, in other 
words for politics” (Micheletti and Stolle, 2010, p. 126) and on the other, it refers to the 
mobilisation element of lifestyle politics of several groups which “consciously and actively 
promote a lifestyle (…) as their primary means to foster social change” (Haenfler et al., 2012, p. 
2).  
However, since the politicisation of everyday life may pertain to practically every field 
of one’s life, almost every activity may fit within the definition of lifestyle participation, risking 
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that it may evolve into a ‘theory of everything’ (van Deth, 2014).  Micheletti and Stolle (2011) 
claim that what distinguishes lifestyle politics from any other generic lifestyle choices, is that 
the former are ‘other-regarding’ and take into consideration the organisation of society at 
large; whereas the latter are prompted by ‘self-regarding’ motives, like one’s personal health.  
Although a comprehensive taxonomy of lifestyle political action is yet to be found in 
available literature, van Deth’s (2014) ‘Conceptual map of political participation’ and De Moor’s 
(2017) ‘Lifestyle politics and the concept of political participation’ are questioning which 
activities should fall under this classification. Lifestyle political participation is therefore defined 
as those activities which “are often enacted throughout different private, public and 
institutional arenas, and that they are often targeted at various social, economic and political 
actors at once” (De Moor, 2017, p. 1)6.  
In face of the continuous emergence of alternative, more intuitive, creative and lifestyle 
forms of participation, the election-focused definitions of political participation constitute an 
anachronistic conceptualisation of the phenomenon and fail to capture the changing patterns 
of what is being perceived as political. It is thus important for the present research to 
conceptualise political participation through an intentionally wide definition, which will be able 
to capture a constantly widening conceptual map of political participation. Moreover, a shift of 
interest from electoral participation to lifestyle forms of political participation, will also 
significantly enhance the relevance of the present research to young people’s own 
understanding of the phenomenon. Flanagan (2013, p. 2) posits that “politics is about more 
than party affiliation and elections. Politics concerns membership in communities and the 
 
6 For instance, De Moor (2017, p. 1) discusses the case of a Critical Mass Movement (CMM) 
local action in Budapest, as a prime example of lifestyle political participation. The CMM is a 
worldwide grassroots movement committed to better bicycling infrastructures. Their actions 
often revolve around mobilising large groups of cyclists (hence their name) who occupy a city’s 
streets, thereby claiming attention to their cause. In 2008, about 80.000 cyclists occupied the 
streets of Budapest, in what was heralded as the largest action ever conducted under the 
Critical Mass Movement (CMM). The CMM’s activists’ primary demand focused on a more 
bicycle-friendly infrastructure in the city (Furness, 2010). CMM’s motivations were clearly 
environmental ones: they strived to encourage green modes of transportation (in this case 
cycling), and to promote more environmentally friendly lifestyles. However, since the urban 
infrastructure presented a crucial impediment to such modes of transportation, CMM activists 
demanded from their governments to modify cities’ infrastructure with the aim of supporting 
those environmentally conscious lifestyle choices. The CMM thus, may be considered as an 
interesting example of the emerging political repertoires that interact throughout multiple 
private and public arenas, integrating several political action forms by on the one hand drawing 
on traditional, state-oriented forms of political participation, as well as emerging forms of 
‘lifestyle politics’.  
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process and practices whereby we work with fellow members of those communities to 
determine the kind of communities, society and the world we want to live in”.  
In that respect therefore the working definition of political participation throughout the 
present thesis will be a deliberately wide one, as proposed by Pickard: 
Political participation encompasses both individual and collective shared values and 
actions (both online and offline) in public and in private, which deliberately seek to 
maintain or bring about change to political, societal or environmental contexts within a 
community, locally, nationally and globally (2019a, p. 61). 
The section that follows therefore, will discuss how political consumerism fits within 
this expanded definition of political participation, recognising it thus, as a lifestyle form of 
political participation. 
 
6. Recognising political consumerism as political participation. 
 
Despite their inherent differences, the terms ‘ethical shopping’, ‘ethical purchase behaviour’, 
‘ethical consumption’, ‘political consumption’, and ‘political consumerism’ among others, have 
often been used interchangeably. Civic values such as citizens' rights, equity, ethics, 
sustainability and social responsibility are being associated with consumerism, pointing to the 
eventual collapse of the dividing lines between the previously exclusive notions of ‘citizenship’ 
and ‘consumerism’ (Gabriel and Lang, 2015; Hirschman, 2013). Consequently, a recent strand 
of political sociology has increasingly identified the consumer as a moral agent, with specific 
consumption patterns intended as a means to a political end (Sassatelli, 2006).  
This section will deliver a detailed conceptualisation of political consumerism as the 
basis on which the following chapters will expand. It will inquire when consumer behaviour may 
be deemed as political, and it will reflect upon its positioning amongst different forms of 
political participation. Importantly, it will adopt an individualist standpoint in the study of 
political participation, as the most appropriate and effective way of capturing the phenomenon 
in a comparative context. 
In their seminal work on the political implications of consumer behaviour ‘Politics, 
Products, and Markets: Exploring Political Consumerism Past and Present’ edited by Wirt (2017) 
and first published in 2004, Micheletti et al. define political consumerism primarily in terms of 
choice. Political consumerism then, stands for the “consumer choice of producers and products 
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with the goal of changing objectionable institutional or market practices” (Wirt, 2017, p. xiv). 
As they explain: 
It is based on attitudes and values regarding issues of justice, fairness, or non-economic 
issues that concern personal and family well-being and ethical or political assessment 
of favourable and unfavourable business and government practice. Regardless of 
whether political consumers act individually or collectively, their market choices reflect 
an understanding of material products as embedded in a complex social and normative 
context which may be called the politics behind products. (Wirt, 2017, pp. xiv–xv) 
For Schossboeck (2012) therefore, “[P]olitical consumerism is one way of rethinking our 
own consumerist behaviour and to influence the public agenda”. Political consumerism thus 
refers to the deliberate choice to buy (or abstain from buying) individually or collectively a 
specific product or service for ethical or political reasons (Micheletti, 2004). Later studies 
(Balsiger, 2013; Stolle and Micheletti, 2013; Zorell, 2019b) describe it as an individualised form 
of collective action and have embedded in their definition also environmental motivations 
(Koos, 2012, p. 37). However, they all clarify that it encompasses mainly two types of action. 
Buycotting, or positive political consumerism (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013; Zorell, 2018) consists 
of the deliberate buying of a particular product or service with the intention of making a 
political statement. Instead, boycotting or negative political consumerism, refers to the 
deliberate abstention from purchasing a certain product or service with the intention of making 
a political statement (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013; Zorell, 2018).  
The underlying motivations behind both boycotting and buycotting vary from concerns 
related to social justice, to ideological issues in relation to the prevalent economic system, to 
more idiosyncratic motivations such as the health of the individuals and their families 
(Micheletti and Stolle, 2014). Both varieties of political consumerism nevertheless, aim to 
express a particular set of values and predilections of an ethical, political or environmental 
nature with which these products or services are associated. The end-recipients of these 
political statements are intended to be either the firms behind the products or the 
governments and regulating bodies of the market. In making these statements, political 
consumers can either act individually or collectively (as for example in the context of an 
organised campaign). Additionally, they may operate openly in relation to a wider social issue 
of concern or privately, that is boycotting or buycotting without mentioning it to anyone and 
expecting their purchasing behaviour to be noticed by the respective firms (Zorell, 2019b).  
It is essential therefore to distinguish between what constitutes everyday shopping and 
what constitutes political consumerism, since the variety of aims, motives, targets and types of 
political consumption encapsulated in its definition makes it difficult to recognise when a 
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consumption activity may be perceived as a political action and when not. In order to solve this 
conceptual problem, Zorell (2019b, pp. 39–40) proposes two different standpoints which can 
assess whether the act of consumption should be considered as political: the outsider’s 
standpoint and the individual’s own perception. 
Drawing from Neilson’s definition of political consumerism as “publicly motivated 
consumption” (2010, p. 214), Zorell (2019b) asserts that in order to assess an act of 
consumption as ‘political’ from the outsider’s standpoint, this must be publicly recognised as 
such. This means however, that the political consumer’s own intentions behind their actions 
“would not suffice to determine its political character” (Zorell, 2019b, p. 39).  
Defining thus political consumerism from the outsider’s standpoint rests on whether 
any consumption-based political statement is being recognised as such by its intended 
recipients, which are often big corporations or privately owned businesses7. Assuming the 
outsider’s standpoint in the study of political consumerism therefore makes it particularly 
problematic, as the individuals’ own understanding of whether an activity is intended as a 
political one is unavoidably overlooked (Fergusson, 2013; Pontes et al., 2018; Sant, 2014). 
Moreover, focusing entirely on the recipient’s acknowledgement of an act as political, would 
raise comparability issues across different research studies (Zorell, 2019b). For example, a 
multi-national corporation, which is often the target of large-scale boycotts, is likely to be less 
responsive to a comparatively small decline in sales. Instead, an equal increase in the sales of a 
small local cooperative (which is often the recipients of buycotts) may have greater social and 
political repercussions in its local community. This may indeed be the case despite the intended 
political message in both cases being the same, that is the rejection of impersonal trading 
networks, for example. 
Focusing instead on the individual’s perception of whether an act of consumption is 
intended as political, amplifies the acuteness of these problems. The problem of recognition of 
a political act by its intended recipients and the proposed solution to it by focusing on the 
individual is being exemplified in the practice of the British Co-operative Bank. The bank issues 
an annual ‘Ethical Consumption Report’ (Triodos, 2018) on which it presents data on the 
progress and development of ethical consumption activities in the country. Its 
operationalisation of ethical consumption activities is based on two parallel measures: the first 
involves figures on the sales of products and services that are explicitly ethical and are being 
marketed as such (outsider’s standpoint); the second relies on consumer surveys asking them 
 
7 This example is reminiscent of David Cameron’s refusal to recognise the intent and 
consequently the political statement of the protesters during the London riots in 2011, and his 
dismissal of the riots as acts of “pure criminality” (Lamprianou, 2013, p. 23). 
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about their motivations when they purchase ‘ethical invisibles’8 (individual’s standpoint). The 
‘Ethical Consumption Report’ recognises thus this conceptual distinction and relies on both the 
outsider’s and the individual’s own understanding of what constitutes political consumerism 
(Clouder and Harrison, 2005). 
According to Verba and Nie (1987) political participation is being defined as a means by 
which citizens communicate their preferences to the government and its elected officials. For 
Verba and Nie therefore, whether the government or elected officials effectively respond to 
citizens’ demands is inconsequential in classifying the action as political participation (Teorell, 
2006). Likewise, Newman and Bartels (2011) in their ‘citizen-centred view of participation’ 
argue that consumerism becomes political as soon as the consumers embed their purchasing 
decisions with (their subjective) political meaning.  
Moreover, according to van Deth (2014, p. 360), it is the intentions and objectives of 
the citizens that constitute if an action is a political one or not. What differentiates a political 
consumerist act therefore, from every-day consumption is the individual’s own intent. For van 
Deth therefore, political consumerism would be categorised as a motivational form of political 
participation, since it is the underlying motivation behind the act of consumption which embeds 
it with political meaning. 
Summarising the benefits of the individual’s standpoint in the study of political 
consumerism, Zorell (2019b, p. 41) posits that if the research study seeks to develop a concise 
understanding of the motivations and intentions of the political consumers - as is the case in 
this thesis – assuming the individualist perspective is the most appropriate and efficient 
standpoint. Relying on the individual’s own assessment of when an act of consumption is to 
understood as ‘political’, allows for a clear-cut delineation of the phenomenon; whilst it also 
permits for cross-country comparisons irrespectively of the opportunity structures prevalent in 
each country. The present thesis will therefore assume the individualist standpoint for the 
study of the underlying motivations of the young political consumers, in the UK and Greece. 
 
 
8 Ethical invisibles involve the consumption of goods or services which may exist irrespectively, 
and whether they will be classified as such depends entirely on the intentions of the consumer 
when they purchase them. Examples of ethical invisibles include using the public means of 
transport for environmental reasons, buying locally to support local economy, buying second 
hand clothing or simply consuming less (Harrison et al., 2005, p. 97). 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the topic of political participation has been a substantial 
field of research among political scientists. The reason is that it is typically perceived - and for 
good reasons - as the archetypical act of citizenship within contemporary democratic states. 
Whereas voting and electoral behaviour have traditionally attracted the greatest share of 
researchers’ attention, several non-electoral forms of political participation have until recently 
gone unnoticed. The chapter has argued therefore, for a wide definition of political 
participation which is in a position to capture the changing participatory patterns in a constantly 
evolving world.  
This chapter has thus sought to problematise the issue of the definitions deployed in 
the study of the political participation of young people. It  has therefore first defined whom 
exactly this thesis means when it refers to ‘young people’. Subsequently, it proceeded to define 
what political participation means. It has therefore introduced a selection of the most widely-
used definitions; it has reviewed their evolution in time; and has discussed how these are both 
‘period’ and ‘beholder’ sensitive. For this reason, it has provided an admittedly wide working 
definition, which is however, able to accommodate political consumerism as a lifestyle form of 
political participation. Likewise, it has proposed a concise conceptualisation of political 
consumerism as the basis on which the following chapters will build upon. It discussed when 
consumer behaviour may be understood as political participation, and when not. Finally, it 
proposed the individualist standpoint in the study of political participation as the most 
appropriate and effective way of capturing the phenomenon in a comparative context. 
Given the aim of the thesis on tracing the underlying factors behind young people’s 
propensity to engage in political consumerism, the following chapter will outline some of the 
most influential theoretical models in political participation research. These will be 
subsequently used in the following chapters as the basis of analysis, seeking to identify the 
drivers of political consumerism among young people in the UK and Greece.   
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Chapter 3: An assessment of the main theoretical frameworks in the 
study of political participation 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Although for many years  the common underlying axiom of the available definitions of political 
participation has involved its conflation to electoral turnout (Leighley, 1995), Chapter 2 has 
discussed the need for a conceptual expansion of the definitions of political participation, to 
include its lifestyle variants, such as political consumerism. Given the aim of the present 
research on identifying the underlying factors behind the expansion of political consumerism 
among young people, this chapter will instead discuss and assess some of the most commonly 
used theoretical models in political participation research. These will be subsequently used 
throughout the thesis as the basis of analysis, seeking to trace the determining factors of 
political consumerism among young people in Greece and in the United Kingdom.  
This chapter will therefore commence by a) laying out the Socio-Economic Status Model 
(SES) of political participation, with its focus on the socioeconomic status of the individuals as 
a predictor of their political participation patterns. It will continue by b) addressing the 
Mobilisation model, which is focusing on the importance of the availability of opportunity 
structures in the individual’s environment, as predictors of their political participation 
behaviour. This will be followed by c) the Rational Choice model, which assumes citizens 
calculate the costs and benefits behind their political participation behaviour. In turn, d) Social 
Capital theory, emphasises on the existence of relationships among individuals and their 
community, in the form of relationships of trust. The chapter will conclude by e) investigating 
the role of the economic conditions prevalent during one’s socialisation, as critical factors 
behind the emergence of Postmaterialist Values, which may in turn influence the preferred 
modes of political engagement of young people, in a constantly evolving social and political 
context.  
 
2. The Socio-Economic Status Model 
 
A significant part of the available literature on political participation draws heavily from the 
classic work of Verba and Nie (1987). This assumes that political participation is dependent on 
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the one hand, on the attitudes people hold towards themselves and the political system, and 
on the other, on their personal resources, such as time, money and skills (Verba and Nie, 1987).  
The Socioeconomic status (SES) model of political participation – as it came to be known 
- captures the individual’s position on a social and economic scale and thus distinguishes 
between high-status and lower-status individuals, based on these characteristics (Brown-
Iannuzzi et al., 2017). The determinants of the socio-economic status of the individuals may be 
the accumulated experiences during the individual’s life-cycle, such as their job type, 
employment status, church attendance or family structure, which are all likely to influence the 
development of their civic skills.  
Thus, high-status individuals are more likely to participate than their low-status 
counterparts, since they are likely to have partaken in such social environments which reinforce 
participatory civic skills (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2017). Factors like gender, education 
attainment, employment status, class and income levels, or belonging to a minority have all 
been consistently found to be significant predictors of political participation, from the 1960s 
(Almond and Verba, 1963; Barnes et al., 1979; Milbrath, 1965; Verba and Nie, 1987), to this day 
(Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2017); and will therefore also be also considered in the present thesis. 
SES can be measured in two separate ways, either by the objective material resources 
or capital or by the subjective experiences of those same resources. Objective SES is generally 
measured by indicators of income or wealth, education, and occupational status. Conversely, 
assessments of subjective SES, depend on the perceptions of the individuals’ own 
socioeconomic status and capture their sense of place in the hierarchy relative to others (Singh-
Manoux et al., 2005).  
A low-status citizen therefore, living in a high-status neighbourhood, may score 
significantly lower on the subjective relative income scale than their objective income levels 
would otherwise indicate, as they would compare their individual status with those prevalent 
in their immediate environment. Conversely, a high-status citizen living in a middle-class 
neighbourhood is likely to report higher scores on the subjective class scale, by comparing 
themselves to their (subjective) average in their perceived vicinity, and not, for example, the 
world’s top 1% income levels. The benefit of subjective over objective SES measures therefore, 
stems from the fact that the former takes into account a cognitive ‘averaging’ of a range of 
personal and economic factors, such as income, education, opportunities for development, and 
it can therefore represent a more accurate forecaster of behaviours than any objective 
measure (Singh-Manoux et al., 2003). For this reason, the present study will adopt the 
subjective SES standpoint with regards to issues such as subjective class and relative income. 
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With regards to age, participation tends to increase as the people get older, since young 
people generally have lower civic skills, education and are often less integrated into their 
community (Jennings, 1979; Jennings and Markus, 1988; Jennings and Niemi, 2014). Instead, 
participation tends to diminish after a certain age for the elderly (Rosenstone and Hansen, 
1993a), giving rise to what is often referred to as the life-cycle model of political participation 
(Erkulwater, 2012).  
Education has been found to be another predictor of participation, demonstrating a 
significant positive relationship throughout the literature, with income factors following 
second, demonstrating though a generally lower weight (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2017; Kitanova, 
2017). The prevailing view in the literature therefore, is that social class and educational history 
seem to be key forecasters of political engagement (Manning and Holmes, 2013; Sloam, 2012), 
especially when it comes to the political participation of young people, (Flanagan et al., 2011; 
Henn and Foard, 2014).  
However, the relevant findings with regards to gender, race and ethnicity are not so 
consistent. Men and women are consistently equally likely to vote (Conway, 1981; Rosenstone 
and Hansen, 1993a; Teixeira, 1987), while they present differences in either direction with 
regards to other forms of political participation, such as protests and community campaigns 
(Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie, 1993). With respect to political consumerism, this has been 
shown to be a gendered form of political participation, with women being particularly more 
likely to engage in it, than their male counterparts (Micheletti, 2004; Stolle and Micheletti, 
2006).  
The SES model has gained wide acceptance in the academic circles, since it provides 
evidence for the inter-relation of political participation to a series of easily identifiable and 
widely available socioeconomic determinants. However, this does not mean that it has 
remained immune to criticism. The greater part of the available empirical research utilising the 
model focuses almost exclusively on the demographic and social class characteristics of the 
individuals, rather than on the distinct factors which led them to choose one participatory 
method over any other, overlooking the architects of the model, who forewarned that there is 
no causal priority for social class over other social characteristics (Verba and Nie, 1987). 
Therefore, the model has been often criticised insofar it underemphasises the individual’s 
motivations to participate, as well as the contextual and institutional factors of their political 
environment, stripping the individuals out of their social contexts and interpersonal 
relationships (Knoke, 1990).  
Wolsfeld (1986) instead, recognised that the relationship between SES indicators and 
political participation may be better understood as mediated by other variables. This implies 
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that variables such as personal values or psychological factors, may function as mediators in 
the relationship between SES and political participation9. For Wolsfeld (1986)  therefore, SES 
characteristics may indeed delineate the potential for political participation, but this happens 
because they capture the effects of personal and social resources, such as political efficacy10.  
To summarise, the positive relationship between SES and political participation 
therefore may be based on cognitive and motivational characteristics typical of lower-SES 
individuals, that may be discouraging political participation, or distinctive  characteristics of 
higher-SES, that may be encouraging political participation instead (Milbrath, 1965; Verba et 
al., 1995). For this reason, the present research will examine, in addition to (subjective) 
demographic factors, as per the standard SES model, the respondents’ interest in politics and 
a series of personal values, including - but not limited to - political efficacy.  
Moreover, the SES model does not distinguish between electoral and non-electoral 
participation activities. Instead, highly engaged participants in elections and those who are 
highly engaged only in political consumerism would be equally classified as high-status 
individuals. Consequently, the SES model seems insufficient to explain why some high-status 
individuals will choose electoral participation, while other high-status individuals non-electoral 
methods.  
Another line of criticism stems from the observation that the standardized SES model 
assumes an even distribution of participation opportunities across its demographic or social-
status categorisations, and it therefore fails to account for intra-group heterogeneity. Failure 
to account for intra-group heterogeneity would, for example predict that all high-status 
individuals are likely to demonstrate higher levels of participation. Following the same 
reasoning, the SES model also fails to provide any insight on the differential participation levels 
among the same status individuals across time (Hansen and Rosenstone, 1983), even if their 
SES status has remained unchanged. For example, the SES cannot explain the difference in 
voter’s turnout between different electoral rounds among people with unchanged 
employment status.  
 
9 At this point, the benefits of multivariate factor analyses, over bivariate comparisons across 
demographic cohorts as an analytical tool becomes pertinent. Yet very little research has 
empirically tested this prospect. 
10 The inclusion of political efficacy determinants will be further discussed under the 
mobilisation model in the section below. 
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However, for Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), the difference in participation levels 
within cohorts with the same SES status, or across time, could be attributed to different sets of 
opportunities prevalent within cohorts and across time. For example, one may not participate 
in a demonstration, if a demonstration has not been organised; sign a petition if a petition has 
not been presented to them; or even vote in a referendum if a referendum does not take place. 
A common example in support of this line of criticism may be derived from the interpretation 
of survey data: if respondents have reported that they have engaged in acts of political 
consumerism, i.e. they have bought an environmentally friendly label in the last 12 months, we 
can be certain that they were presented with such an opportunity. If, however, they report that 
they have not, does this mean that they had the option to do so and chose not to, or that they 
were not presented with such an opportunity to start with?  
It is at this point that the examination of contextual factors and opportunities behind 
political participation becomes pertinent. The next section will thus proceed to provide an 
overview of the Mobilisation Model, which seeks to address the criticisms of the SES model 
discussed above. 
  
3.  The Mobilisation Model 
 
The Mobilisation model posits that political participation is dependent also on contextual 
factors, such as the opportunities present in the individual’s environment. In general, people 
may participate less or more based on their individual socio-economic characteristics (as the 
SES model suggests), but also based on their social context and available opportunity 
structures. In other words, the decision to refrain from political participation could be because, 
based on their individual preferences, they simply chose not to; but also because they could 
not or because nobody asked them to (Verba et al., 1993).  
Although the skills and motivations of the individuals are still being considered, the 
socioeconomic status of individuals is now recalculated under the Mobilisation model to 
include both the individual’s civic orientations, as well as the level of their political mobilisation. 
Therefore, the high-status individuals will have higher personal skills on the one hand, but also 
more opportunities to utilise them, either through the existence of more institutional 
opportunities, or more informal, mobilisation opportunities. For example, recent survey data 
(European Social Survey, 2018) clearly indicate that a growing number of citizens are turning to 
the market to express their political and moral concerns. However, what these data fail to 
capture is whether this is because the citizens chose to do so on their own accord, or whether 
they were presented with more fair-trade or organic products available in their local grocery 
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shop. The Mobilisation model poses that the skills of the high-status individuals of the SES 
model are more likely to be translated into behaviour in a contextual environment that allows 
them to flourish into political action.  
In a conceptualisation reminiscent of the nature and nurture cleavage of the natural 
sciences, intrinsic political attitudes become no longer the only factor behind the expression of 
political behaviour. Instead, this is now dependent not only on ‘internal’ attitudinal drivers such 
as membership in the high-status cohorts of the SES model would suggest; but also on the 
‘external’, environmental factors of the existing mobilisation opportunities. Even the highest 
status individuals would be unable to participate in the elections in a political environment 
which persecutes the organisation of elections. Similarly, a political consumer would find it 
increasingly difficult to buy certain products for ethical, political, or environmental reasons, if 
such products were not available in their vicinity. To account for this, the Mobilisation model 
takes into consideration the reciprocal relationship between the presence of political 
opportunities and the civic skills of the individuals (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  
Although the development of the Mobilisation model of political participation 
presented a major contribution in the study of political participation, a great part of available 
empirical research based on the effects of mobilisation factors on political participation fails to 
avoid common operationalisation problems. Political participation is often operationalised as 
voter turnout, whilst mobilisation is typically measured by campaign spending (Boyd, 1989; 
Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko, 1985; Tucker, 1986).  
However, several other factors influencing mobilisation, such as the effectiveness of 
institutional (party, candidate, organisation) communication campaigns have also been 
identified (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993b). Mobilisation 
therefore becomes dependent on electoral competitiveness, institutional campaigning, and the 
effectiveness of social movements. For example,  Dubuisson‐Quellier et al. (2011) analyse the 
main fields of action of three French consumer organisations: consumer education, 
implementation of alternative forms of trade and consumer mobilisation in protest campaigns. 
They demonstrate that these actions require the mobilisation of social actors in order to build 
representations of consumers on the one hand, but also to provide them with widely available 
ethically-labelled products, among which to choose from. This approach therefore, emphasises 
on the role of collective action with regards to political participation and, by implication, in 
determining the amount and forms of individual political participation (Kriesi, 2008).   
For instance, membership in voluntary association has been consistently identified as a 
factor which is likely to increase overall participation, with membership in voluntary 
associations with strictly political goals (party membership, labour unions) having stronger 
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effects on electoral and campaigning activity, but also on the communal activity of the 
individuals. Verba, Nie and Kim (1987) explain the dynamics of the above relationship whereby 
membership in voluntary organisations trains the individual in the participative process, 
augmenting thus their personal and political skills, which are then more likely to spill over back 
to the electoral political sphere.  
Most importantly however, the Mobilisation model is able to respond to the criticism 
of the SES model with regards to intra-group heterogeneity, discussed in the previous section. 
The perceived difference between participation levels across groups of the same 
socioeconomic status has received special attention by Verba, Nie and Kim (1987) within the 
framework of the Mobilisation model. Their findings, indicate that in the absence of strong 
group mobilisation processes, socioeconomic status remains a strong predictor of participation 
levels, validating the SES model. However, when effective group mobilisation processes are in 
place, this relationship is typically insignificant. The same applies not only to voter turnout, but 
also to participation in social movements (McAdam, 1986).  
These findings reflect the importance of the inclusion of the contextual opportunity 
structures in models of political participation. For example, almost one fourth of the local party 
leaders in the 1960s reported that they ‘were asked to do so’ (Bowman and Boynton, 1966). 
Beck and Jennings (1979) report that as a result of the political opportunity structure of the 
1960’s, there was a reversal of the tendencies of participation in party politics, with more young 
liberals participating, as opposed to older conservatives, which was the norm till that time. 
Overcoming the individualistic bias of the SES model, Koos (2012) extends the comparative 
analysis of actor-centred accounts behind the rise of political consumerist practices, by focusing 
on political, cultural and economic opportunity structures and on globalisation. He concludes 
that opportunities for political consumption are provided by national affluence, retailing 
structures and the availability of environmental and fair-labelled goods. Following this 
rationale, this thesis will be examining the influence of neoliberalism as a contextual factor 
behind political consumerism among young people in the UK and Greece, as it will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter 5. 
Summing up, the participation decisions of the individuals will therefore reflect a) a set 
of socioeconomic characteristics of the individuals, according to the SES model; but will also 
reflect b) the available opportunity structures presented to them at any given time. The 
Mobilisation model thus, stresses the importance of the availability of options in the process of 
the participatory decisions of the agent; and emphasises the role of mobilisation opportunities 
in the creation of these options. But where there are options, there are also decisions. 
Therefore, another part of the literature on political participation pertains that participation 
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remains primarily a ‘decision’ insofar it involves certain costs and benefits for a – presumably - 
rational agent. The following section will discuss the dynamics of this assumption, in the 
emergence of the Rational Agency model. 
 
4.  The Rational Agency Model 
 
Most mainstream economic theories are based on the assumption of rational agency.  Similarly, 
the Rational Agency model of political participation, assumes that individuals will choose to 
engage in a political activity as long as its benefits outweigh the costs involved (Aldrich, 1993; 
Jackman, 1987, Whiteley, 1995). It follows that rational political agents will seek to avoid the 
costs of participation, since in modern liberal democracies they may be entitled by definition 
to its benefits, leading to what in economic literature has been termed the ‘free-rider problem’ 
and ‘collective-action problem’ in Political Sciences11.  
Downs (1957) discussing electoral participation in his classical work ‘An Economic 
Theory of Democracy’, has termed the same concept as ‘the calculus of voting’. Since the 
marginal probability of each voter to determine the outcome of an election is minimal, he 
claims, the cost of voting will always surpass its benefits and therefore the rational voter should 
always choose to abstain. However, such an assumption would lead to zero, or no participation, 
and although turnout in elections has indeed been shown to be declining (Ipsos, 2015), 
participation is still a common practice, leading to what has been termed ‘the paradox of 
participation’ (Olson, 1965). The most common approaches used to resolve this paradox 
involve a) reviewing downwards the costs of participating; and b) expanding the weight of the 
benefits involved in participating. 
With regards to reviewing downwards the costs of participating in political 
consumerism therefore, the rational agency model would predict that political consumerist 
participation would be higher, the higher a) the satisfaction with the availability of certain 
ethical-labelled products; b) the satisfaction with the prices of these ethically-labelled 
products; c) the satisfaction with the variety of retailers in the vicinity of the consumer; and 
finally d) the satisfaction with market information for these products. These four variables 
therefore, will form part of my survey questionnaire and will be subsequently examined as 
contributing factors behind the decision of young people to engage in political consumerism in 
the UK and Greece. 
 
11 For an overview of rational agency models, see Aldrich (1993) and Whiteley (1995). 
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With regards to expanding the weight of the benefits involved in participating, the 
overall support for democracy in principle, has been considered as a driving factor behind an 
individual’s decision to participate. For an individual to decide to participate, they should be 
satisfied that their long-term benefits from doing so should outweigh the costs involved. In 
order to satisfy this condition, the greatest part of scholars who approach the paradox of 
participation will attempt to expand the weight of the benefits involved with participating. This 
approach often develops based on Downs’ own observation (1957, p.266) that one of the 
factors entering one’s (long-term) calculated benefits from voting should include “the value of 
voting per se”. This is often captured by the ‘Democracy Value’ (or D-Value for shorts), which 
represents the long-run value the individual attributes to preserving democracy in their 
country12.  
The D-value therefore, would represent “a pay-out from fulfilling one’s civic obligation 
or duty to vote” (Feddersen, 2004, p. 101). The D-Value will thus be addressed in the 
questionnaire of the present thesis by the questions ‘How important is democracy for you?’ 
which  aims to capture the relative importance the young people in the UK and Greece attribute 
to the long-term benefits of preserving democracy in their country; and the question ‘Voting is 
a duty?’, which similarly aims to capture the relative importance of voting as a civic duty. Both 
of these questions have previously (Galais and Blais, 2016; Wattenberg, 2015) been employed 
in explaining young people’s political participation in general, and particularly their 
engagement with political consumerism (Gotlieb and Wells, 2012).  
The rational choice model of political participation demonstrates therefore the 
importance of subjectivity of ideological factors and soft incentives as a basis for group 
membership, with respondents citing the weight of achieving certain public policy outcomes as 
the basis for their participation, as opposed to the importance of immediate gains which are 
typically considered less important (Leighley, 1995). It could thus be argued that the rational 
agency model is based on a generalised and subjective cost-benefit analysis of participating. 
For example, if one places increased value on postmaterialist concerns (Inglehart, 2018), such 
as self-expression or the freedom of speech associated with participation, their decision to 
participate will be entirely rational, since the benefits (self-expression) will outweigh the costs 
involved (time).  
 
12 Possibly the most influential reformulation of Downs’ calculus of participation, has been the 
one proposed by Riker and Ordeshook (1968, p. 27) with the addition of the D-Value in the 
calculated benefits. The formula thus assumes the following form: pKB - C +D > 0  
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The study of the age-specific underlying value orientations of young people should 
therefore attain further scrutiny. Moreover, the focus of the above models of participation has 
been primarily quantitative, i.e. they examine whether there is less or more participation. As 
Leighley puts it however, “…to account for more than ‘how much’ participation, we must 
conceptualise the participation decision not as a choice between activity and inactivity, but 
rather as a choice of a particular type of political act out of a set of potential acts”  (Leighley, 
1995, p. 198).  
It thus follows, that more emphasis should be placed on questions such as ‘what kind 
of action’, and ‘in which social context’ (Salisbury, 1975, p. 336). When it comes therefore to 
examining a) non-electoral forms of political participation such as political consumerism, and 
b) the underlying social context as a predictor of engagement in these, the Social Capital Model 
is in a position to provide valuable insights, as it will be demonstrated in the section that 
follows. 
 
5.  The Social Capital Model 
 
The theory of Social Capital draws heavily from the sociological perspective of the rational-
choice sociologist Coleman (1988). It is being perceived as an overarching concept which 
describes the existence of relationships among the individuals of a community, and 
demonstrates positive effects to their levels of education and social status (Teney and 
Hanquinet, 2012).  
Since the publication of Putnam’s landmark work (1995) on the decline of social capital 
and its consequences on political participation in the US, research on social capital and political 
participation has flourished, especially in relation to the different forms this assumes among 
young people. Building upon the work of Coleman (1988), Putnam developed his own 
influential conceptualisation of social capital (Fine, 2010), which is understood as resulting from 
networks and relations of trust among individuals, and which is expected to accelerate the 
capacity for several non-electoral forms of political action, and increase the likelihood of 
individuals to participate in these forms (Paxton, 1994).  
Teney and Hanquinet (2012) instead, perceive social capital as a multifaceted 
phenomenon whose different components are associated with different dimensions of political 
participation. As a concept which is intended to capture the effects of varying social relations 
on political participation, they argue that social capital may take equally different forms. 
However, to this day, the complex relationship between social capital and political participation 
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has produced contradictory results (Fine, 2010) due to the a) varying and often inconsistent 
definitions of the term, and as a result of this, b) an equally inconsistent operationalisation of 
the concept. This section will therefore discuss the problem of definition of social capital, and 
consequently the problem of operationalisation that emerges from it.  
With regards to the former, earlier attempts to define social capital are placing 
emphasis on individual factors. Portes’ (1998, p. 6) definition poses that “social capital stands 
for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other 
social structures”. Instead, Putnam, drawing from Tocqueville’s and Rousseau’s perspective on 
civil society, shifted the emphasis of the concept from the individual to the collective 
perspective (Kim and Kim, 2009). Putnam’s definition therefore,  identifies social capital as 
“features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (1995, p. 67). It follows therefore that 
communities with high social capital are more likely to cooperate, as opposed to communities 
with low social capital.  
For Putnam (1995; 2002) therefore, social capital consists of three intertwined 
elements, namely trust, networks and norms of reciprocity, the interplay of which enhances 
cooperative behaviour within any given community and promotes social cohesion. Higher social 
capital facilitates political participation, understood as a means for the resolution of communal 
conflicts, by sharing information and strengthening the sense of belonging to the community. 
In subsequent literature, a common conceptualisation of social capital places emphasis on its 
first two constituent elements, trust and associations (Widmalm, 2005, 2007). The former, 
trust, is further subdivided into institutional and personal trust (Khodyakov, 2007; Misztal, 
2013). Institutional trust is theorised to have a positive effect to voter’s turnout since it implies 
support for the established status quo and the electoral processes. Personal trust on the other 
hand tends to demonstrate a positive relationship with respect to alternative forms of political 
participation such as protests, demonstrations, and community campaigns (Widmalm, 2005, 
2007).  
With regards to the effects of social (personal and institutionalised) trust to political 
participation, several mechanisms have been proposed. Firstly, trust reduces insecurity of 
social relations, allows the agent to continue to be dependent on their social interactions and 
afford the risks of unforeseen behaviours, encouraging social interaction and thus cooperation 
for a common goal. Like any other social domain, the costs associated with political 
participation discussed under the rational agency model are more easily overcome with the 
existence of high levels of trust. It is therefore expected that trust will have a positive effect on 
political participation. Especially in the case of institutional trust it may be argued that highly-
58 | P a g e  
 
trusting citizens will seek to optimise their limited political resources by placing their trust on 
politicians and political institutions. It follows therefore that high levels of institutional trust 
would foster institutional participation. However, if trust to politicians declines, because of 
unpopular measures by the government for example, then it is likely that the individuals will 
seek to voice their concern through non-institutional means (Warren, 1999), like political 
consumerism.  
In turn, membership in voluntary associations has been often used as a proxy for the 
‘network’ element of social capital. Membership in associations is a meaningful source of social 
capital, insofar it proliferates civil virtues, encourages the dissemination of information, and 
induces mobilisation (Campbell, 2013; Helliwell and Putnam, 2007). Moreover, people tend to 
participate more when they are asked to do so in person (Campbell, 2013), or when their social 
network includes people with high interest in politics (McClurg, 2006). All of these elements 
have been assumed to augment political participation in all its forms.  
However, this is not always the case. A further subdivision of the associational element 
of social capital divides it into two main categories. Bonding (or particularised) social capital 
refers to the ‘in-group’ of any given community, such as family, circle of friends, and people 
with whom one shares a common ethnic and cultural identity. Bridging (or generalised) social 
capital instead, describes those social links one shares with their extended social network. An 
important difference between the two therefore, is that bonding social capital is contingent to 
the individuals’ perception regarding who constitutes their ingroup, whereas bridging social 
capital is part of one’s overarching value structure (Damron, 2004).  
Since the aim of the present research is to identify the factors behind engagement in 
political consumerism among young people, bridging social capital will be measured by the 
variables ‘Intention to work with others’ with regards to a social, political or environmental 
issue of concern, and ‘Intention to take part in a voluntary association’ for the same reasons. 
Similarly, bonding social capital will be captured by the element ‘Intention to demonstrate’ 
since demonstrations have been shown to be associated with political resilience (Aldrich, 2012; 
Kousis and Paschou, 2017) and are characterised by high levels of bounded solidarity 
(Schwedler, 2003). 
The use of social capital as an analytical tool in social sciences may be relatively recent. 
However, it has already attained a variety of interpretations, definitions and uses across several 
disciplines. The concept has often been treated as a panacea for a variety of pressing social 
issues (Portes, 1998; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Even though social capital theory continues 
to expand into new areas of research, it has also received extensive criticisms, with its critics 
arguing that the term itself is vague, difficult to measure, or poorly defined (Fine, 2002).  
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Despite its shortcomings, mainly with regards to its conceptualisation and 
operationalisation, social capital expands the predominately individualistic theoretical 
underpinnings of the SES model and the rational agency model, by addressing not the 
opportunity structures available (as the mobilisation model suggests), but the existence of 
social relationships and the investigation of their different combinations, as different forms of 
social capital. Social Capital theory therefore re-imagines the individual not as merely a 
member of  a demographic cohort; neither as an outcome of its available opportunities within 
its environment; but also nor as a one-dimensional rational agent. Instead, Social Capital theory 
reintroduces the role of personal interactions in the form of trust and interpersonal 
associations as determining factors behind people’s political participation. Especially the 
decline of trust in traditional political institutions (Putnam, 2001) has often been identified as 
a primary factor behind the corresponding emergence of alternative socio-political arenas, 
within which political consumerism holds a central position (Neilson and Paxton, 2010).  
The diverse consequences of Social Capital theory remain a pertinent issue of research, 
since its relation to other forms of political participation, like political consumerism,  remains 
relatively understudied. This thesis will shed light in that direction by examining the relationship 
of social (personalised and institutionalised) trust and associational membership (intention to 
work with others, volunteer and demonstrate) with political consumerism among young people 
in the UK and Greece.  
 
6. Postmaterialist value orientations and the Silent Revolution thesis 
 
The transition from the individual to the wider social determinants of political participation 
which may be discerned in the evolution of the theories discussed above, paves the way for the 
study of the underlying value orientations of citizens as a response to the prevalent societal 
conditions. Yet another influential approach, especially pertinent to young people’s non-
electoral political participation, comes in the form of the Silent Revolution thesis, as developed 
by Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1997).  
According to Inglehart, there has been a ‘silent revolution’, in terms of the changing 
values of the overall population from the 1970s onwards in many industrialised democracies, 
as a response of the relatively favourable economic conditions, economic stability and physical 
security. Pickard (2019c, p. 378) quotes the architect of the thesis who states that: 
…important groups among the population of Western societies […] are acting in pursuit 
of goals which (unlike symbols of affluence) no longer have a direct relationship to the 
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imperatives of economic security. These individuals – drawn largely from the younger 
cohorts of the modern middle class – have been socialised during an unprecedently long 
period of unprecedently high affluence. For them, economic security may be taken for 
granted (Inglehart, 1971, p. 991). 
Inglehart’s thesis therefore comes in direct contrast to Putnam’s (1995) thesis of 
diminishing social capital, according to which each new generation was found to be less 
politically engaged, and more concerned with the accumulation of material wealth than their 
predecessors. Inglehart instead, provides evidence in support of his hypothesis that the 
younger the participants, the more likely they are to favour what he initially termed ‘post-
bourgeois’ value priorities. Conversely, the older the participants the more likely they were to 
favour ‘acquisitive’ value priorities (Inglehart, 1971, p. 1000). Although in his later work he 
transitioned to the use of the terms ‘postmaterialist’ and ‘materialist’ value priorities, the 
underlying principles of the theory remain the same. The major implications of Inglehart’s 
thesis therefore, are that a) individual value orientations are rooted in the prevalent economic 
conditions during the individual’s formative years, b) these will remain relatively stable 
throughout adulthood, and finally that c) affluence during their formative years will result in 
postmaterialist values, and scarcity to materialistic value orientations.  
 At the heart of the Silent Revolution thesis therefore, stand the ‘scarcity’ and the 
‘socialisation’ hypotheses. Maslow’s (1975) scarcity hypothesis, maintains that individuals tend 
to value highly what is in short supply. Therefore, they will place higher value on concepts such 
as material security and physical survival, as long as these are still scarce. According to Inglehart 
however, the post-World War II generations were socialised in an unprecedented period of 
peace and economic prosperity. As a result, they tended to take physical safety and economic 
security for granted and therefore they prioritised postmaterialist values connected to quality 
of life, self-expression and environmental concerns.  
As a result of this increased material security, the postmaterialist cohorts are therefore 
significantly more future-oriented, demonstrate an almost teleological belief in progress and 
seek to find the “natural, true and authentic” (Seippel, 1999, p. 139) within oneself. Liberated 
by the urgency of material subsistence, the postmaterialist cohorts are therefore expected to 
express their disapproval of the confines presented by institutional participation and they will 
instead be fascinated by non-conventional, transformative forms of political engagement in 
order to advocate political reforms. This shift in value orientations has eventually led to new 
issue demands on which, the traditional political institutions were hardly equipped to respond. 
Consequently, the emerging postmaterialist cohorts have turned their back on the traditional 
political institutions in an attempt to express their political demands by way of new political 
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movements and within alternative political arenas, which are able to accommodate their 
postmaterialist concerns.  
In general, the Silent Revolution thesis posits that affluent societies will demonstrate a 
general postmaterialist value orientation, whilst in contrast the poorer societies will remain 
primarily materialistic. The question that arises therefore, is whether young people will 
continue to carry with them their postmaterialist value orientations as they age in an economic 
environment of relative precariousness as a single Mannheimian generational unit (see Chapter 
2) or whether these postmaterialist value orientations will give way to materialist ones as the 
political life-cycle hypothesis would suggest.  
Inglehart’s response to this question stems from his ‘socialisation hypothesis’, which 
poses that the value orientations acquired during one’s formative years (typically associated 
with childhood and adolescence) are critical and will remain stable throughout adulthood. And 
will define one’s values throughout their lifetime. It follows therefore, that if the younger 
cohorts have experienced different material conditions than their older counterparts, one may 
observe substantial and persisting alterations between the basic value-orientations of older 
and younger generations. This particular hypothesis of the Silent Revolution theory has  not 
remained uncontested, mostly on the grounds that it is not grounded in the field of Psychology 
(Abramson, 2011). Nevertheless, Inglehart (1997) has diagnosed a persisting trend in favour of 
postmaterialist values since the 1970s through a process of generational replacement. In 
‘Generational Replacement and Value Change in Eight Western European Societies’ (1992), 
Abramson and Inglehart attribute shifts in values between young people and their older 
counterparts to their differential conditions growing up. But as the younger cohorts 
progressively replace the older ones over time, they also observed predictable changes in the 
values and behaviour of the population of that society as a whole. 
However, the greatest part of Inglehart’s research was published before the 2008 
financial crisis. In a much more recent article, Inglehart and Norris (2016) partly anticipate a 
cultural backlash of materialist values as a result of the precarious economic conditions. The 
austerity measures that were implemented as a response to the crisis, have had a defining 
adverse impact especially upon young people in both the UK and Greece (Pickard, 2019a; 
Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis, 2018).  As a result, these have been the first generations to 
experience a deterioration of their material conditions compared to the generations before 
them (Grasso, 2018). The implications of such developments have been anticipated by Inglehart 
even earlier: 
Recent developments, such as relatively high unemployment, the collapse of stock 
markets and welfare state retrenchment, have increased economic insecurity; if this 
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went far enough, it could undermine the prevailing sense that survival can be taken for 
granted, and, in the long run, bring a resurgence of materialist values (Inglehart and 
Welzel, 2005, p. 98) 
 Nevertheless, the implications of the financial crisis in young people’s persistence or 
dissolution of postmaterialist value priorities has been significantly understudied (Henn et al., 
2017). More recent research posits that periodic economic booms and downturns will be 
followed by periodic fluctuations in the materialist/postmaterialist value orientations 
continuum within given age cohorts. Henn et al. (2017) examine whether the seeming rejection 
of traditional forms of political participation in favour of more unconventional forms perceived 
over time in the UK, may be explained by the fluctuating economic conditions of the last couple 
of decades13. Their results confirm Inglehart’s hypotheses only partly. On the one hand they 
report slightly lower levers of postmaterialism, as a result of the lower levels of affluence in the 
second sample, providing support to Inglehart’s scarcity hypothesis. On the other hand 
however, they also report that young postmaterialists in Britain are considerably more likely to 
participate in both institutionalized and non‐institutionalized forms of political engagement 
alike.  
This implies that, as a result of the precariousness brought about by the 2008 financial 
crisis, young postmaterialists may now be obliged to take an equal interest in materialist values 
in addition to their postmaterialist socialisation. Manning (2015, p.6) pertains that social 
movements, like Occupy London, which was particularly active during winter 2011 (see Gitlin, 
2012) reveal that “young people can still be mobilised around an agenda of material needs and 
inequality”. Similarly, Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis (2018, p.1) report that many young people in 
Greece will increasingly engage in alternative forms of political participation as a response to 
“social dislocation, the failures and the pressures of the market and the state”. Pickard (2019c, 
p. 380) however, suggests that one form of participation does not exclude the other, and that 
“while many young people have immediate materialist priorities this does not prevent them 
from having postmaterialist values and ideals too, such as environmentalism, social justice and 
attachments to various freedoms that provide hope for a fairer and greener world”.  
Moreover, an equally significant, albeit often overlooked, implication of Inglehart’s 
theory of value orientations is related to the role of authority, with general affluence (and 
 
13 They do so by contrasting the results from two different surveys of British 18 year olds; one 
conducted in 2002 during an era of relative global affluence, and another one in 2011 - at the 
midst of the global financial crisis. 
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hence higher-order postmaterialist values) leading to diminishing support for authority as this 
may be represented by both tradition and religiosity.  In a another article Inglehart posits that:  
Current changes enable [younger people] to play an increasingly active role in 
formulating policy, and to engage in what might be called ‘elite-challenging’ as opposed 
to ‘elite-directed’ activities. Elite-directed political participation is largely a matter of 
elites mobilizing mass support through established organizations such as political 
parties, labour unions, religious institutions and so on. The newer ‘elite-challenging’ 
style of politics gives the public an increasingly important role in making specific 
decisions, not just a choice between two more set of decision makers (Inglehart, 1990, 
p. 5). 
According to Inglehart therefore, young postmaterialists will tend to be less trusting 
towards the establishment. However, this does not mean they are politically apathetic, but 
instead that due to their elite-challenging postmaterialist values they will choose to participate 
differently. For Inglehart therefore, western democracies “have become markedly more likely 
to engage in elite-challenging forms of political participation” (1997, p. 296) and generally non-
electoral forms of political participation.  
Consequently, younger cohorts will not only display preferences for higher‐order 
postmaterialist concerns like freedom of expression or environmental sustainability. Liberated 
from the urgency of material subsistence, these young postmaterialist cohorts are also likely to 
display higher… 
…awareness of, and frustration with, the limits of existing democratic arrangements and 
institutionalized forms of political participation – and more so than their materialist 
counterparts. Instead, they were attracted to an alternative and transformative politics, 
advocating political reform while also supporting and participating in new forms and 
styles of non‐institutionalised political action (Henn et al., 2017, p. 716). 
In this process, novel participation styles and methods are rapidly replacing the old 
ones, especially among the younger generations who tend to be more eager to participate in a 
non-hierarchical, informal networks and a variety of lifestyle mobilisation endeavours. The 
postmaterialist cohorts thus, will demonstrate a noteworthy inventiveness when it comes to 
voicing their concerns about such one-issue demands into alternative political fields conducive 
of their postmaterialist agenda. Involvement in informal youth groups, spontaneous rallies and 
demonstrations, online engagement and the tendency to consume politically are merely a few 
instances of this phenomenon (Grasso, 2018; Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis, 2018).  
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The postmaterialist thesis has not remained immune to criticism14 both on a 
methodological  (Clarke et al., 1999; Davis and Davenport, 1999), as well as an theoretical 
grounds (Flanagan et al., 2016). Summarising, Davis and Davenport (1999) suggest that the 
four-item index developed by Inglehart is invalid because its first two options are randomly 
correlated and that it therefore conveys an erroneous picture of the respondents' position on 
theoretically relevant social issues. For this reason this thesis will employ the expanded 12-item 
postmaterialism index instead, as employed by the World Values Survey (Davis and Davenport, 
1999). 
The greatest part of criticism however, refers to the postmaterialist assumption of a 
generational shift. Flanagan et al. (2011) pertain that there is no evidence for a long-term 
generational shift towards postmaterialism. Instead, taking a life-cycle approach, they suggest 
that young people are merely temporarily suspending their engagement with politics and that 
they will begin to participate in conventional politics only after they have attained the markers 
of adulthood – such as home-ownership and secure employment.  
In a different vein, Grasso (2014) contests the postmaterialist assertion that young 
people’s propensity to engage in non-conventional forms of political participation comes about 
as a result of the affluence during their socialisation. Controlling for age, period and cohort 
effects, she concludes that being socialised in a politically volatile era, marked by strong 
ideological divisions, is much more significant in driving young people to engage in non-
institutionalized acts of political participation. The prolonged austerity of the current financial 
crises, and the political volatility it has brought about on the European level therefore, may 
have exactly the opposite effects of what the postmaterialist thesis would normally suggest and 
may instead intensify the  postmaterialist orientation of young people. 
The hypothesis that the critical changes brought about by the financial crisis may have 
had an effect on the relative importance of postmaterialist values for young people in the UK 
and Greece, as well as their support to non-institutional forms of political participation such as 
political consumerism, will be further investigated in the present thesis. In line with the theory 
above, it is anticipated that the postmaterialist cohorts in both countries, will be more prone 
to engage in forms of active citizenship and elite-challenging political participation, given the 
progressively greater lack of trust in the authority of the state, and politicians. 
Inglehart’s thesis has attained academic prominence, especially with regards to its 
application to the study of youth political participation (Henn et al., 2017), since it has far 
 
14 Abramson (2011) provides a thorough analysis of the criticisms and the relevant responses 
of Inglehart on the subject. 
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reaching implications with regards to public perceptions on issues ranging from the standard 
of living and quality of life, to work and employment patterns, political orientation, 
environmental protection, minority and women’s rights, consumption patterns and eventually 
lifestyle forms of political engagement such as political consumerism. In this process, class 
politics are increasingly losing prominence (Bernardi, 2009; Ferrer-Fons and Fraile, 2013; 
Pakulski and Waters, 1996) in face of an ongoing political transformation in a number of 
European societies, as policies initially advocated at the fringes of the political spectrum are 
being introduced into mainstream political agendas. In this context the postmaterialist thesis, 
in addition to coming in contrast to Putnam’s conceptualisation of diminishing social capital, 
also challenges the assumptions of the SES model, which is predominately tracing the drivers 
of political participation in people’s socio-demographic characteristics. Even though, Inglehart’s 
thesis never did overlook the effects of key socio-demographic indicators such as age, social 
class and education, as predictors of postmaterialist value preferences, it suggests that it is the 
latter that predominately defines political participation (Inglehart, 2016). The upsurge of the 
postmaterialist left (Inglehart, 1977, 1997), and to some extent the postmaterialist right 
(Achterberg and Houtman, 2006) herald the emergence of novel political discourses which are 
based less on the economic components of class struggle, and more towards the internalised 
feelings of individuals (Lakatos, 2015). 
Moreover, the postmaterialist thesis is particularly useful in the study of young people’s 
political participation during periods of economic downturn. Notwithstanding cyclical effects in 
response to the economic environment, the postmaterialist thesis discerns a long-term rise in 
non-conventional participatory forms over the past decades, as a response to an alleged long-
term postmaterialist shift (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002). Political consumerism has been 
shown to have a particularly strong link with postmaterialist value orientations, especially 
among younger, more educated citizens (Stolle et al., 2005). Young political consumers 
therefore, have been previously shown to be significantly more likely to favour non-
conventional forms of political participation, doubt the effectiveness of institutionalised politics 
and assume postmaterialist value orientations (Copeland, 2014a).  
In addition to the models that preceded it, Inglehart’s materialist/postmaterialist 
cleavage therefore, provides another useful analytical tool for the study of political 
consumerism, as a form of youth political engagement, detached from traditional forms of 
political participation, and pulled towards the marketplace as an alternative political arena, and 
will assist in identifying the drivers of young political consumers in the UK and Greece.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
Given the aim of this doctoral research is to identify the underlying factors behind the 
emergence of political consumerism, this chapter  discussed and critically evaluated some of 
the most commonly used theoretical models in the study of political participation. These will 
be used throughout the thesis as the basis for the selection and operationalisation of the 
variables, in the search for the determinants of political consumerism among young people in 
Greece and in the United Kingdom.  
The chapter started by reviewing the Socio-Economic Status Model (SES) of political 
participation. The SES model emphasises the socioeconomic status of individuals and remains 
an influential tool in the study of political participation to this day. However, a major 
shortcoming of the SES model is that it overlooks the opportunity structures behind one’s 
political participation decisions. The Mobilisation model seeks to address this gap by identifying 
the role of the opportunity structures present in the individual’s environment, as factors behind 
their political participation behaviours. In turn, the Rational Choice model of political 
participation perceives citizens as rational, profit-maximising agents, who will calculate the cost 
and benefits behind their preferred political participation activities, and then rationally decide 
whether to engage or not in different forms of political participation (such as political 
consumerism). The theoretical assumptions of the rational agency theory however, do not 
seem to enjoy empirical support. Finally, the Social Capital theory asserts the existence of 
relationships among individuals and their community, and thus reintroduces the collective 
element in the study of political participation. Trust (towards others and towards politicians) 
and associational membership are both pivotal elements of social capital theory. However, 
problems of definition and operationalisation render it particularly problematic in the study of 
political participation. Finally, the postmaterialist thesis, with its focus on the underlying 
economic conditions prevalent during one’s socialisation is yet another valuable tool in the 
study of politics of consumption, since these are inextricably dependent on the economism of 
the market.  
This chapter therefore has outlined some of the most influential theories in political 
participation research, which will be used in the subsequent chapters to examine the patterns 
of political consumerism among young people in the UK and in Greece. Since this doctoral thesis 
intends to examine consumerism as an action imbued with political meaning, it is also crucial 
to expand the discussion so as to include the ideological and discursive elements of consumer 
culture and appreciate why consumers may instil their objects of consumption with political 
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meaning. The chapter that follows will therefore, discuss how the consumption of goods and 
services in late modernity has been interpreted within the relevant literature.  
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Chapter 4: Sociology of Consumption and the emergence of the 
Citizen-Consumer 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 has problematised the issue of the definitions in the study of the political 
participation of young people. In turn, Chapter 4 outlined some of the most widely used 
theoretical models in political participation research. These definitions and theoretical models 
will be employed throughout this doctoral research as the basis of analysis, seeking to trace the 
factors driving and shaping political consumerism among young people in the UK and Greece. 
The present chapter in turn, will review the social theory behind the politics of 
consumption. It will a) commence by illustrating consumption as identity and responsibility, and 
it will subsequently b) make the case that as a result of these two developments, late modernity 
has brought about the convergence of the previously distant notions of the citizen and the 
consumer, in the form of a citizen-consumer hybrid which uses the market as an arena to 
express its political concerns. It will argue that political consumerism as a form of political 
engagement that has been the result of these developments on the social and economic 
spheres, and stands as the behavioural embodiment of the convergence of the citizen and the 
consumer realms.  
 
2. Consumption as Responsibility and Identity 
 
In mainstream economics, consumption is understood as the last stage of the material cycle; 
following production and distribution. The primary purpose of consumption has traditionally 
been the satisfaction of the basic human needs for food, water, clothing and shelter; in order 
to survive and procreate. To these, it could be argued that late modernity has added also 
sanitation, education, healthcare, and the internet. Consumption plays thus an indispensable 
part in the progress of human civilisation. It stands central to the functioning of the market 
economy whereby money becomes a medium of exchange for the acquisition of consumer 
goods. The three stages of the material cycle are intricately interconnected and mediated by 
the use of money as a medium of exchange. In other words, one has to back up their consumer 
needs with their consumer power.  
But the act of consumption becomes much more than merely an economic transaction 
in postmodern societies. The available definitions of postmodernism vary to such an extent that 
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a single exhaustive definition becomes thus virtually impossible (Haanpää, 2007, p. 2). 
However, two elements are commonly present in all: firstly, postmodernism tends to transcend 
the emphasis of modernity on grand meta-narratives. Arguably, no other meta-narrative has 
attracted more widespread criticisms from postmodern thinkers than Marxism, with its 
materialist conception of history, and emphasis on class struggles. Secondly, postmodernism 
stresses the symbolic – or sign value – behind production, products and social processes. It 
therefore “directs  our  attention  to  changes  taking  place  in  contemporary culture”  
(Featherstone, 1991, p. 2).  With its shifting emphasis away from collective class struggles, the  
postmodern  condition therefore,  is  being perceived  as  conducive of  individualism  and  value 
change;  particularly with regards to  freedom  of  choice,  change  of  lifestyles  (both in terms 
of consumption and political activities) and the emergence of new social movements, including, 
but not limited to, environmentally conscious consumption (Bauman, 2000). Shifting the 
emphasis away from production costs and the use-value of commodities, implies that the 
postmodern consumer will deliberately seek goods and services not only as a way of satisfying 
their  basic materialistic needs, but as symbolic of their lifestyles. 
Similarly, the available literature provides a wide range of definitions for lifestyles; from 
a Weberian manifestation of class association (Bennett, 2004), to recognisability (Haanpää, 
2007). For Miles (2000), youth lifestyles denote a material expression of identity, whereas Veal 
(2000) defines lifestyle as a pattern of social and individual behaviour which characterises a 
group or an individual. Veal’s definition therefore, emphasises the approach that lifestyle is a 
set of behavioural patterns, dictated by an underlying set of values and attitudes that the agent 
is free – but also responsible - to choose from, without any considerations with regards to class 
membership. Lifestyle becomes thus a synonym for the coherence behind the behavioural 
patterns of a group or an individual (Spaargaren and van Vliet, 2000).  
This postmodern conceptualisation of lifestyles has led to the understanding of lifestyle 
politics, such as political consumerism, as being associated with the responsibility of choice 
behind individuals’ consumption patterns (Southerton et al., 2004) on the one hand; and the 
symbolic dimension of these consumption patterns on the social level, with regards to the 
creation of individuals’ identity (Spaargaren and van Vliet, 2000), on the other. The available 
literature under the postmodernist standpoint on the subject therefore traces predominately 
two, often intertwined, constituting elements of lifestyle politics. These are the notions of 
consumer responsibility, and the role of consumerism in the creation of identity. 
This section will therefore examine consumption as responsibility and identity, and their 
consequences in terms of consuming for ethical, environmental and political reasons. These 
developments will eventually pave the way to discuss the emergence of the citizen-consumer, 
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as an agent of political responsibility. These developments will provide the backdrop against 
which the following chapters will examine political consumerism as a form of political 
participation amongst young people in the UK and in Greece. 
 
a. Consumption as Responsibility 
Slater (1997) refers to postmodern society as the locus of 'post-responsibility' in two ways, one 
positive and one negative. With regards to the former, postmodernism liberates people from 
the traditional ‘dominant myths’, such as those of class and gender belonging, allowing them 
to trace new sources of symbolism through their consumption patterns. With regards to the 
negative implications of post-responsibility however, it also liberates them from commitments 
to stables of ethical, participatory or political nature (Slater, 1997, p. 198). These two 
implications will be discussed below. 
The positive expression of post-responsibility for Slater, refers to the liberation from the 
dominant myths prevalent during modernity. In modernity both political, and consumption 
behaviour were perceived as the interpretative framework within which social processes and 
relations were taking place. By contrast, with the transition to postmodern societies both 
political affiliations and consumption patterns came to be perceived merely as signs, 
independent from class or party affiliations and even from the satiation of the basic materialist 
needs. 
For example, whereas a person’s job and the resulting position on the social ladder that 
this previously signified, would almost automatically dictate their party affiliation as well as 
their style of fashion, taste and generally their consumption patterns (Bourdieu, 1986), these 
previously durable bonds are increasingly losing prominence today.  Instead, in postmodern 
societies one’s consumption patterns no longer signify one’s life-long membership in a certain 
class. 
The increased material prosperity and the corresponding existential security of the 
post-war generations have shifted the individuals’ attention to the active pursuit of non-
materialistic aspirations and towards what Inglehart has termed as postmaterialist goals, 
instead (Inglehart, 1977, 1990). These include aims like the conservation of the environment or 
safeguarding individual rights and freedoms. But this expansion of individual pursuits has 
extended the fragmentation of interests in society, and thus traditional political affiliations 
have lost prominence (Crouch, 2004, pp.63–64). The diminished significance of traditional 
institutional structures and the substitution of class belonging by individual  identity as the basis 
for political engagement (Bennett, 1975), has brought about the advent of lifestyle politics. 
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These forms of political participation are primarily characterised by an increased 
emphasis on political issues which are more closely related to the individualised concerns of 
the postmodern citizen, than to some predetermined understandings of citizenship determined 
by class and expressed primarily by formally established institutions, such as labour unions and 
political parties. Such a development therefore, has offered citizens the freedom, but also the 
responsibility, to choose their own symbols of citizenship through an expanded repertoire of 
civic engagement, without being confined by the restrictions imposed by the monopoly of a 
dominant, class-dependent civic culture.  
The same positive consequences of Slater’s post-responsibility thesis extend also to the 
consumer domain. Here instead, for Jäckel (2013) the emphasis is shifting from the satiation of 
basic needs, to lifestyle. Economic developments in late modernity in many western  countries, 
have brought about a convergence of the living conditions of the greatest part of the 
population, and have expanded the middle class. This however, leaves little room for defining 
one’s self through consumption simply by how much one can spend on luxury items and the 
signified social status such a purchase may have reflected under modernity. Instead, individuals 
have started seeking alternative ways to differentiate themselves through their consumption 
patterns. Such alternative ways may be found in the increased availability of products that are 
imbued with ethical, environmental or political meaning, such as fair-trade, organic and ‘green’ 
products, which the postmodern consumers are now free, but also responsible to choose from. 
Nevertheless, a great part of consumer behaviour remains connected to materialist 
conceptions of consumption, as for example when buying products simply for their use value 
(Autio and Heinonen, 2004). The act of consumption of fair-trade or organic products may be 
simply motivated by their price or personal preferences with regards to their taste. For 
instance, some people may consistently avoid  multinational fast-food franchises not because 
they protest against US’s foreign policy (Bové and Dufour, 2002), nor because they seek to raise 
awareness against the carbon emissions of meat production (Knudsen et al., 2008), but simply 
because they do not like hamburgers. Stern (2000) argues that political consumers’ 
consumption patterns diverge from general consumer behaviour with regards to their levels of 
commitment and responsibility. This responsibility in turn, is a reflection of their underlying 
values and general ideological standpoint with regards to ethical, political and environmental 
concerns (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013).  
Moreover, whereas partaking in generic consumer behaviour presupposes an appraisal 
of the likely costs and benefits, solely for the individual consumer who engages in it, political 
consumerism is inherently more collective and future-oriented, as it evaluates costs and 
benefits for the extended community, the environment or the society as a whole, including the 
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costs and benefits for the future generations (Micheletti and Stolle, 2010). For instance, the 
political consumers are more likely to take into considerations the ecological implications for 
the future generations of their carbon footprint when they travel with long distance flights; the 
consequences of their consumption of certain products produced in sweat shops under 
questionable labour conditions; or when they buy from second-hand shops in their vicinity to 
support their local community. This development of consumers’ responsible consumption 
choices has allowed for the advent of lifestyle forms of political participation through the 
individuals’ consumption choices, as in the case of political consumerism. 
In turn, the negative expression of post-responsibility refers to the implications of those 
choices. Although such developments may be liberating on the individual level, they become 
problematic when one considers their collective implications. The postmodern individual may 
now choose to forfeit the ethical and political obligations that were linked to the dominant 
narratives of citizenship under modernity, choosing eventually without any reference to 
external constants, such as values, needs, or even truth itself. Keynes (2004) refers to the term 
‘post-truth’ politics to denote a political culture according to which political debate is framed 
principally by appeals to emotion; disengaged from actual policy and legislative implications 
and ignoring factual rebuttals. Similarly, the political commentator Eric Alterman (2005) coins 
the term ‘post-truth presidency’, and investigates the misleading statements allegedly made 
by the Bush administration at the aftermath of 9/11. 
Colin Crouch (2004), first used the phrase "post-democracy" in his book with the same 
name to denote a political model where "elections certainly exist and can change governments" 
but "public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by rival teams of 
professionals expert in the techniques of persuasion" (Crouch, 2004, p. 4). Crouch points 
directly towards the advertising industry of political communication, and its strategic appeals 
to emotion, as the primary responsible for the crisis of trust in the institutional political sphere 
that post-democracy has brought about. Based on Crouch, other scholars have recognised the 
role of political marketing towards a general apathy and distrust against political institutions 
(Harsin, 2018). Since then, political commentators have repeatedly identified post-truth politics 
in different countries across the globe, like Brazil, Russia, India, but also in western democracies 
like the United Kingdom and Greece, and have identified as underlying factors for their 
emergence a combination of the 24-hour news cycle, unbalanced reporting of news, the 
increasingly uncontrolled social media and fake news websites (Connor, 2014; Gopalakrishnan, 
2016). 
The two consequences – one negative and one positive - of the ‘post-responsibility' 
hypothesis provide the theoretical framework behind both the ‘decline thesis’ of political 
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participation (Hay, 2007; Pharr et al., 2000; Putnam, 1995), as well as the increase of extra-
institutional or lifestyle forms of political participation (De Moor, 2017; Pickard, 2019c) such as 
political consumerism (Balsiger and Moor, 2018; Stolle and Micheletti, 2013). With regards to 
the former, the apathy and distrust towards traditional political institutions will drive 
individuals to refrain from the class-based ethical commitments to electoral participation, party 
or labour union membership, as it was previously dictated under modernity. Researchers have 
portrayed the advent of post-truth politics as responsible for the decline of trust particularly of 
young people to traditional electoral politics (Ball, 2017; Hay, 2007), and the abrupt decline of 
voter turnout and party membership of the last decades, especially among young people (Henn 
and Oldfield, 2016).  
With regards to the latter however, that is the positive implications of post-
responsibility thesis, liberated from the traditional ‘dominant myths’ of their civic commitment 
to electoral politics, individuals are now free to trace new sources of symbolism with regards 
to their individualised understandings of citizenship. Consumerism, with its power to create 
and reproduce a sense of identity, provides therefore the par-excellence framework for young 
people to redefine their civic duties and responsibilities, as it will be discussed in the following 
section. It is this empowering element of consumerism that has brought about the convergence 
of the citizen and the consumer, and thus the emergence of political consumerism as a form of 
political participation which uses the marketplace as an alternative arena for political 
participation. The sections that follow will examine these dynamics. 
 
b. Consumption as Identity: Two parallel narratives 
A common thread in the social theories of Ulrich Beck and Antony Giddens (Beck, 1992; 
Giddens, 1991) is the understanding that in late modernity people define themselves through 
the signs they transmit to others via the commodities they decide to consume. In this process 
they manipulate appearances and thus they devise a unique self-identity. In a market 
environment where there are increasingly more commodities available, the obligation of self-
identification resides almost entirely on the consumer. This section will explore these dynamics 
of self-identification through consumption among young people, in the works of Ulrich Beck 
(1992), Anthony Giddens (1991). The role of consumption in the creation of identity will be 
subsequently used to elucidate a perceived convergence of the previously distant notions of 
the citizens and the consumer, and thus the emergence of the political consumer. 
The significance of Beck’s (1992) work resides in his conceptualisation of a process of 
reflexive modernisation. The process of social modernisation that followed the industrialisation 
of the economy in the West offered the promise of establishing a sense of control over the 
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insecurities of the pre-industrial era. In turn, reflexive modernisation for Beck, refers to a 
process whereby technology and science was increasingly applied on all aspects of society so 
as to counteract the harmful consequences of industrialisation. In a way, under reflexive 
modernisation the underlying logic of modernisation is being applied to itself. Science and 
technology are increasingly applied on the evaluation of the production process itself 
attempting to control a range of unpredictable and often invisible risks.  
But Beck’s analysis does not stop there. Instead, he proceeds to apply the same notion 
of reflexivity on the social circumstances of the individual, and identifies a clear tendency 
towards increased individualisation, that takes place in three stages:  
• The Disembedding dimension denotes the removal from historically prescribed 
social structures and commitments, such as those of class, gender and 
materialist concerns and their expression via traditional forms of political 
participation. 
• The Disenchantment dimension describes the loss of the security which the 
practical arrangements of party-affiliation according to class and other guiding 
societal norms used to provide. 
• The Re-embedding dimension establishes a novel, highly individualised form of 
social commitment within the market as an alternative political arena, within 
which young people may now express their concerns, and re-instils the sense of 
control lost in the previous stage. 
As income levels, class, family structure or even gender are increasingly losing 
prominence as identifiers of their reflexive biographies, individuals become the “agents of their 
own livelihood mediated by the market” (Beck, 1992, p. 130). In the words of Beck: 
People with the same income level, or put in the old-fashioned way, within the same 
‘class’, can or even must choose between different lifestyles, subcultures, social ties and 
identities. From knowing one’s ‘class’ position one can no longer determine one’s 
personal outlook, relations, family position, social and political ideas or identity (1992, 
p. 131). 
With respect to young people’s political participation therefore, the process of the 
increased autonomation outlined above initially liberates young people from the traditional 
commitments of party affiliation as dictated by class (the disembedding stage). A result of this 
liberation however, young people are likely to sense a loss of control with regards to their 
influence on the traditional political sphere (the disenchantment stage). As a consequence, 
young people will seek to replace their electoral and party affiliation commitments by 
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secondary agencies and institutions within the marketplace (the re-embedding stage), which in 
turn “stamp the biography of the individual and make that person dependent upon fashions, 
social policy, economic cycles and markets” (Beck, 1992, p. 131), or in other words, an entirely 
new set of risks that the individual has now to face.  
It is at this point of Beck’s analysis that the element of responsibility discussed above 
resurfaces. In Beck’s individualised risk-society, new forms of personal risks arise with regards 
to the elective biographies chosen by the individuals, as the responsibility of one’s biography 
lies now almost entirely on the hands of the individuals, mediated only by the possibilities the 
market has to offer. As a result of this process, now “…individualisation means market 
dependency in all dimensions of living” (Beck, 1992, p. 132). The complexity of the 
contemporary global trade environment reduces the ordinary consumer’s understanding of the 
production process behind the greatest part of consumer commodities. Lacking this access to 
the full information behind the products therefore, consumers are unable to assess the risks of 
their consumption decisions on the political, social, and environmental level. As a result, a 
relatively new market segment has emerged that promotes products which provide 
transparent information about their production. The proliferation of Fair Trade, organic, 
ethical, or 0-miles labelling schemes carry the advantage of informing consumers about the 
environmental footprint of the said products, or about the conditions under which they were 
produced. Contemporary consumption therefore reflects these shifting risks of the creation of 
identity through consumption; or in other words of living in - what Beck calls - a ‘risk society’.  
The examples from the application of Beck’s theory of risk-society to political 
consumerism are numerous: For instance, consuming meat and dairy products contributes to 
climate change (Bakker and Dagevos, 2012; De Boer et al., 2013). On the other hand however, 
cultivating soy as an alternative for meat consumption, has been reported to be the prime 
driver of deforestation in the Amazon basin (Nepstad et al., 2014). Similarly, savouring a 
chocolate bar might be contributing to the propagation of slavery and child labour in the cocoa 
plantations of Western Africa (Schrage and Ewing, 2005). However, opting for fair-trade 
chocolate instead, which ensures that the workers are being paid fair wages and work under 
humane conditions, may have severe repercussion with regards to the increased carbon 
emissions involved in their distribution (Unger, 2010). Furthermore, the textile production 
needed to sustain the contemporary fast fashion industry, has been often associated with child 
labour, bad working conditions, and environmental depletion (Connell, 2019). It follows 
therefore that each time consumers purchase a new jacket from Primark, consume particular 
kinds of food, or even when they attempt to lift their moods by enjoying a hot cup of cocoa, 
they unavoidably, and often unbeknownst to them, are influencing various societal issues 
across the globe. Beck’s conceptualisation of risk-society perceives that these risks are 
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unavoidable, and as such it is the consumers’ responsibility to address them accordingly, by 
developing an individualised self-identity according to their preferred consumption patterns. 
In turn, Anthony Giddens (1991) examines the nature of these new risks the individuals 
now face in sustaining their elective self-identities. Giddens defines self-identity as “the self as 
reflexively understood by the individual in terms of his or her biography” (1991, p. 244). For 
Giddens, the choice of the elective biographies out of all the complex diversity of non-binding 
alternatives available in the market is critical; especially since the market offers “little help as 
to which options should be selected” (1991, p. 80). He then proceeds to explore the multitude 
of pressures that render this commodified self-identity problematic. For Giddens, the 
commodification of identity through the facilitation of the market, simultaneously attacks 
tradition and enhances the individualisation process. As such, the “[m]arket-governed freedom 
of individual choice becomes an enveloping framework of individual self-expression” (1991, p. 
197). For Giddens therefore, the sign-value of consumed commodities increasingly outweigh 
their use-value. In other words, by purchasing fair trade coffee, one does not simply buy the 
utility of being able to brew a hot cup of coffee the following day, but also purchases in part 
the self-identity of a responsible citizen – either of an activist when buycotting, or a rebel when 
boycotting. 
Giddens’ major contribution to the study of the formation of identity under 
consumerism stems from his emphasis on the resistive element of postmodern consumption 
to the standardisation of mass consumption. Similarly to Beck, Giddens stresses the element of 
choice behind every-day consumption decisions, and the uncertainty that this creates. Unlike 
Beck however, for Giddens this does not bring about any significant risks. Consumption for 
Giddens is generally a positive, and constructive activity in a continuous process of self-
identification. In that respect a change of one’s consumption patterns will simply eventually 
lead to a different conceptualisation of the self in the long run. Consumption therefore for 
Giddens is a significantly less risky endeavour than for Beck, since biographies can be 
continuously re-written. For both Beck and Giddens, commodities (clothes, cars, cigarettes etc.) 
serve primarily as markers of identity and as such they are evaluated for their symbolic 
significance. Moreover, for Giddens, just like for Beck, consumption remains primarily an 
instance of individual choice. Whether consumers actually exercise this choice or not is 
irrelevant, since they will be judged as if they have done so. For Giddens therefore, political 
consumerism represents an inevitable – and generally positive - shift of young people’s identity 
creation under postmodernism.  
For Giddens therefore, the distinction between individualised and collective identity 
that will follow in the next section is a rather limited way of interpreting what should be better 
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understood as “an expansion of social reflexivity” (1994, p. 13). In the high reflexivity that 
characterises postmodern societies, individuals need to achieve a certain degree of autonomy 
of action, in order to survive the novel risks, of Beck’s (1992) ‘risk-society’. But for Giddens 
(1994, p. 13) “autonomy is not the same as egoism and moreover implies reciprocity and 
interdependence”. Political consumerism therefore “should not be seen as a form of protecting 
social cohesion at the edges of an egoistic marketplace. It should be understood as one of 
reconciling autonomy and interdependence in the various spheres of social life, including the 
economic domain” (Giddens, 1994, p. 13). 
What both accounts above have in common is the acceptance that consumption 
matters, because it defines self-identity, and is a critical part of its creation and maintenance. 
In postmodernity, consumption has moved away from its understanding as a means to ensure 
the physical survival of the self (as it was primarily understood under modernity), and towards 
the creation and perpetuation of elective biographies based almost entirely on individual 
choice. But with this choice also increases the insecurity of this new self, as new risks come to 
replace the old ones.  
Applying the theories outlined above to young people’s political participation, it could 
be argued that the increased individualisation of postmodern societies would initially liberate 
young people from the traditional commitments of citizenship, as for example those of 
institutional, election-centred participation, and within that, party affiliation according to one’s 
class. Such a development however, also brings the loss of control and influence on the purely 
political sphere, as young people increasingly abstain from these forms of political 
participation. As a consequence therefore, young people are likely to seek other means of 
expressing their political agency. The marketplace is thus the only way to turn, as for Giddens 
this is the only place in postmodern societies that offers a certainty of an identity. Nevertheless, 
Beck remains cautious that such a displacement of one’s citizenship commitments from 
political to market institutions as a means of expressing one’s political considerations can be 
particularly problematic.  
For Bauman (2005) instead, a great part of the problems that arise from Beck’s risk-
society stems from the observation that this has been accompanied by an identity displacement 
away from collective forms of political participation, such as elections, and towards 
individualised forms of political participation within the market. This observation provides the 
connection for the analysis of the opposite dynamic – that of the re-establishment of collective 
concerns in individual purchasing decisions. The section that follows will explore this reverse 
dynamic. 
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3. Between the Individual and the Collective? 
 
As displayed above, for the postmodern thinker, consumption becomes the primary 
determining factor behind the emergence of a variety of individualised lifestyles (Bauman, 
2000; Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991). However, other social commentators (Maffesoli, 1996) 
emphasise the opposite dynamic, insofar different consumption patterns reflect new social 
ideologies and cause consumers to cluster into new social ‘tribes’. For instance, Copeland 
(2014b) demonstrates how environmentally-friendly consumption patterns reflect 
postmaterialist value-orientations (Inglehart, 1997). These complementary understandings of 
the liquid, postmodern self as simultaneously individualistic and collectivist in orientation will 
be the focus of this section. 
As outlined in the previous section, postmodern consumerism is linked to the creation 
and reproduction of individual identity. Products are impregnated, knowingly or not by the 
buyer, with a greater significance than merely the utility of their use would dictate. 
Acknowledging the symbolic value of the products indicates that consumption itself is a factor 
of the construction and perpetuation of identity, irrespectively of young people’s 
circumstances of birth, gender, class or race. The very act of consumption becomes thus a 
highly-individualised activity and this may lead some consumers to assume that their 
individualised consumption patterns distinguish them from their societal counterparts.  
However, Todd (2012, p. 48) argues that this is merely one part of the argument. 
Instead, Todd perceives consumption as a form of communication between the consumer and 
society at large. On the one hand therefore, consumption distinguishes one consumer from the 
next one. On the other hand however, it also communicates a set of common underlying values 
shared with like-minded consumers. In that respect therefore, consumption-driven self-
identification has less to do with ‘who am I?’ and more with ‘who are we?’ or ‘with whom do I 
belong?’. For example, McCarty and Shrum (2001) explore the influence of individualistic and 
collectivist value orientations on environmental beliefs and subsequent consumer behaviour 
and find that individualism is associated with shared beliefs about the inconvenience of 
recycling, whereas collectivism is related to beliefs about the importance of recycling instead. 
In turn, Poortinga et al. (2004) demonstrate that people who exhibit low levels of 
environmental concerns prefer free-market solutions rather than advocating for the 
introduction of environmental policies on the mainstream political arena. 
This conceptualization of consumption as communication of identity draws heavily from 
Baudrillard's semiotics. Baudrillard (2016) demonstrates how society has moved away from 
reality and meaning, to the use of symbols and signs. Utilising the signifier-signified distinction, 
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Baudrillard establishes that the consumer no longer purchases a product (a signifier), with a 
certain utility value, but a ‘piece of language’ (the signified symbolism this product conveys) 
which defines his identity only through the consensus of such a meaning from the Other. In this 
respect, our individual consumption patterns reflect our desire towards a collective identity.  
Thus, political consumerism does not only provide fertile grounds for expressing one’s 
individualised concerns, but also provides the benefit of a sense of belonging in a community 
for the young people who will engage in it, albeit an ‘imagined’ one (Anderson, 2006). 
Maffesoli’s (1996) sociological concept of “neo-tribalism” as an outcome of shared 
beliefs, passions and social rituals, becomes thus pertinent. For Maffesoli, society has moved 
away from the modern conceptualisation of the Self, with its emphasis on instrumental reason, 
and the blind faith to individual agency. So, if Beck and Giddens emphasise on individualism, 
Maffesoli introduces the concept of ‘togetherness' as the key notion of his theory of tribalism. 
In view of the contingency of the postmodern Self, the concept of ‘togetherness’ as an essential 
element in one’s socialisation, bridges the gap between the creation of individual and collective 
identities. 
According to Hebdige (2012) the 'style' adopted by each 'subculture' is meant as both a 
way to comment on the larger framework of the society, while simultaneously marking their 
membership to their distinctive subculture or their social positioning. On such a grounds, 
therefore, the consumption patterns of neo-tribes, such as vegetarians, vegans, Extinction-
Rebellion activists and right-wing skinheads alike, cease to be about the individual but more 
about the collective, wherein the consumers will choose a distinctive sense of style, which 
communicates their membership in their ingroup of choice. 
The notion of collective identity has been extensively employed by social movement 
theory in an attempt to explain how social movements produce and maintain cohesion and 
commitment between individual actors over time. Despite its wide application in social theory, 
collective identity remains a particularly abstract concept (Fominaya, 2010). For Melucci (1989, 
p. 34) collective identity is defined as a “shared definition produced by several interacting 
individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as well as the field of 
opportunities and constraints in which their actions take place”. Similarly, Polletta and Jasper 
(2001, p. 285) define it as “an individual’s  cognitive, moral and emotional connection with a 
broader community, category, practice or institution”. Collective identity theory therefore, 
focuses primarily on the ways through which individuals form attachments with likeminded 
individuals with similar goals. The above analysis begs the question of how this consumption-
based individualised Self relates and interacts on the collective level with its social counterparts 
to form imagined communities on the political level. Consumption-based collective identity has 
80 | P a g e  
 
the advantage of not requiring the existence of formal organisations, other than the market. 
Instead it relies primarily on the common choices of individuals, based on their – shared - 
ethical, environmental and political value orientations.  
The theory of imagined communities (Anderson, 2006) first developed in 1983 to 
advance the study of nationalism, becomes of particular interest for the study of political 
consumerism. Imagined communities are “larger than face-to-face-societies, the communal 
bonds felt by their members are imagined, that is exist in their minds […] it is imagined because 
their members will never know most of their fellow members, meet them or even hear of them, 
yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”  (Anderson, 2006, p. 7). The theory 
of imagined communities can therefore explain how collective identity based on individual 
consumption behaviour becomes possible. Ethical and political consumers share bonds and 
practices that rise above national borders, by constructing imagined community-based 
identities. The theory of imagined communities implies that political consumerism has the 
potential to transcend the mere aggregate of disparate individual purchasing decisions. Instead 
it suggests the existence of a collective of consumers who share a common collective identity, 
based on a similar set of values and common political goals, embodied in the purchase of similar 
commodities. The potential of political consumerism to generate social and political change is 
being augmented by the belief that other people, with similar motivations, are making similar 
choices (Lekakis, 2013a).  
Political consumerism seems to closely fit within the discussion above as it constitutes 
a non-electoral form of political participation, that expresses at a first instance an essentially 
individualistic form of civic action. The greater part of the available literature considering 
political consumerism has indeed stressed significantly more the individualistic nature of 
political consumerism, at the expense of its collective appeal (Micheletti and Stolle, 2010; Stolle 
and Micheletti, 2013), linking its perceived expansion to a general trend towards individualistic 
modes of political participation (Dalton, 1996).  
Despite however, its essentially individualistic nature, political consumerism has also a 
dormant collective appeal. Even though Zukin (2006, p. 79) reports that citizens participated in 
acts of political consumerism “because it’s a good thing to do”, emphasising thus its normative, 
individualistic appeal, Micheletti and Stolle (2010) identify also social solidarity as a 
determinant for political consumerism. This renders political consumerism an individualised- 
collective for of political participation, that instead of perpetuating the individualist-collective 
cleavage, it rather reconciles the two. Political consumers therefore, partake in an imagined 
community which, on the one hand, opposes the global production networks of western 
societies, but also operates within them by either punishing or rewarding certain production 
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processes through their collective consumption decisions. Political consumerism therefore, 
demonstrates the potential to expand beyond locally-based imagined communities and evolve 
into a global phenomenon (Axtmann, 2018).  
To sum up, the use of consumerist practices towards the constant reinvention of the 
Self, away from gender, class, racial and social rigidities, echoes the fluidity of postmodernism. 
However, our consumption patterns do not only help us develop a sense of identity, but also 
allow us to collectively redefine our civic duties. Political consumption based on individualised 
decisions in relation to one’s environmental, ethical and political considerations bears the 
potential of creating imagined communities with other likeminded consumers across the globe. 
Jacobsen and Dulsurd (2007, p. 471) pose that, “[w]hen aggregated, these individual choices 
have the potential to transcend the actions of individuals to form political movements that 
may, in turn, challenge political and economic powers”.  
The democratic repercussions of the aggregated dynamics of individual consumer 
choices, based on imagined communities which share collective values, in relation to issues of 
justice, fairness, or environmental concerns (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013), echoes the political 
potential of the market as an alternative political arena. The section that follows thus, will be 
discussing this convergence of the previously distant notions of the citizen and the consumer 
and the emergence of the citizen-consumer hybrid. 
 
4. The emergence of the Political Consumer 
 
The traditional conceptual distinction between the ‘homo politicus’ and the ‘homo 
oeconomicus’ (Faber et al., 2002) under modernity, refers to the self as being divided between 
these two separate outlooks. For example, Cohen (2004) emphasises the dichotomous role 
between citizens and consumers. The former are defined as individuals who have the obligation 
to fulfil certain civil duties in connection to the government in order to guarantee their rights 
and privileges. The latter instead, are perceived as merely preoccupied with satisfying their 
private material needs and desires.  
This distinction however, implies that political opinions and consumer decisions are 
created and subsequently exist in void, independently of each other. Sagoff (2007, p. 8) 
exemplifies this fragmentation: “As a citizen, I am concerned with the public interest, rather 
than my own interest; with the good of the community”, whilst “as a consumer […] I concern 
myself with personal or self-regarding wants and interests”. The societal developments brought 
about under postmodernism however, have allowed for this distinction to fade away.  
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On the one hand, the emergence of ‘lifestyle politics’ that ensued these developments, 
is being characterised by a shift of the emphasis of citizenship, from collective concerns, to 
individualist concerns (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; Micheletti and Stolle, 2010). As a result, 
people will thus increasingly rely less on institutionalised forms of political participation on the 
one hand, and will simultaneously expand their repertoires of preferred modes of political 
action (Giddens, 1994; van Deth, 2012), as a way of expressing their individualised values. Zorell 
(2019b, pp. 48, 49) captures this process: “Election-centred political participation is extended 
or even replaced by a customised inclusion of ‘politics’ in everyday life, based on a personal 
and ‘flexible’ set-up of varying political participation modes and group belonging”.  
On the other hand however, a relatively recent strand of political sociology is 
increasingly identifying the consumer as a moral agent, with specific consumption patterns 
intended as a means to political ends (Sassatelli, 2006). Schudson (2007), for example, 
emphasises the complementarity of the roles of the citizen and the consumer, in the 
emergence of the ‘political consumer’. The political consumer therefore is being understood as 
a consumer empowered by ethical, environmental and political concerns. As a consequence, 
for Schudson (2007, p. 237), consumer choices are no less an “inferior form of human activity 
compared to voting at the polling place or otherwise exercising citizenship”.  
Summarising then, identity, values and behaviour under postmodernism are no longer 
necessarily linked to the profession, income levels or class positioning they previously signified 
– neither in terms of citizenship, nor in terms of consumption patterns. Instead, individuals are 
now increasingly faced with the risk, but also the responsibility, of establishing an  elective set 
of values or what Bernardi (2009) has termed ‘elective’ biographies, which will express 
themselves simultaneously both in the political, as well in the consumer arena.  As a result, 
these two arenas are consequently being conflated.  
The increasing interconnectedness in today’s globalised political and market 
environments involves an equal interconnectedness of the problems that pertain 
simultaneously to the political and consumer realms (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013; Zorell, 
2019b). The examples are numerous, and range from environmental depletion, genetically 
modified products, contaminated crops as well as the exploitation of the workers, sub-standard 
wages in the manufacturing sectors etc., which all correlate both to the roles of consumers as 
citizens and to citizens as consumers,  who increasingly appreciate that citizenship grants not 
only rights but also responsibilities (Zorell, 2019b, p. 49). Unlike the traditional 
conceptualisation of the self as being fragmented between the private and the public spheres 
(Sagoff, 2007), this novel set of responsibilities however, is connected to both the private and 
the public realms. As a result, more and more individuals seem to have started recognising that 
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as “consumers [they now] have power to influence a fair and moral marketplace” (Neilson, 
2010, p. 214). 
Zorell (2019b, p. 50) summarises these developments: “Together, the desire to feel and 
act freely and self-determinedly, the wish to convey a particular ‘self’ in public, the focus on 
new issues, and the recognition of consumer power, seem to lead to a fundamental shift: the 
entangling of the citizen and the consumer roles”. This entanglement of these previously 
distinct roles into a single hybrid, in the form of ‘citizen-consumer’, is being accompanied by 
another important consequence. This is the realisation that developments in the purely 
consumer sphere may foster developments in the strictly political sphere, and set in motion 
changes in both. Such changes would not be possible if the spheres were not aligned (Zorell, 
2019b).  
The emergence of a critical mass of empowered consumers with increasingly 
postmaterialist values, has only recently rendered possible what Kotler describes as a 
‘democracy of goods’ (Kotler et al., 2002, p. 36). Sassatelli thus, (2006, p. 188) stresses, in the 
words of Beck (1992) that “If modernity is a democracy oriented to producers, late modernity 
is a democracy oriented to consumers: a pragmatic and cosmopolitan democracy where the 
sleepy giant of the ‘sovereign citizen-consumer’ is becoming a counterweight to big 
transnational corporations”.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The discussion above provides an overview of the sociological understanding of consumerism, 
and the ensuing developments under postmodernism that have enabled the emergence of the 
citizen-consumer. Most prominent stand the conceptualisations of consumption as 
responsibility and as identity. However, the conceptualisation of consumption as responsibility 
provides support to the standpoint that consumer behaviour under postmodernism is also 
influenced by altruistic norms and motives, fostered by the collective identity orientation of 
postmodern consumers. For instance, awareness of the consequences that consumption has 
on the environment, motivates altruistic consumption behaviour and greater responsibility 
with regards to individual consumption decisions. In that respect, consumer responsibility 
seeks to critically assess the creation of consumer identity, embedding it with ethical, political 
and environmental collective considerations.  
Consumer identity therefore, lingers between the postmodern emphasis on 
individualisation on the one hand, and collective responsibility-taking on the other. The chapter 
has thus  discussed two parallel narratives, drawing from Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991), 
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which explore the paradox that while the increased individualisation of liquid modernity leads 
to greater freedom of choice, it also transfers the responsibility of that choice back to the 
individuals. As a result, consumers find themselves in a context where they need to decide 
between their individual needs, wants and desires and the collective repercussions of their 
consumer behaviour on the environment and the future generations.  
This chapter argues therefore, that it is exactly this conjunction of the notions of 
postmodern responsibility and identity that has brought about the convergence of the 
previously distant notions of the citizen and the consumer. Consumerism therefore, with its 
ability to create and reproduce a sense of identity and responsibility, provides the underlying 
framework for young people in late modernity to redefine their civic duties and responsibilities 
as citizen-consumers. But as a form of political participation that operates predominately within 
the bounds of the market, political consumerism is inexorably connected to the neoliberal 
ideological framework that has permeated the markets for more than 30 years in western 
democracies. The next chapter will thus problematise the contextual influence of neoliberalism 
with respect to political consumerism. 
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Chapter 5: Neoliberalism and Political Consumerism  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The politics of consumption discussed in Chapter 4, have not remained uncontested. One of 
the resurfacing questions in the study of political consumerism is the degree to which the 
phenomenon is susceptible to market appropriation. Indeed, Mukherjee and Banet-Weiser 
(2012) present the potential of the transformation of consumer activism into another branded 
commodity, under a neoliberal economic and ideological superstructure. In turn, Lekakis 
(2013a, p. 23) highlights that a “focal point of interrogation in the conceptualisation of ethical 
consumption as a political phenomenon has been the question of whether and how much it 
has become enveloped into the gulfs of neoliberal capitalism”. Furthermore, a recently revived 
strand of literature in the field of youth political disengagement (in general) connects it to the 
expansion of neoliberal policies (Allsop et al., 2018). However, there has been significantly less 
attention placed on the connection of neoliberalism to political consumerism (in particular).  
The discussion on the convergence of the citizen and the consumer in the previous 
chapter, will thus form the backdrop on which this chapter will seek to establish political 
consumerism as a form of economic voting within a neoliberal market context. The chapter will 
proceed to identify and distinguish between a set of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors associated with 
neoliberalism that may either drive young people away from conventional participation (such 
as voting), or in turn may induce the young neoliberal subjects into market-oriented forms of 
political participation, such as political consumerism. 
 
2. Neoliberalism and youth political (dis)engagement   
 
a. The neoliberal rationale 
Since its first use in 1938, ‘neoliberalism’ has been a highly contested concept. Especially after  
the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008, neoliberalism is being often perceived as the 
root of all evil with regards to its social, political and environmental implications. For a term 
that has received so much attention and criticism in the academic, political and social 
discourses, it is surprising that there is hardly a single working definition. Harvey (2007a, p. 18) 
defines neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human 
well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, 
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and free trade”. The range of available definitions stress a process of reconstitution of the 
power of the state through, and interplay between, the tools of privatisation, finance, and 
market forces. State interventions in the economy are diminished, while the onus of the state 
as the primary caretaker of its citizens’ welfare is similarly reduced (Harvey, 2007a). 
Neoliberalism therefore, with its emphasis on affirming free markets, is remodelling 
“every human need or desire in a profitable enterprise” (Brown, 2015, p. 28) and is thus 
“reducing all forms of life to economic ones” (McAfee, 2017, p. 11). It perceives competition as 
the distinctive property of human relations, and therefore it defines citizens primarily as 
consumers, whose democratic resolution is best exercised by buying and selling within a 
deregulated global market. Any attempt to limit market competition is thus perceived as 
detrimental to liberty, and therefore any kind of government regulations should be minimised. 
Collective bargaining and trade unions are deemed as market distortions which hamper the 
restoration of a ‘natural hierarchy’. In turn, inequality is considered as a virtuous premium for 
the generation of wealth, which is destined to trickle-down to all members of the economy. In 
contrast, any egalitarian effort is not only counter-productive, but also morally repugnant, since 
the free market will grant everyone what they deserve according to their individual 
contribution to the economy. 
Peck (2010) distinguishes between the ‘roll-back’ and the ‘roll-out’ effects of 
neoliberalism. The former refers to the institutional, laissez-faire economic principles of 
neoliberal reasoning, such as the deregulation and privatisation of the state. The latter, 
however, refers to the attempt of neoliberalism to harness the existing social forces and to 
remould them around its own objectives, either by accentuating competition as an inherent 
force of human nature, or by the marketisation of previously non-market social domains.  
This double assault of neoliberal rationality on both the existing institutional and social 
constructs has been exemplified in the work of Foucault (Zamora and Behrent, 2016), who 
describes neoliberalism not as an externally-induced form of ideological control, but instead as 
a highly internalised form of self-regulation and self-discipline, and coined the term 
governmentality15 to describe this process (Byrne, 2017). 
 
15 The term is a synthesis of the French gouverner and mentalité – ‘governing’ and ‘mode of 
thought’ – and is roughly translated into English as ‘governmental rationality’ (Byrne, 2017, 
p.348). 
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For Foucault (1991), government is not static and encompasses not only the traditional 
political sphere linked to state institutions, but also that which operates at the community level, 
including the government of the self.  Governmentality thus defines a configuration of power 
which bears mainly two defining elements: first, it primarily targets the people, “aiming to 
produce a happy and well-ordered society of workers and consumers” (Byrne, 2017, p. 348); 
and secondly it dictates ‘political economy’ as the guiding framework to achieve these aims. 
That is, society as a whole should be remodelled following the principles of the market. 
Neoliberalism throughout this thesis will thus be defined in Foucauldian terms, as a form of 
governmentality. 
In this way, neoliberalism becomes an internalised “form of surveillance and control as 
attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods” (Byrne, 2017, p. 
349). Whereas however, the state should therefore, paternalistically safeguard its operation 
according to market principles for the wellbeing of its citizens, the actual responsibility for the 
citizens’ education, health and social security has been displaced to individuals. As a result, 
neoliberal governmentality, in a process that has been described as “creative destruction” 
(Harvey, 2007b, p. 1), has accelerated a paradigm shift from the power of the people to that of 
the market - and consequently, an equal shift from the agency of citizens to that of the 
consumers.  
As a result, society as a whole had to undergo a process of internalisation of the 
neoliberal values. The neoliberal emphasis on entrepreneurism, consumerism, the scarcity 
hypothesis, and the corresponding competition of resources that follows it, have been 
internalised to such an extent by neoliberal subjects that these processes and phenomena 
combine to define people’s political identity and behaviour (Kennelly, 2011).  
This roll-out process of neoliberalism, has been augmented by the adoption of the 
neoliberal rationale by think-tanks, academia, and political parties across the ideological 
spectrum from the 1980s onwards, and was intensified after Margaret Thatcher became Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom (1979-1990). So ubiquitous has the roll-out process of 
neoliberalism been that it is hardly recognised as a distinct ideology anymore, providing 
support to the Foucauldian understanding of neoliberalism as a form of governmentality. 
Instead, it is often portrayed as merely descriptive of a natural force, similar to gravity or a 
biological law, reflecting the intrinsic human nature, neglecting to recall that we are referring 
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to a “philosophy that arose as a conscious attempt to reshape human life and shift the locus of 
power” (Harvey, 2007a, p. 3).  
As a result of the internalisation of neoliberalism as a form of governmentality, 
individuals are being called to compete for scarce employment and insecure jobs, diminishing 
wages and increasing price levels (Dardot and Laval, 2013). However, this prevalence of 
neoliberalism on the international political, economic and social domains, came allegedly to an 
abrupt halt following the outbreak of the ongoing global financial crisis, which for Harvey 
(2007b, p. 38) has disclosed the failings of the neoliberal rationale.  
 
b. A crisis of neoliberal capitalism 
A thorough analysis of the enduring global financial crisis is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, given that the thesis aims to explore the motivations behind the political consumerist 
practices of young people in the UK and Greece in a time of austerity, at least some background 
information about how the crisis has affected perceptions about neoliberal capitalism remains 
indispensable.  
The measures which were introduced as a response to the crisis and the magnitude of 
their underlying rhetoric were in direct contrast to the neoliberal narrative that had dominated 
the financial, but also the political spheres for almost three decades. Garrett (2019, p. 195) 
posits that these “would have been viewed as outlandish by the political mainstream only 
months previously”. For example, several governments at the heart of the EU coordinated 
massive rescue efforts of virtually bankrupt banks and financial institutions, which for Callinicos 
(2010, p. 8) “amounted to the greatest nationalisations in world history”. 
Eventually, the dominant narrative in response to the crisis developed into one of 
“macro-Keynesianism and micro-Neoliberalism” (Callinicos, 2010, p. 129). In other words, 
democratic states were more partial to financial interventions in an attempt to save the 
corporate banking sector, whereas the working class, the unemployed and many marginalised 
groups continued to be affected by coercive interventions (Garrett, 2019, p. 195).  
However, these developments have also ignited the emergence of opposition to 
neoliberal political forces, with parties, such as the Bloco de Esquerda in Portugal, Diem25 on 
the European level, but also a surge of electoral support for Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour (and an 
alleged Youthquake in Britain) (Sloam and Henn, 2018), which are directly confronting the 
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hegemonic neoliberal rationality. Among these parties there may be observed – maybe for the 
first time so openly on the institutional level - narratives in favour of alter-globalisation 
(Pickerill, 2007), post-growth and post-capitalism (Shiva and Mies, 2014), or post-consumerist 
(Blühdorn, 2017) tendencies, all of which are associated with higher-order postmaterialist value 
orientations, especially among young people (Henn et al., 2017).  
According to Inglehart’s socialisation hypothesis however, in a context of a neoliberal 
austerity, these postmaterialist forms of political engagement should no longer be presumed 
to be the result of affluence during young people’s socialisation. Recent research suggests that 
there has indeed been a relative reduction in postmaterialist values in many western 
democracies as a result of the ongoing austerity (Cameron, 2013; Janmaat, 2016). Inglehart has 
previously anticipated this development by conceding that during times of economic downturn 
the advance of postmaterialist values is likely to slow down (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). But 
despite such cyclical patterns of postmaterialism in relation to short-term economic 
fluctuations, the long-term tendency remains that of a continuously increasing proportion of 
the population adhering to postmaterialist values (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002). Indeed, 
Henn et al. (2017) find that postmaterialist values seem to persist among young people in 
Britain, despite the transition of the economy from a context of relative affluence to that of 
austerity after the onset of the global recession. Even though these findings seem to contradict 
Inglehart’s socialisation hypothesis, they do “suggest by implication that Inglehart's 
postmaterialist thesis has ongoing theoretical and explanatory value with respect to British 
youth in contemporary context, even under conditions of economic austerity” (Henn et al., 
2017, p. 733).  
Instead, Grasso (2018) provides a complimentary explanation for the perceived 
increased engagement of young people in non-institutionalised forms of political participation, 
such as political consumerism. Assuming an approach that draws equally from social capital 
and political mobilisation theories, she argues that being socialised in a politically volatile era, 
marked by strong ideological divisions, is a much more significant driver of young people’s 
engagement in non-institutionalised acts of political participation, than postmaterialist values 
are. It can thus be argued that the widespread discontent from neoliberal policies, which are 
held responsible for the crisis, coupled with the ensuing prolonged austerity, and the political 
volatility it has brought about on the national and European levels, may have instead intensified 
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young people’s need to seek the ‘political’ in alternative, lifestyle forms of political 
engagement. 
 On the institutional political domain in the UK, Corbyn’s election as the leader of the 
Labour Party and the party’s performance during the General Election of 2017 bring to light the 
extent of public antipathy toward the post-crisis neoliberal agenda (Garrett, 2019). A similar 
pattern is evident on the non-institutional political domain in the UK. Since the outbreak of the 
crisis, several informal and more established groups have emerged, such as the People’s 
Assembly Against Austerity (Mercea and Yilmaz, 2018), the Occupy movement (Cloke et al., 
2016), the UK Uncut (Street, 2015), and the Extinction Rebellion (Shah, 2019), to mention just 
a few. 
Likewise, in Greece, the prolonged austerity that followed the neoliberal crisis, has 
resulted in a political polarisation that has led to the emergence of SYRIZA’s coalition 
government with Independent Greeks (ΑΝΕΛ). However, the  widespread discontent from the 
institutional political domain, has also led young people to increasingly engage in grassroots 
solidarity initiatives and collective organising ‘from below’ which seek to address everyday 
basic needs for food, clothing, services and health treatment. Prominent examples include the 
Residents’ Committee and the Solidarity Network of Exarcheia area in Athens (Arampatzi, 
2017), or the establishment of Alternative Currency Systems in Volos (Streinzer, 2018). As 
Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis (2018, p. 1) observe, such initiatives aim to respond “to social 
dislocation, the failures and the pressures of the market and the state”. 
The direction and the intensity that these usually ‘bottom-up’ participatory initiatives 
will assume however, are being defined by the ‘Concept of the State’ theories, which will be 
the focus of Chapter 6.  
 
c. Neoliberalism, Political Engagement and Dis-engagement 
The simultaneous emergence of alternative political forces on the institutional domain, along 
with the emergence of informal collective organisations from below, are being predominately 
understood as a direct consequence of the neoliberal crisis (Grasso, 2018; Shah, 2019; 
Streinzer, 2018). As a consequence, it could be argued that perhaps the most intrusive effect 
of neoliberal governmentality is not the economic impact it has instigated, but a political one. 
As the responsive power of the state is significantly diminished, so is the capacity of the citizens 
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to influence their livelihoods through electoral participation. Instead, the neoliberal doctrine 
proposes the market as an alternative arena in which citizens may exercise individual choice 
through their spending behaviour.  
Such is the ideological hegemony that neoliberalism had achieved on the institutional 
level, that global political leaders often acceded to neoliberal technocratic solutions for 
addressing economic and social problems (McAfee, 2017). Furthermore, these decisions were 
usually determined not by the EU’s democratic institutions, but by technocrats operating 
behind closed doors (McAfee, 2017), pointing towards what Habermas has referred to as “a 
dismantling of democracy” within the EU (Diez, 2011). Consequently, the resulting 
disempowerment, especially among the lower and middle-income cohorts and the young, 
turned into disenfranchisement, as more parties of the traditional right—but progressively also 
of the former left - complied with the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism. 
Several scholars have asserted that these developments have left behind a “regulatory 
vacuum in global governance” (Micheletti, 2003, p. 9; Scherer and Palazzo, 2011, p. 899; Vogel, 
2008, p. 266; Zorell, 2019a, p. 80). As a result, private businesses intercepted and filled this 
vacuum by increasingly assuming social and political responsibilities which previously belonged 
exclusively to the state. These include the provision of public goods and services like healthcare 
and education or even lobbying to influence the laws of the state  (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011, 
p. 900; Zorell, 2019a, p. 80). Scherer et al. posit that in this context “the nation state is losing 
part of its regulatory power [and] the private-public distinction gets blurred” (2009, p. 322). It 
is argued that eventually, private firms effectively become ‘political actors’, able to influence 
decisions and actions on the political and social domains.  
Consequently, similar to the convergence of the roles of the citizens and the consumers 
discussed in Chapter 4, here we have the dissolution of the traditional division between the 
state and the business sector, whereby socio-political responsibilities were previously the 
domain of the former, while economic responsibilities were the domain of the latter. This 
understanding has been internalised by young people to such a degree, that the market 
becomes now the par-excellence arena of political participation.  
In  conclusion, the shift of industrial modernity to postmodernism has resulted in the 
convergence of the previously distant notions of the citizen and the consumer in the form of 
the citizen-consumer hybrid; the prominence of neoliberal policies in western democracies 
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have likewise, brought about the convergence of young people’s understanding of the roles of 
the state, and the business sector.  
The following section will therefore argue that neoliberalism has resulted in two 
antithetical, but complimentary effects in the UK and Greece. Initially, the neoliberal critique 
of democracy accentuates a ‘push’ effect on young people away from electoral politics, and 
into the commercial domain. However, the politicisation of the market domain calls attention 
to the presence of a parallel ‘pull’ effect into the neoliberal market as a field of potential youth 
political engagement, in the form of political consumerism.  
 
3. Factors influencing political consumption decisions  
 
The previous section has argued that neoliberalism has resulted in many citizens (and young 
people in particular) eschewing electoral politics,  and choosing to express their political, ethical 
and environmental concerns within marketplace. This section will trace these complimentary 
dynamics associated with neoliberalism, that on the one hand ‘push’ young people away from 
institutional forms of political participation, and which simultaneously ‘pull’ young people into 
the marketplace as an alternative political arena. 
 
a. Push Factors 
Published work on political engagement has identified at least three distinct paths through 
which neoliberalism may negatively affect the propensity of young people to engage with 
formal politics, ‘pushing’ them away from participating in traditional democratic deliberation 
processes (Crouch, 2011). Firstly, the neoliberal insistence on the importance of economic 
policies over purely political responses has rendered political actors unable to respond to the 
demands of their constituency (Edwards, 2009). Secondly, and as a consequence of the above, 
the neoliberal critique of democracy itself has made the constituents highly suspicious of the 
motives of politicians (Hay, 2007). Finally, the electoral inequality that has resulted from the 
proliferation of the neoliberal ideology has acted as an additional barrier to the franchise and 
the subjective understanding of citizenship (Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010) limiting both young 
people’s capacity, as well as their motivation, to engage with electoral politics. 
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Hart and Henn (2017) discern an interconnectedness of these strands, which, when 
combined and reinforced by neoliberalism’s roll-out process, form a neoliberal matrix that 
discourages young people’s electoral participation. More specifically, neoliberal  
governmentality indicates that the rules that safeguard the free-market principles should be 
untouched by democratic deliberation. As such, technocratic limitations should be enforced on 
democracy, especially when it comes to market interventions, since only through the free 
market is social emancipation possible. It follows, therefore, that politicians are increasingly 
bound to the technocratic parameters of a free-market logic, irrespective of the mandate of 
their constituency. 
Building upon this logic, James Buchanan (1978)  expanded the neoliberal critique of 
democracy. Armed with the assumption of rational, utility-maximising agents, Buchanan claims 
that politicians are bound to govern in favour of their own narrow interests rather than those 
of their constituents. Buchanan’s critique of the capacity of democracy itself to respond to 
social problems is threefold. Firstly, collective decision-making is unable to satisfy individual 
preferences. Secondly, and following from the previous argument, the politicians are likely to 
support increased state control, in order to maintain their own power, and to increase their 
influence and salaries. These criticisms point back to a principal-agent problem: “Agents are 
supposed to represent the interests of their principals, but in fact they tend to put their own 
interests ahead of the interests of those whom they are supposed to represent” (Soros, 2009). 
Thirdly, profit-maximising politicians are likely to favour certain social groups in return for 
votes. The political parties are therefore prone to converge towards the ideological centre 
(Downs, 1957) in search of maximising their share of the constituency by ideologically 
approaching the median voter, making these parties especially inelastic to the demands of the 
underrepresented youth (Henn and Foard, 2012; Sloam, 2007).  
The above critique portrays politicians as not only unable to influence political outcomes 
within a technocratic economic environment, but also as inherently selfish (and as such, 
untrustworthy) and thus unwilling to represent the mandate of their constituency. In the 
contemporary European political context, this is reflected in recent empirical research (Henn 
and Foard, 2014) which suggests that young people are disengaged with electoral politics 
because the latter is “… hierarchical and remote, the province of self-serving elitists with little 
interest in their lives” (Hart, 2017). The consumer logic that has permeated the neoliberal 
subject allows for expressing their support or rejection of the available options by deliberately 
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‘purchasing’ among the available options of politicians and political parties (Downs, 1957). 
However, this will inevitably be expressed by increased disengagement from electoral politics 
if the interests of the young voters continue to be underrepresented in the political debate, in 
favour of the median voter. 
Taking the individualist standpoint, these opportunity structures will be measured on 
the individual level by measures of political efficacy. Political efficacy has played a pivotal part 
in the study of youth political engagement (Amnå, Munck, and Zetterberg, 2004) and political 
consumerism (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013) alike, and has been emphasised during the focus 
groups  conducted for this thesis (see Chapter 9). Amnå et al. (2004) define Internal Political 
Efficacy (IPE) as the subjective individual aptitude to understand and to influence political 
matters. Similarly, they define External Political Efficacy (EPE) as the individual’s confidence 
that decision makers will consider and attend to the opinions of their constituents; that is, the 
extent of responsiveness of the political system to their individualised claims. In the present 
thesis, EPE will be further subdivided in terms of a) the perceived inability of politicians to 
respond to the claims of their young constituents within a neoliberal economic environment; 
and b) in their inherent unwillingness to do so. In turn, c) the subjective understanding of 
citizenship will be measured by an open-ended question, where the respondents will be asked 
to define what politics mean to them. Their responses will be subsequently coded into a 
dichotomous variable as “bottom-up” and “top-down” politics, according to Beck’s (1997) 
definition of subpolitics. 
 
b. Pull Factors 
The sections above have illustrated that the politics of consumption are inextricably dependent 
on neoliberal doctrine. With its emphasis on rationality, competition, and striving for 
burgeoning economic expansion, neoliberalism ceases to be yet another position on the 
ideological spectrum. Instead,  reinforced by its roll-out process, it has been described as a form 
of non-politics (Duggan, 2012), the only rational and viable way forward. Neoliberalism thus 
has accelerated a clear shift of power and responsibility from the state to that of the market. 
Political consumerism therefore, as a market-oriented form of political participation, offers 
young people access to an alternative form of democratic participation.  
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At the individual level, neoliberal governmentality equates the marketplace with a 
democracy, where citizen-consumers vote according to their purchasing power, each time they 
purchase a product or a service.  In contrast to the typical model of electoral politics in which 
citizens’ participation opportunities are restricted to voting in periodical electoral contests, 
engaging in acts of political consumerism presents the additional benefits of frequency and 
immediacy. On the one hand, people register and reiterate their political support or opposition 
to a certain production process on a daily basis via their purchasing decisions. In this way, 
citizens-consumers will support certain production processes (and penalise others) directly 
through their purchasing actions in the marketplace rather than through the mediation of their 
elected representatives.  
This consumer-oriented democracy, or ‘marketopoly’ as Lekakis (2013a) terms it, may 
more adequately reflect the individual preferences within the market as a highly decentralised 
framework of political action, and thus increasingly ‘pulls’ the underrepresented young people 
to operate within it. Political participation becomes in this way a commercialised product, and 
the widespread diffusion of the neoliberal creed, coupled by the birth of the ‘citizen-consumer’, 
herald the end of traditional understandings of citizenship (Falk, 2000). 
The classical notions of citizenship are therefore re-forged into a commodified 
interpretation of citizenship. In this context, the factors that may attract young people to 
express their political considerations within the marketopoly should not be very dissimilar from 
the factors that influence them to purchase any commercial item.  
Drawing from the discipline of consumer studies, this thesis will thus introduce the 
notion of Perceived Consumer Efficiency (PCE) as a possible factor behind young people’s 
political participation. PCE stands for the self-reported perception that the consumer is able to 
influence the production process and influence the prices of products, coupled with the 
availability of alternative products and the availability of product-related information (Bray et 
al., 2011). Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) define PCE as the extent to which people have 
confidence in their individual consumer behaviour as a means for solving environmental issues. 
They suggest that this is a critical factor in explaining environmentally-friendly consumer 
behaviour. The similarities of the PCE to Internal Political Efficacy (IPE) introduced in the 
previous section, are striking, even though they derive from different academic disciplines. 
Their primary difference however is that, whereas IPE refers to the conviction that individual 
political action can have a significant impact upon political outcomes, PCE captures the belief 
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that individual consumer action can have a significant impact upon ethically desirable market 
outcomes.  
Some of the factors that may therefore ‘pull’ young people to engage in political 
consumerism include a) their Perceived Consumer Efficiency (PCE), that is their  perception that 
they are able to influence the production process and influence the prices of products (Kollmuss 
and Agyeman, 2002), coupled with b) the availability of alternative products and c) the 
availability of product-related information (Bray et al., 2011).   
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the crisis of neoliberal capitalism of 2008 has served as a catalyst behind the 
emergence of oppositional political narratives to a hegemonic neoliberal paradigm that has 
been perceived as responsible for the social ailments of the post-crisis social and political 
domains. Simultaneously however, the internalisation of neoliberal governmentality along with 
the politicisation of the market, has assisted the expression of these oppositional forces 
through the use of the market as an arena imbued with political meaning.  
 Disillusioned and disenchanted by institutional forms of participation, young people in 
the UK and in Greece will thus be ‘pushed’ away from institutional (electorally-focused) political 
participation and will seek the ‘political’ within the marketplace. Having however internalised 
the neoliberal doctrines in favour of an all-powerful market, they will simultaneously be ‘pulled’ 
into the marketplace as an arena for politics.  
The decision therefore to deliberately buy, or to refuse to buy a product or a service 
based on one’s ethical, environmental or political considerations is a result of a combination of 
factors at the micro and macro-levels. Chapter 6 will therefore proceed to discuss these micro-
level factors, such as the individual attitudes, values and orientations of young political 
consumers, in the context of the macro-level determinants prevalent in the UK and in Greece.  
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Chapter 6: Political consumerism at the country level 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Although the recent global financial crisis has accelerated a widespread rejection of the general 
tenets of neoliberalism, neoliberal governmentality has nonetheless been instilled in young 
people’s understanding of the ‘political’, and they are therefore likely to seek its expression 
within the bounds of the marketplace. Chapter 5 has discussed these dynamics on the 
individual level: on the one hand, the chapter claims that the neoliberal critique of democracy 
‘pushes’ young people away from electoral processes, while neoliberal governmentality 
simultaneously ‘pulls’ young people into the market as an alternative domain of political 
participation. These dynamics can be understood as a result of an alleged convergence of young 
people’s understandings about which duties and responsibilities pertain to the state, and which 
to the business sector.   
In addition to the theories delineated in Chapter 3, the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ theory 
may therefore, be particularly well-suited to explain these processes, as it connects the micro-
level determinants of political participation to broader socio-political developments taking 
place on the macro-level. In doing so, it shifts the focus of analysis from the demographic 
characteristics of the SES model; beyond the availability of opportunity structures of the 
mobilisation model; and in parallel to the social capital theory and the postmaterialist thesis, 
on the effects of ‘civic culture’ on political participation. This chapter therefore, will consider 
whether the processes and outcomes of neoliberalism discussed in Chapter 5 are uniform 
across the range of advanced liberal democracies or whether they differ from one country to 
the next. The chapter will proceed by discussing the expressions of political consumerism in the 
UK as opposed to Greece, and will conclude by suggesting a multi-layered approach in the study 
of political consumerism. 
 
2. On the concept of the state and Varieties of Capitalism  
 
Within each country, certain factors will have a greater or lesser impact according to the 
perceptions of the citizens with regards to their duties and responsibilities (Kim et al., 2013). 
Hofstede (1983, p. 388) discerns patterns within countries, or as he prefers to term it, a 
‘collective mental programming’, according to which “citizens exhibit similar patterns of 
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behaviour and attitudes depending on the country they come from” (Zorell, 2019a, p. 83). This 
mental programming reflects the Foucauldian conceptualisation of neoliberalism as a form of 
governmentality (Byrne, 2017). 
In a similar conceptualisation, Zorell (2019a) asserts that this mental programming is 
inclusive of a country’s civic culture. Almond and Verba (1963, pp. 14, 15) define civic culture 
as “the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the 
members of a nation”. In turn, this consists of “attitudes toward the political system and its 
various parts” and their “attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (Almond and 
Verba, 1963, p. 13). Similar to the development of postmaterialist values outlined by Inglehart 
(1997), for Almond (1990, pp. 143, 144), civic culture on the individual level is an outcome of 
one’s political socialisation during childhood, but also of one’s education, the influence of the 
media as well as the socioeconomic and political circumstances during adulthood. In other 
words, although these attitudes manifest on the individual level, they are being influenced by 
macro-level determinants. Moreover, although they develop on the individual level, they 
collectively form the backdrop upon which the society as a whole will operate (Hofstede, 1983). 
In this way, they provide a comprehensive framework for the study of political participation 
which connects  attitudes and dispositions on the individual level, with patterns on the social 
level, and eventually with institutional political participation.  
The distinct advantage of the Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) for the study of political 
consumerism, is that it challenges the clear-cut distinction of the ‘political’ and the ‘cultural’, 
understood as separate spheres of life which define individual behaviour independently from 
each other. In other words, the object of analysis under the CVM is the interrelation of the 
individual to the state and private business actors (Zorell, 2019a), and in particular the 
understanding of which duties and responsibilities pertain to each. The positioning of the 
citizen-consumer is thus central in this arrangement (see Figure 3, adapted from Shamir, 2015, 
p. 247). 
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A similar understanding motivates the ‘Concept of the State’ theories. These refer to 
the interrelation of citizens’ attitudes concerning the state, the market and civil society and the 
relationship between the three. It focuses on the views that the citizens of a country have with 
regards to “who is responsible for what, and how cooperation between the actors should look” 
(Zorell, 2019a, p. 84). Under this standpoint, the ‘Concept of the State’ defines the desired 
equilibrium between free competition and economic collaboration among the individuals of 
any given country (Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 1990). In turn, this individualised 
understanding of the state will define the preferred “repertoire or ‘tool kit’ of habits, skills, and 
styles from which people construct ‘strategies of action’” (Swidler, 1986, p. 276; see also 
Wahlström and Peterson, 2005). In a context therefore where duties and responsibilities 
between individuals, the state  and the private sector are being reorganised according to the 
individuals’ understanding of which responsibilities pertain to each, new repertoires of political 
action will emerge which are able to express simultaneously the preferences of the individual 
citizens and those of society as a whole, with regards to how these may influence policy-making 
on the institutional level.  
Based on this premise, Hall and Soskice (2001, 2003) developed the ‘Varieties of 
Capitalism’ (VoC) theory, according to which each country will demonstrate concrete patterns 
with regards to how it responds to socioeconomic and political challenges. Similarly to the Civic 
Voluntarism model developed by Almond and Verba (1963), Hall and Soskice capture the 
distinct patterns of political action between the individual, the social and the institutional 
Figure 3: The citizen-consumer according to the CVM (Shamir, 2015, p.247). 
100 | P a g e  
 
domains. They describe these patterns as nation-specific, that is, moulded by cultural, historical 
and religious circumstances (Hall and Soskice, 2001, pp.15,16), which the authors suggest have 
led to systematic divergences between countries with regards to their preferred decision-
making processes.  
Thus, they commence by describing what they have termed as ‘Coordinated Market 
Economies’ (CME) (Hall and Soskice, 2001, pp. 16–18). Under this approach, the prevalent 
means of dealing with tasks of socio-political significance involve non-market-based forms of 
cooperation between the state, the market and civil society. These means focus on establishing 
a form of consensus, or equilibrium between the three, while relying on business networks and 
associations across industrial sectors. Moreover, the policies that will be established through 
this interplay will in turn, often focus on further enhancing non-market cooperation and 
coordination. For the architects of the thesis, examples of this approach include Germany, 
Austria, Belgium, Japan, Sweden, and Finland (Hall, 2018, p. 4; Hall and Soskice, 2001, pp. 46, 
47)  
Instead, in ‘Liberal Market Economies’ (LME), individuals, business and state actors will 
rely almost exclusively on laissez-faire market competition to coordinate decision-making. 
Liberal market economies will therefore reject any institutional state intervention and will 
instead rely on the invisible hand of the market to safeguard successful – and allegedly more 
efficient - interactions between the state, the private sector and civil society. Similarly to the 
CME, the ensuing policies in LME are so designed that they further encourage market 
competition on the institutional level, but also in all domains of life. For Hall and Soskice, 
examples of LMEs include the UK, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland (Hall, 2018, 
p. 5; Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 46). 
Finally, they distinguish a third cluster of countries, which combines elements of the 
previous two. They term these ‘Mediterranean – or Mixed-Market Economies’ (MME).  These 
include Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece 16 (Hall, 2018, p. 6,7; Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 21). 
They claim that these countries share common elements with both the CMEs and LMEs, but 
they also deviate from both in some other respects. One main common characteristic the 
MMEs share, of particular interest to the emergence of political consumerism as a form of 
political participation, is the prevalence of structures that favour cooperative approaches 
 
16 To these may also be included France, which currently shares many elements with the 
MMEs of southern Europe (Hall and Soskice, 2003, p. 21). 
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between different civil-society actors on the one hand, and liberal approaches when it comes 
to the interaction of corporations with civil society and the state, on the other (Hall and Soskice, 
2001, p. 21)17.  
To summarise, different kinds of socioeconomic and historical legacies will shape the 
political culture of any given country and create different styles of institutional regimes, which 
in turn will foster the reproduction of their political institutions and form the predominant 
attitudes in the country with regards to the roles of the market, the state and the ensuing 
notions of citizenship.  
The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) theory provides on the macro-level,  a firm and time-
inelastic response to the classical theories of political participation (see Chapter 3), as it is able 
to explain why political participation patterns differ consistently from one country to the next 
one, and across time. In other words, just like in the CVM of Almond and Verba (1963), it 
provides a socio-political constant for each country which influences the preferred decision-
making processes both on the individual level and the institutional level.  
With respect to the individual level, the VoC theory implies that the type of a country’s 
market economy will in-turn shape the individuals’ understandings of citizenship and the 
anticipated roles of the state, the market and civil society respectively (Zorell, 2019a). 
Moreover, as VoC theory observes, these conceptualisations will differ significantly from 
countries that operate under a different market system, as for example between Greece and 
the UK, but will instead be relatively constant among the individuals of each country (Schwartz, 
2006, p. 172). 
For example, the theory assumes that individuals living in functioning representative 
democracies will be ideally satisfied with the prevailing market system in their country (Almond 
and Verba, 1963; Schwartz et al., 2010). The rationale is that in liberal, representational 
democracies, citizens should– at least in theory - be able to influence the balance of power 
between the state, the market and civil society via institutional forms of political participation, 
 
17 These special arrangements, they claim, have been the result of comparable historical and 
socioeconomic backgrounds: most of the countries in this cluster have only recently restored 
democracy from autocratic regimes, which resulted in a large segment of their industry sector 
being controlled by the state, and on the social level, the establishment of strong family ties 
and informal networks (Zorell, 2019a, p. 85). 
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as for example by their electoral vote, their involvement in political parties or unionisation. The 
model assumes that in the long run, the systemic balance of powers should reflect the 
expectations of the majority of the citizens of any given country.  
Instead, individuals who are living in a Coordinated Market Economy (CME), having 
been nurtured in an environment of cooperation and coordination, would be expected to have 
developed an understanding of the state which relies on these principles. These expectations 
are being supported by research in the field of social psychology, which suggests a congruence 
between seeing oneself as part of an ingroup; whether that is a country, a nation, a voluntary 
association, or even an imagined community (Anderson, 2006), and adopting the values, norms 
and structures of this group (Chen and Li, 2009; Huddy, 2013).   
As a result, individuals who are living in countries operating under a Liberal Market 
Economy (LME), much like young people in the UK for example, are likely to adopt an equally 
liberal concept of the state. Consequently, they would be expected to have adopted the general 
belief that the invisible hand of the market will lead to optimal market outcomes, and this belief 
will also influence their individual behaviour. Accordingly, in countries like Greece with a Mixed 
Market Economy (MME), it would be expected that young people would demonstrate an 
understanding with regards to the role of the state as a regulating mechanism (Molina and 
Rhodes, 2007, p. 225), but they would also be familiar with informal networks – based on social 
trust and rules of reciprocity - as the Social Capital theory suggests. Hence, the citizens of MMEs 
are likely to generally demonstrate less responsibility to get politically engaged. Nevertheless, 
when they do, they would prefer more informal or collaborative methods (Molina and Rhodes, 
2007, p. 225; Zorell, 2019a, p. 86).  
The propensity of young people in Greece and the UK to engage in political 
consumerism should therefore be examined through their similarities, but also their underlying 
differences. The following section will thus provide an empirical overview of the expressions of 
political consumerism in an MME country, such as Greece, as opposed to an LME country like 
the UK. 
3. Political Consumerism in Greece and in the UK 
 
In terms of their similarities, the rise of political consumerism among young people between 
the both countries (Tilikidou and Delistavrou, 2018; Triodos, 2018), should be understood 
within the framework of a generalised anti-institutional political climate that permeates 
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Western democracies (Hay, 2007). Voters’ turnout for Greece in the 2019 European Assembly 
Elections was close to the country’s historical low (58.7% in 2019, as opposed to 52.5% in 2009). 
Likewise, voters’ turnout for the UK was 37.2% in 2019, and continued to be at levels 
consistently lower than the EU average of 50.7% (European Parliament, 2019). Despite the 
sudden rise (and equally abrupt fall) of new political forces on the institutional domain, such as 
the Coalition of Radical Left (SYRIZA) and the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which signify the 
emergence of new political actors on the institutional level, a generalised partisan dealignment 
of the young people in both countries has been well-documented (Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis, 
2018; Sloam and Henn, 2018).   
In terms of their differences, Greece represents a Mediterranean Market Economy 
(MME) (Hall, 2018) country with the highest youth unemployment in Europe (35.2% in January 
2020) (OECD Database, 2020) and some of the lowest levels of consumer participation in 
Europe (Grasso, 2018). UK instead, stands representative of a Liberal Market Economy (LME) 
country (Hall, 2018), with one of the lowest youth unemployment rates, at 11.1% of the youth 
labour force, by the beginning of 2020 (OECD Database, 2020), and one of the highest levels of 
consumer participation in Europe (Triodos, 2018). Generally, the available literature on political 
consumerism often emphasises that practices of market-based political engagement are 
significantly more widespread in Northern European economies than in the South. On the 
country level, Stolle and Micheletti (2013) trace the reasons behind such differences on several 
factors, such as the differences in the per capita income distribution, and the authoritarian 
legacy of countries in the European South; while Zorell (2019d) emphasises on the availability 
of opportunity structures. The following sections will thus discuss the expression of political 
consumerism in Greece as opposed to the UK.  
 
a. Political Consumerism in Greece 
 
At the turn of the 21st century, the European Social Survey reported a steep increase in the 
levels of boycotts and especially buycotts in most of the European countries under examination 
(Koos, 2012). However, when it comes to buycotting and boycotting in Greece, the country 
remains consistently at the bottom of the list (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013). For instance, Greece 
was fifth from last among the 21 countries examined in the first wave of the European Social 
Survey (2002/2003) (Lekakis and Forno, 2017, p. 2). Nevertheless, the case of Greece (along 
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with Italy, another South European country) is unique across Europe and USA, where boycotts 
appear to be more frequent than buycotts (Lekakis and Forno, 2017). Examination of different 
rounds of the European Social Survey, combined with data from the World Values Survey, 
which is particularly useful in order to trace boycotting trends for the years prior to 2000, 
conveys similar patterns. They consistently confirm lower market-based participation rates 
throughout recent decades, with Greece being persistently more prone to boycotts than 
buycotts (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013, p. 50). 
Country specific research in connection to political consumerism in Greece remains 
limited. This may also be on account of the lack of formal organisational structures in relation 
to political consumerism, at least in comparison to the European North. Research points out 
that the fair-trade market in the country remains far less developed than any other European 
country (Tilikidou and Delistavrou, 2007) while the primary aim of Fair Trade Hellas, which was 
founded only in 2004, remains that of awareness-raising. Moreover, according to its site18, the 
official Fair-trade retailer in the city centre of Athens was eventually reduced to an online shop 
in 2016, in an attempt to cut down operational costs in response to the financial crisis.  
This lack of formally established organisational structures however, is being offset to an 
extent by the proliferation of informal, community-based networks especially after the 
outbreak of the crisis.  As a response to the austerity measures introduced to the economy at 
the time, and an alleged deficit of democratic legitimacy in the country, young people sought 
to redefine the commonly accepted definition of politics. Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis (2018) 
have termed these attempts as ‘heteropolitics’, and frame them as a response to the political 
disenfranchisement brought about by the crisis. The civil society therefore reorganised using 
collaborative, bottom-up (or subpolitical) methods and have effectively managed to 
disseminate collective forms of political consumerism throughout the country (Kioupkiolis and 
Pechtelidis, 2018).  
Several clusters of political consumerism existed prior to the crisis. Characteristic is the 
case of the Exarcheia area, in the centre of Athens, which since the early 1980s has been at the 
forefront of political and social movements in the country and is renowned for its capacity for 
insurgency and its anti-capitalist ethos. Chatzidakis et al. (2012, p. 510) illustrate how Exarcheia, 
provides a site for utopian practice, particularly in relation to a range of green and ethical 
 
18 www.fairtrade.gr  
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behaviour. They report that in the area of Exarcheia, responsibility-taking and autonomy 
concerns often took the form of consumer-oriented activism. Moreover, Vathakou (2015) 
reports that similar initiatives of consumer-oriented activism have recently spread from 
Alexandroupolis on the far north of the country, to Crete on the south, as an attempt to 
restructure collective resilience efforts under austerity. Especially market-based participatory 
methods, such as buycotting and boycotting, became an indispensable tool towards a wider 
socioeconomic transition, starting from the local level, but striving for collective outreach 
(Lekakis and Forno, 2017). 
It has been suggested thus, that that a critical factor for the rise of political consumerist 
practices throughout Southern Europe is the outbreak of the financial crisis (Lekakis and Forno, 
2017), perceived as a reaction to the austerity measures imposed thereafter. This standpoint 
provides support to the hypothesis that political consumerism in Greece is primarily connected 
to the ‘push’ effects of neoliberalism, and thus driven primarily by the perceived inability and 
unwillingness of the mainstream political sphere to respond to young people’s pressing needs, 
as well as by the changing perceptions of young people on what constitutes the ‘political’.  
Although political consumerism has been commonly understood as a result of affluence 
and as such, as a primarily postmaterialist phenomenon (Copeland, 2014b; Micheletti, 2003; 
Stolle et al., 2005), recent empirical research proposes that it needs to be re-evaluated in the 
context of the ongoing recession (Guidi and Andretta, 2015). Indeed, political consumerist 
practices in Greece after the outbreak of the crisis tend to stem from an ideological critique of 
materialism, neoliberal consumerism and mass production, concerns towards equal 
distribution of wealth and opportunities, direct and unmediated relationship between 
consumers and producers and a generalised interest for solidarity (Forno and Graziano, 2014). 
Indeed, Tilikidou and Delistavrou (2018) report that political consumers in Greece exhibits anti-
materialist value orientations, and high levels of universalism. 
Consequently, political consumerist instances in Greece seem to represent “a tool 
through which grassroots groups build, construct and reinforce solidarity ties in order to foster 
collaboration among usually small-scale of actors of consumers and producers starting from 
the local level” (Lekakis and Forno, 2017, p. 5). Solidarity-based networks, zero-kilometre 
exchange groups, time-banks, urban gardening and alternative currency systems crop up in the 
neighbourhoods of Athens on an almost weekly basis. Their emphasis is on local 
empowerment, strengthening community ties and environmental sustainability. Such instances 
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tend to interpret political consumerism primarily as a means of mobilising individuals to achieve 
and empower collective action (Dubuisson‐Quellier et al., 2011). 
 
b. Political Consumerism in the UK  
 
Both activist and academic critiques of capitalist globalisation and intrusive neoliberalist 
policies in the UK, have resulted in a widespread interest in the examination of the political 
potential of so-called ‘alternative economic spaces’ (Leyshon et al., 2003), including also 
research on alternative food networks, alternative currency systems, and social economy (Amin 
et al., 2002; Hughes, 2005). As a result, after the crisis there have spurred several informal and 
more established consumer and environmental groups like the People’s Assembly Against 
Austerity (Mercea and Yilmaz, 2018), the Occupy movement (Cloke et al., 2016), the UK Uncut 
(Street, 2015), and the Extinction Rebellion (Shah, 2019), just to mention a few. One particular 
area that has received extensive attention in the country however, has been the growth of fair-
trade and organic labelling schemes. 
According to the British Sociological Association (BSA), in 2004 about 38% of people in 
the UK had deliberately boycotted or buycotted products for political, ethical or environmental 
reasons. This figure remained relatively stable till  2014 (38%) (POSTnote, 2015, p. 3), despite 
the outbreak of the crisis. Distinguishing between boycotting and buycotting however, yields 
that buycotting is on the rise and is more common than boycotting products and services 
throughout the country (Lekakis and Forno, 2017). This may be in part because many large scale 
campaigns have shifted towards supporting labelling schemes like ‘Fairtrade’, and away from 
the use of boycotts as a campaigning tool (Ward and deVreese, 2011). This observation may 
also provide support to the hypothesis that young people in the UK are primarily driven by the 
‘pull’ factors of neoliberalism into the marketplace. 
Fair-trade is being described as a market-driven ethical consumption (Nicholls and Opal, 
2005) and refers to a “movement that seeks to harness the mechanisms of the market to 
address socioeconomic inequalities and environmental harms associated with the global 
economic system” (Clarke et al., 2007, pp. 583–584). Although often used interchangeably, 
there is a marked distinction between the terms ‘ethical’ and ‘fair-trade’ (Smith and Barrientos, 
2005).  
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Ethical trade places emphasis on “labour conditions in mainstream production and 
distribution networks”(Clarke et al., 2007, p. 584) and, as such, its practices vary significantly 
between different countries. The most prominent of these campaigns in the UK is the Ethical 
Trading Initiative, which works in coalition with trade unions and NGOs. Its main aim is to 
enforce corporate codes of practice in relation to sustainable living wages and conditions in the 
workplace, and as such, it usually targets major market players such as Gap, Nike, and 
Bodyshop. 
The fair-trade movement instead, aims to help promote and actualise the 
“development of alternative spaces of production, trade, and consumption”(Clarke et al., 2007, 
p. 584) and involves cooperatives, producer organisations, trading networks, retailers and 
certification agencies. Its goals include improving market access to disadvantaged producers, 
including women and indigenous groups, through partnership in trade through dialogue, 
respect and transparency, both by new trading agreements with said groups, but also through 
awareness-raising and campaigning.  
In the UK, the diffusion of fair-trade initiatives is based on a long history of consumer 
campaigns. Oxfam’s first shop was opened in 1948 in Oxford, whereas it currently numbers 
more than 750 physical shops throughout the country (Clarke et al., 2007, p. 584), selling not 
only second-hand items, but also a selection of fair-trade products. But Oxfam is hardly the only 
example. Cafédirect, Tropical Wholefoods, Fairtrade Foundation (FTF), and Traidcraft among 
others take part in a network which is oriented at the production, distribution, marketing, and 
retailing of fair-trade goods. Although each organisation is specialising in separate activities, 
these are almost never mutually exclusive (Clarke et al., 2007).  
The FTF has recently cooperated with the Trade Union Congress, the leading labour 
union representative body in the UK, in an attempt to ensure that its activities adhere to the 
established labour rights of the national labour union organisations (Clarke et al., 2007). As a 
result, in 2017 alone, sales of ethical goods and services reached £81.3 billion, while UK’s ethical 
market demonstrated a market growth of 3.2% from the previous year. Moreover, the sector of 
Ethical Food and Drinks alone, saw a growth of 9.7% growth, at a time when the British 
economy was just recovering from the recession, with an overall GDP growth of only 1.9% 
(Office for National Statistics, 2017). The category of Ethical Food and Drinks has more than 
doubled in value since the outbreak of the crisis in 2008, and it currently stands at £9.8 billion. 
The value of consumer boycotts alone, in the same year, was estimated at about £2.5 billion. 
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Moreover, 42% of UK consumers preferred to shop locally in 2017, spending an estimated £2.7 
billion. However, by its own – very high - standards, growth over the previous three years had 
been relatively sluggish, averaging just 4.3%, meaning that 2018’s year-on-year increase of 
9.7% shows a return to stronger performance in this sector. Vegetarianism alone shows a 30% 
increase since the outbreak of the crisis. A steady 5.1% annual growth in sales of vegetarian 
products denotes a sharp surge in the number of people who are deliberately changing their 
diet for ethical reasons (Triodos, 2018, p. 5).  
The above figures from ‘2018 Ethical Consumer Report’ (Triodos, 2018) draw a picture 
of ethical and fair-trade products in the UK as a thriving, market-based economic sector. As the 
VoC theory suggests, the ethical and fair-trade business sector has been cooperating with 
political organisations such as labour unions on the institutional level. In this context, the 
individual consumer in the UK is being faced with a multitude of ethically sourced products. As 
a result, having internalised the discursive neoliberal monopoly, they are likely to turn to these 
market-based alternatives to express their (political) concerns for ethically responsible 
production processes.  
Even at the academic level, the volume of sales of ethical-trade products is often 
interpreted as evidence of a broader increase of political consumerism (Chatzidakis et al., 2012; 
Lekakis, 2013a; Nicholls and Opal, 2005). The main analytical tool for understanding both fair-
trade and ethical trade in the UK is therefore predominately related to the volume and value 
of commodities traded between producers in the global South and consumers in the North 
(Lekakis, 2013a; Petkova, 2006). This standpoint however, interprets political consumerism 
merely as the domain of consumers, devoid of its essential responsibility element in relation to 
ethics, ecology, and politics (Chatzidakis et al., 2012). 
 Indeed, Clark et al. (2007) challenge the assumption that the actors involved in the 
growth of fair-trade movement should be primarily understood as mere consumers, since its 
explicit focus is the empowerment of local communities, democratisation, and active civic 
participation. However, even though this need is extensively acknowledged in research in 
relation to the impact of fair-trade on producer communities in the global South (Lekakis, 
2013a; Moberg, 2005), the study of ethical consumption in the global North is persistently 
constrained by the assumption that the key actors in these practices are conventional 
consumers trying to satisfy their primarily materialistic needs. As the previous chapters 
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however have demonstrated, this is hardly the case, since the political consumers instil their 
market behaviour with ethical, environmental and political motivations.  
This realisation bears two implications for the future of research on political 
consumerism: Firstly, more research is deemed necessary in order to identify the value 
orientations of political consumption behaviour in each country. Secondly, this analytical 
oversight points towards the need to generate new ways of measuring political consumerism, 
which will be able to capture both its behavioural components (buycotting and boycotting), in 
addition to the embedded responsibility concerns that accompanies them, as well as the 
frequency with which they take place. The present thesis intends to provide an original 
contribution to knowledge in both of these areas, by employing a multi-layered approach to 
the study of political consumerism among young people, in the UK and Greece. 
 
4. Putting the pieces together: A multi-layered approach to Political Consumerism  
 
Despite the ideological hegemony of neoliberal governmentality in western democracies since 
the late 1980s, this chapter has suggested that the ways through which citizens express their 
political considerations within the marketplace varies significantly, according to their 
understandings pertaining to the desired role of the state, the business sector, and civil society. 
Throughout this thesis, political consumerism is being studied from the individual’s standpoint. 
Chapter 2 discussed why conceptualising political consumerism in terms of the subjective 
motivations of the consumer was deemed to be the most appropriate and efficient way, since 
it permits for cross-country comparisons irrespectively of the opportunity structures prevalent 
in each country. 
Furthermore, as Chapter 3 discussed, the decision at the individual level of how one will 
participate may be shaped by their personal socioeconomic background but also by their (level 
of) social capital and their underlying values. In light of the ideas developed in this current 
chapter however, it follows that the individual’s standpoint is, in turn, being influenced by the 
macro-level context in which they operate. The prevalent ‘Variety of Capitalism’ in each country 
therefore, is likely to determine the individual’s standpoint on political consumerism. This 
suggests that political consumerism should be understood as a process which develops 
primarily at the individual level, but is also influenced by the macro-context at the country level. 
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This macro-context will manifest in different ways on the individual level depending on which 
concept of the state is dominant in each country. 
It would thus be expected that, in its capacity as a lifestyle form of political participation 
(which simultaneously operates within a market instilled by the neoliberal rationale), political 
consumerism would be highly appealing for young people from Greece. On the one hand, as a 
lifestyle form of political participation, it provides the framework to respond to their expected 
disenchantment (Datta, 2014) and disillusionment (Hart and Henn, 2017) from the institutional 
political sphere, which followed the financial crises since 2008 and exposed the inherent 
contradictions of capitalism (Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis, 2018), as the VoC suggests. On the 
other hand, in its capacity as a market-oriented form of political participation, young people in 
Greece would be less trusting with respect to the capacity for political consumerism to bring 
about significant change; at least compared to young people in the UK who are expected to 
have internalised the centrality that LMEs place on the ability of the market to effectively 
influence political outcomes. Moreover, the VoC approach suggests that young people in 
Greece (a MME country) would be likely to choose political consumerist forms that are more 
cooperative and informal in nature than their UK counterparts, who have been socialised in a 
LME system.  
Indeed, Lekakis and Forno (2017) report that, even though political consumerism 
continues to be less widespread in Southern European (SE) countries than in North-western 
European countries (NWE), the global financial crisis of 2008, with its particularly adverse 
effects in Southern Europe (Hall, 2018), seems to have resulted in an abrupt increase in political 
consumerism practices in the country (Lekakis and Forno, 2017). However, they clarify that 
political consumerism practices in SE demonstrate a more communitarian approach, based on 
grassroots, locally-based consumer networks, influenced by the principles of solidarity 
economy (Bergeron et al., 2015; Miller, 2010). It follows therefore, that as the VoC theory 
suggests, young people in Greece are expected to demonstrate greater disillusionment from 
institutional politics, and a more bottom-up, informal and cooperative understanding of 
politics.  
This hypothesis echoes Beck’s (1997) conceptualisation of subpolitics. As it has been 
discussed in Chapter 3, the term subpolitics for Beck (1997) refers to a form of bottom-up 
politics (Pickard, 2019c, p. 383), which is less institutionalised and more informal (Holzer and 
Sørensen, 2001, p. 3). It is being described as a way of doing politics outside the institutional 
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framework of the formally defined political system of the state. Similarly therefore, one would 
expect that when it comes to political participation through the use of the market, young 
people from Greece would also choose a more subpolitical approach.  
Conversely, young people in the UK, being socialised in a LME, are expected to be more 
influenced by the conviction that the invisible hand of the market is likely to lead to optimal 
market outcomes, and this belief is also likely to influence their individual behaviour when it 
comes to buycotting and boycotting. With regards to their preferred forms of political 
consumerism, they are therefore expected to have a more top-down understanding of politics 
– whether in the institutional domain or the market domain. This means that ‘politics’ for them 
will be understood more as the domain of ‘politicians’ rather than as a place for grassroots 
collective action.  
Similarly however, young people in the UK are also expected to have an equally top-
down understanding of market-oriented political participation. Influenced by their internalised 
conviction in favour of the professed capacity of the market to achieve greater and more 
effective (political) outcomes, they are more likely to engage in political consumerism as a 
market-oriented form of political participation. However, also influenced by their top-down 
understanding of ‘politics’ - and unlike their counterparts from Greece - they are expected to 
demonstrate a top-down approach with respect to political consumerism, in its guise as political 
participation. For example, they are expected to be more responsive to Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) schemes or market(ing) campaigns organised from ‘above’, unlike the 
young people from Greece who, as we saw, are expected to be attracted to and engage in more 
informal, bottom-up approaches to political consumerism (Lekakis and Forno, 2017).  
To summarise, it is expected that as a result of the global neoliberal crisis of 2008 which 
has allegedly exposed the failings of neoliberalism in terms of ideology and in practice, young 
people from the UK and also from Greece would be disillusioned with the institutional political 
domain, and the perceived inability and unwillingness of politicians to respond to their 
individualised claims. They are therefore expected in both countries to demonstrate low 
External Political Efficacy (EPE) and therefore be ‘pushed’ away from institutional politics. 
However, due to young people in Greece having been nurtured in a Mixed Market Economy 
(MME) they are expected to demonstrate higher levels of Internal Political Efficacy (IPE) than 
their UK counterparts, reflecting their bottom-up understanding of politics. This is expected to 
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further ‘push’ them away from institutional politics, as they would have greater confidence in 
doing politics collectively, from the bottom-up, and through their own means. 
Instead, it would be expected that young people in the UK, having been nurtured in an 
LME, will be more susceptible to the pull-effects of neoliberalism into the market as an 
alternative political arena. In other words, young people in the UK are expected to demonstrate 
higher levels of Perceived Consumer Efficacy (PCE); higher levels of satisfaction with respect to 
the available range of ethically-sourced products and services; and greater satisfaction with 
product-related information, which will pull them into the marketplace as an alternative 
political domain. 
Nevertheless, factors such as political interest, political knowledge or subjective social 
positioning, as suggested from the classical theories of political participation outlined in 
Chapter 3 are also expected to play a role on the political consumerist behaviour of young 
people. For example, individuals with high levels of political knowledge may thus also be more 
interested in comprehending and exposing the perceived contradictions or failures of the style 
of market economy in their country.  
Moreover, despite the professed ‘death of class’ in postmodern societies (W. Atkinson, 
2007; Bernardi, 2009; Pakulski and Waters, 1996), the VoC theory retains that one’s subjective 
social position may also be important, since better-off citizens are more likely to be satisfied 
with the style of market economy in their country and perceive it as more fair and egalitarian. 
Instead, a long term unemployed young person who is thus dependent on the welfare state, is 
likely to compare their individual circumstances with others who are better-off and develop a 
dissatisfaction of the prevailing system altogether as being unjust (Jost et al., 2008; Jost and 
Andrews, 2011). This dissatisfaction may eventually radicalise them politically so that they will 
refuse to acknowledge the democratic legitimacy of the prevailing system; instead, they may 
turn to lifestyle forms of political participation, such as political consumerism, in order to 
express their disdain from the existing institutions. However, this claim has not been confirmed 
in the existing literature. Moreover, despite the professed shift of politics beyond the 
traditional conceptualisation of left and right under postmodernism (Giddens, 1994), one’s 
ideological orientation may also remain pertinent as it would influence the extent of 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction at the individual level from the prevalent variety of capitalism 
in one’s country.   
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Exploring the factors that influence young citizens’ decisions to engage in political 
consumerism in the two countries, the analysis of the present thesis will thus be organised 
accordingly: Firstly, Chapter 10 will examine a set of ‘push’ factors that the literature review 
has suggested may be responsible for pushing young people away from institutional forms of 
political participation. Subsequently, Chapter 11 will instead examine a series of ‘pull’ factors 
that the literature review has suggested may be responsible for pulling young people to express 
their ethical, environmental and political concerns within the market19. Finally, Chapter 12 will 
employ the use of the Political Consumerism Index (PCI), a new comprehensive but intuitive 
measure of political consumerism, so as to provide a conclusive image of the underlying factors 
behind young people’s decisions to engage in market-oriented participation in Greece as 
opposed to the UK.  
This thesis therefore, will employ a multi-layered  approach to the study of political 
consumerism, taking into consideration the micro-level approach of the classical theories of 
political participation outlined in Chapter 3, in the context of the convergence of the citizen 
and the consumer spheres discussed in Chapter 4, and within the framework of the neoliberal 
crisis discussed in Chapter 5.   
The previous chapters therefore, have cumulatively provided the theories and 
definitions necessary for the analysis of political consumerism among young people in Greece 
and in the UK. Empirical literature on the subject indicates that there may indeed be a 
difference in the focus of political consumerism varieties, with political consumerism in Greece 
demonstrating a more collective than individualistic orientation and being generally more 
rooted in local communities (Graziano and Forno, 2012). Instead, in the UK, political 
consumerism is often interpreted in terms of the volume and value of fair and ethical products 
traded (Triodos, 2018). This realisation exposes the need for the development of a unified 
measure of political consumerism which will be able to capture not only the behavioural 
aspects of political consumerism, but also how often it takes place and the levels of motivation 
behind it.   
 
19 Examples of the factors examined in each chapter include the following: Neoliberal ‘push’ 
factors: a) Inability of political actors (EPE), b) Untrustworthiness of political actors (EPE), c) 
Internal Political Efficacy (IPE). Neoliberal ‘pull’ factors: a) Perceived Consumer Effectiveness 
(PCE), b) Availability of products in the market, c) Availability of product-related information. 
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Chapter 7 therefore, will shed light in this direction, and will argue for the need for the 
development of a Political Consumerism Index (PCI), which will be incorporating both of the 
behavioural dimensions of political consumerism, enhanced with the responsibility the 
individual demonstrates in engaging in the action, and the frequency with which they do so.  
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Chapter 7: On measuring Political Consumerism 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Chapter 6, the actions, methods, processes and intended outcomes of political consumerism 
were considered on the country level. However, in face of the continuous definitional 
expansion of political participation it is critical to delimit the single varieties of political 
consumerism to be examined in this thesis, or else we bear the risk of evolving into a ‘theory 
of everything’ (van Deth, 2014), whereby every market-oriented action could be considered as 
a form of political consumerism, eventually trivialising its ‘political’ character. Besides, the 
findings of the thesis are likely to vary depending on the definitions used. A concise delineation 
of the main concepts on which the ensuing examination will be based therefore is indispensable 
if we want to avoid misleading comparisons and inaccurate conclusions.  
This chapter, intends thus to provide a precise definition of the varieties of political 
consumerism and shed light on their underlying character. It will commence by a) discussing 
some of the numerous terms which have been used when referring to politically-oriented 
purchasing behaviour and will consider their meaning. It will suggest that, instead of being 
understood as distinct varieties of politically-oriented behaviour, they all are parts of a wider 
concept; that of ‘political consumerism’. The chapter will proceed by suggesting that, b) when 
studying political consumerism as a form of political participation, the emphasis should 
predominately lie on the double expression of the phenomenon, namely positive (buycotting) 
and negative (boycotting) consumption of products and services. It will discuss buycotting and 
boycotting independently from each other, in order to demonstrate that the use of the general 
term ‘political consumerism’ fails to capture the differing underlying motivations, attitudes and 
values of each. Ultimately, it will posit that examining only the behavioural elements of political 
consumerism, runs the risk of overseeing the breadth and depth of the phenomenon. The final 
section of the chapter therefore, c) will advocate for the creation of a Political Consumerism 
Index (PCI) which not only attributes additional weight  when one engages in both buycotting 
and boycotting, but it also captures the responsibility and frequency of the said behaviour 
within a single index. The PCI will then be used in Chapter 12 of the present thesis, to analyse 
the political consumerist behaviour of young people in the UK and Greece. 
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2. Varieties of Political Consumerism  
 
The variety of approaches, aims and motivations which comprise political consumerism in the 
various forms it has assumed across countries and throughout history, has already resulted in 
an extensive literature on the subject. However, the focus of enquiry varies from one 
publication to the other. The main distinction in the relevant literature extends in two 
dimensions. Firstly, some scholars focus their research on the content of political consumerism. 
In other words, they are trying to trace the variety of motivations, attitudes and aims behind 
the phenomenon. Secondly, other scholars emphasise instead the “shape of the action” (Zorell, 
2018, p. 41); that is, the different ways through which these motivations, attitudes and aims of 
the first dimension, are being expressed through actions. It is this second dimension that 
includes the distinction between positive and negative consumerism. 
Within the first dimension, several terms have been used. All of these terms however, 
intend to capture the differing motivations, attitudes and aims behind the more general term 
‘political consumerism’. Along with the different terms used, the conceptual understanding 
attached to them also varies. Some scholars will thus examine a specific aspect of political 
consumerism in isolation, and hence use a specialised term (Lekakis, 2013a; Mazar and Zhong, 
2010), whereas others will use the same issue-specific term but in its general context (Atkinson 
and Kim, 2015). As a result, terms such as ‘sustainable consumption’, ‘ethical consumerism’ or 
‘green buying behaviour’ (Andorfer, 2013; Atkinson and Kim, 2015; Rumpala, 2011; Young et 
al., 2010) have often been used interchangeably. Nevertheless, a closer look at the differing 
use of issue-specific terms within the relevant literature “reveals that, ultimately, all these 
terms are rather specialised sub-concepts which allude to the characteristics of a product, but 
they are not truly distinct types of actions used to communicate a political preference” (Zorell, 
2019b, p. 41, 42).  
In other words, the deliberate purchase of a product based on ethical, sustainable or 
green considerations, emphasises on the underlying motivations behind such a purchase, which 
could be categorised alongside general drivers of conventional purchases such as price, quality 
or brand loyalty (Zorell, 2019b). In a similar way, voting for example, may be equally driven by 
environmental, ethical, or green considerations (as well as conservative, liberal or nationalist 
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ideological orientations). However, unless one is examining a specific driver behind voting 
decisions, voting is generally perceived as a single mode of political participation.  
The use of such issue-specific terms (whether with regards to voting, or to political 
consumerism) therefore, involves the risk of shifting the focus of enquiry from the actual act 
of political participation to its underlying content. Instead, the more general term ‘political 
consumerism’, presents the benefit of being able to accommodate all the various motivational 
sub-categories into one. In this way, political consumerism may stand alongside other types of 
political participation, such as voting, signing a petition, or demonstrating. Therefore, when 
studying political consumerism as a form of political participation that falls within the various 
political participation repertoires, the general term ‘political consumerism’ appears to be the 
more accurate option.  
With regards to the second dimension, that is, the distinction between the positive and 
the negative forms of political participation, the use of the term also varies significantly. This 
variation however, differs from the one above insofar it does not relate to the underlying 
motivations behind which type of products one is buying, but instead to the way that individual 
is acting; that is, it captures its praxial dimension. This feature refers to political consumerism 
as a form of political participation which takes predominately two forms: positive (buycotting) 
and negative (boycotting) political consumerism. But although these two variants are the ones 
most often found in the available literature, Micheletti et al. (2012) have expanded the 
conceptual variation of political consumerism even further. They discern thus, two more modes 
of political consumerism, alongside buycotting and boycotting. These are ‘discursive actions’ 
and ‘lifestyle choices’ (Micheletti et al., 2012) 
‘Discursive actions’ are being defined as “the expression of opinions about corporate 
policy and practice and even consumer culture in a variety of communicative efforts and 
venues” (Micheletti et al., 2012, p. 146), whereas under ‘lifestyle choices’ they classify the 
decision to integrate environmentally, ethically and politically responsible action consistently 
into one’s everyday life (Micheletti et al., 2012, p. 145). In other words, the expansion of the 
classification of political consumerism as a discursive action emphasises the extent of 
‘openness’ behind one’s political consumerist activities, whereas ‘lifestyle choices’ relate to the 
frequency or consistency of the said action throughout the individual’s life. In response to the 
additional classification by Micheletti et al. outlined above however, Zorell (2019b, pp. 42–47) 
makes the point that notwithstanding if one buycotts or boycotts openly or more privately, and 
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whether they decide to do so only a few times a year or more frequently, the act itself 
essentially consists of either supporting a certain product or firm (buycotting), or deliberately 
rejecting it (boycotting).  
Moreover, each of the two additional types of political consumerism may also involve 
other forms of political participation in addition to buycotting or boycotting. For example, 
under discursive actions one may want to decide to openly demonstrate or circulate a petition 
(Harrison and Scorse, 2010) or even exchange emails (Peretti and Micheletti, 2011) as it 
happened during the iconic mobilisation against the use of sweat-shops by multinational 
corporations like Nike in the early 2000s. Similarly, with regards to lifestyle choices one may 
decide to not only boycott meat and dairy products, but also to grow their own sustainable, 
organic plants privately, in their backyard (White, 2011) or more openly in urban community 
gardens (Bendt et al., 2013) as a way of building transitions towards post-capitalist urban 
commons (Chatterton, 2016). However, this conceptualisation would conflate political 
consumerism with other forms of political participation, resulting eventually into what van Deth 
(2014, p. 351) described as a ‘theory of everything’. 
To summarise, both ‘discursive actions’ and ‘lifestyle choices’ encompass variable 
behavioural repertoires, which may move beyond political consumerism (as for example 
signing petitions, demonstrating or even voting). Therefore, instead of conceptualising them as 
separate variants of political consumerism next to buycotting and boycotting, they may instead 
be understood as extra features indicating the breadth (in the case of discursive actions), and 
the depth (in the case of lifestyle choices) of one’s involvement in political consumerism.  
This however, makes them especially difficult to capture in political participation 
research, as is being evidenced by the general lack of studies presenting empirical data on 
either discursive actions and lifestyle choices, particularly on a comparative, cross-national 
level (Micheletti et al., 2012; Zorell, 2019b, p. 43). Therefore, instead of conflating different 
forms of political participation, at the additional risk of raising comparability issues, 
concentrating exclusively on buycotting and boycotting seems to be the most helpful approach.  
Such an approach will thus be assumed in the present thesis.  
Conversely, even though most scholars acknowledge boycotting and buycotting as 
facets of political consumerism, a great part of research fails to distinguish between the two. 
Instead, only a handful of researchers consistently scrutinise buycotting and boycotting in their 
own rights (Baek, 2010; Copeland, 2014a; Koos, 2012), whereas the greatest part of the 
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research on the subject tends to examine political consumerism as a unified concept (Bossy, 
2014; Micheletti et al., 2012; Newman and Bartels, 2011). In some of these studies, this practice 
is unproblematic. For example, if political consumerism is primarily understood as an 
expression of underlying values, distinguishing between buycotting and boycotting may be not 
be necessary. For instance, Newman and Bartels (2011), perceive political consumerism as a 
single unified phenomenon and scrutinise it as a way of achieving policy objectives and 
expressing political preferences, in comparison to other means of political participation. For 
Newman and Bartels therefore, the emphasis lies on the positioning of political consumerism 
as a single-dimensional phenomenon along other repertoires of political participation, rather 
than on the underlying drivers between buycotting and boycotting.  
However, buycotting and boycotting are based on fundamentally dissimilar 
motivations. On the one hand, buycotting entails the deliberate decision to buy a certain 
product or support a specific firm as a means to reward their ethical production process, or 
their business conduct in relation to environmental concerns. As such, it may be perceived as 
an investment, or as a form of economic voting (Zhang, 2015). Instead, boycotting entails the 
deliberate rejection of the business conduct of certain firms and the production processes 
behind certain products, and as such it may be understood as a form of economic ostracism 
(Malkopoulou, 2017). As a form of political participation therefore it can be argued that it 
shares more similarities with demonstrations and generally with the politics of dissent (Pickard, 
2018).  
In view of the differing underlying motivations behind the two behavioural expressions 
of political consumerism therefore, one may regard buycotting as an appropriate form of 
political participation for certain political, ethical or environmental claims, and boycotting for 
others. For this reason, when the object of analysis is political consumerism in itself  (and not 
in relation to other forms of political participation), using the general term ‘political 
consumerism’ as a unified phenomenon bears the risk of misinterpreting its significance to its 
entirety.  
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3. Determinants of Political Consumerism  
 
Nevertheless, the findings of a great part of the research regarding the motivations of citizens 
to consume politically20, are often interpreted as descriptive of a single, archetypical ‘politically 
consumer’. Instead, distinguishing between the generalised concept’s different praxial 
varieties, may yield significantly different (or even contradictory) results.  
With regards to age, the greater part of research does not distinguish between 
buycotting and boycotting. Instead, it tends to focus on motivations on the individual level, 
largely based on distinct phases of one’s life (Kotzur et al., 2017; Lorenzini and Bassoli, 2015; 
Ward and deVreese, 2011). Newman and Bartels (2011) find that young people from 16 to 30 
years of age are particularly more likely than their older contemporaries to take part in political 
consumerism – and that unlike conventional political participation, political consumerism is 
likely to decrease with age. Elsewhere, Gotlieb and Wells (2012) find a strong positive 
relationship between engagement in political consumerism at a young age and the 
development of those civic competencies necessary for the engagement in institutional politics 
as adults. Wicks et al. (2014) demonstrate that the predictors of adult political consumerism do 
not necessarily coincide with those of youth political consumerism, and they find that parental 
modelling is a significant predictor for both boycotting and buycotting at a young age21.  
With regards to gender, significantly more females are political consumers within the 
same age cohorts (Stolle et al., 2010). These results have been confirmed in several other 
studies (Lorenzini and Bassoli, 2015; Micheletti, 2004; O’Neill and Gidengil, 2013; Petersson et 
al., 1998), and have led to a widespread academic perception that political consumerism is a 
‘gendered’ form of political participation, which bridges the participation gap of institutional 
participatory forms (Bateman and Valentine, 2010; Micheletti, 2004; O’Neill and Gidengil, 2013; 
Stolle and Micheletti, 2006). One of the latest available studies on the subject (Zorell, 2019e, 
pp. 131–132), confirms that involvement in boycotting and buycotting has been on a steady 
 
20 These may include their socio-economic characteristics, opportunity structures, the cost of 
participation, particularised and generalised trust and postmaterialist values among others 
(see Chapter 3). 
21 Nevertheless, their findings also suggest differing effects for buycotting and boycotting. They 
report that young boycotters are much more likely to be either liberal or conservatives, than 
moderate. Instead, young buycotters demonstrated support for individualism, and were more 
likely to also engage in other forms of political engagement. 
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rise over the last decade, with more women (63%) than men (60%) being active political 
consumers, although the gender difference has been declining, compared to older studies. 
However, it also reports that out of the subset of active political consumers, almost 81% of men 
and women have boycotted over the past year, while 85% of women have buycotted over the 
same period, as opposed to 77% of men. 
With regards to class and socioeconomic status, contrary to concerns which perceive 
political consumerism as an elitist type of political participation (Maxton-Lee, 2020; Micheletti 
and Stolle, 2014; Tobiasen, 2004) that only a relatively small part of the overall population may 
be able to access, individual income levels seem to bear only a marginal effect – if any at all - 
on people’s propensity to engage in political consumerism (Copeland, 2014b; Tobiasen, 2004). 
Stolle et al. (2005) even discern a negative effect (albeit a weak one) with students from richer 
households being less likely to consume politically. When however, the studies are 
distinguishing between boycotting and buycotting among the general population, the results 
may be significantly different. For instance, Koos (2012, p. 47) reports that higher household 
income has a strong positive effect on buycotting, but no effect on boycotting.  
Generally, when examining the influence of demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics (under the standpoint of the SES model of political participation) on political 
consumerism as a unified concept, findings indicate that political consumers are more likely to 
be individuals who are female, young, highly educated, and highly interested in politics 
(Newman and Bartels, 2011; O’Neill and Gidengil, 2013; Quintelier and van Deth, 2014; 
Tobiasen, 2004). However, in many of these studies, several participants indicate that they have 
either engaged in buycotting only or buycotting only and significantly less will typically respond 
that they have engaged in both (Stolle and Micheletti, 2005, p. 45). For example, Neilson (2010) 
examines the underlying motivations behind buycotters and boycotters only, and those who 
engage in both (dualcotters) and finds that women, and more trusting and altruistic people are 
more likely to buycott, than boycott. Contrary to the unified conceptualisation of political 
consumerism therefore, these studies reveal differing demographic and socio-economic 
determinants for buycotters and boycotters. These differences support the inclusion of 
independent measures for buycotting and boycotting, in the study of political consumerism.  
Nevertheless, even when the studies include separate measures for buycotting and 
boycotting, but examine only the SES characteristics of the respondents, the findings convey 
only a partial understanding of the drivers behind the individuals’ decisions to buycott or 
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boycott only, or to engage in both. Instead, studies that examine the phenomenon in light of 
the Social Capital theory, show that having high generalised trust and low trust in political 
institutions seems to be associated with higher involvement in political consumerism (Baek, 
2010; Copeland, 2014b; Micheletti and Stolle, 2005). Moreover, examination of buycotting and 
boycotting separately provides somewhat more revealing findings. Neilson (2010, p. 220) 
considers the psychological variations between buycotters and boycotters and reports that, 
boycotters demonstrate much lower levels of trust in institutions (particularised trust) and in 
their fellow citizens (generalised trust), when compared to the buycotters. Moreover, whereas 
individuals with very low levels of  particularised trust seem more likely to engage in boycotts 
than not to consume politically at all, it is only when they have high levels of generalised trust 
that they will tend to buycott than to not consume politically at all, demonstrating a difference 
behind their underlying dispositions behind each political consumerist variant when examined 
separately. Similar findings are being confirmed also by Baek (2010) and Copeland (2014a, p. 
182).  
With regards to the rational agency model, buycotts typically involve a greater cost than 
boycotts, which do not involve a monetary ‘investment’ that entails the risk of a loss. 
Consequently, boycotters can more easily observe whether their fellow citizens are also 
engaging in the same action, and thus do not require them to be so trusting. Moreover, 
boycotts are intended to influence producers and state regulations to change objectionable 
features of production processes or company conduct. Boycotts thus, as an expression of 
political dissent (Pickard, 2018) are expected to be associated with lower levels of 
institutionalised trust. For the same reason, buycotts will also be expected to have a positive 
correlation with support for Democracy in principle, unlike boycotts, which as a form of 
participation that conveys dissatisfaction with the prevailing market economy, may yield the 
opposite results. 
Furthermore, studies emphasising on the macro-level determinants of political 
consumerism, reveal rather different patterns of boycotts and buycotts across countries. 
Political consumerism seems to be much more widespread in Northern European countries 
(Pellandini-Simányi and Gulyás, 2018) and in the US (Katz, 2011), with engagement rates 
steadily increasing over the past decade (Copeland, 2014a; Koos, 2012; Micheletti et al., 2012). 
However, the distinction between buycotting and boycotting discloses higher rates of  
boycotting in the US than in Europe as a whole (Copeland, 2014a, p. 180), with marginally lower 
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rates in the Western European countries, such as Germany, France, Switzerland and the UK, 
compared to Scandinavian countries (Koos, 2012, p. 46).  
Moreover, the latest comprehensive and publicly available, large-scale, cross-national 
surveys that include measures for both buycotting and boycotting are rather dated: these 
include the Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy Study (CID) conducted in 2000 and the 
2002/03 wave of the European Social Survey (Zorell, 2019b, p. 47). Nevertheless, both surveys 
clearly indicate that buycotting is more widespread than boycotting in almost every country 
under examination. Notable exception is Greece, which is the only country (along with Italy in 
the ESS, another MME country) which demonstrates higher levels of boycotts instead. 
Generally, the percentages for buycotting range between 4 and 11 percent in Southern and 
Central European countries; and 25 and 48 percent in Middle and Northern 
European/Scandinavian countries. In turn, when it comes to boycotting only, the percentages 
are much lower and vary between only 3 to 5 percent in Central and Southern Europe, and 10 
to 32 percent in Middle and Northern European countries. More recent studies emphasising  in 
single countries (Copeland, 2014a; Stolle et al., 2010) are maintaining that the distribution of 
buycotting and boycotting varies significantly across countries. This observation further 
highlights the importance of distinguishing between the two forms when studying political 
consumerism as a form of political participation.   
Summarising, this section argues that on the one hand, when studying political 
consumerism as a form of political participation, the more comprehensive term ‘political 
consumerism’ is preferable than the more particularised terms ‘ethical’ and ‘green’ 
consumerism, or ‘sustainable consumption’; since it allows the researcher to focus on the 
praxial component of the activity, rather than on its content (Zorell, 2019b, p. 47). The present 
thesis therefore, will assume the use of the term ‘political consumerism’  throughout, instead 
of its more particularised variants.  
On the other hand, previous findings suggest that the way through which individuals 
engage in the two  forms of political consumerism varies with regards to their socioeconomic 
characteristics and their underlying values and attitudes. Buycotting seems thus to be driven 
by a different set of factors than boycotting, or engaging in both. Treating buycotts and 
boycotts interchangeably, might underestimate the differences between the two. As a result, 
effects between individual factors and buycotting and/or boycotting may be erroneously 
attributed to all political consumers when, in fact, these may be associated with only one of the 
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two.  Moreover, the magnitude of these effects may also be erroneously reported if, for 
example, they are positive for buycotting and negative for boycotting, cancelling each other 
out. For this reason, the first part of the analysis of the present thesis will examine the effects 
of a number of  factors previously identified in Chapter 3, with regards to positive and negative 
consumerism separately. Moreover, instead of using the cumulative measurement for 
dualcotters (those who have engaged in both buycotting and boycotting), this thesis will 
employ a third measure for ‘buycotters/boycotters’, that is those who have engaged in either 
buycotting or boycotting. When used in conjunction to individual measures for buycotting and 
boycotting, this approach provides the benefit of discerning whether the individual effects of 
the single measures either spill-over to the cumulative measure, or whether they cancel each 
other out.  
However, emphasising only on the praxial elements of political consumerism, that is in 
the actions of buycotting or boycotting only, still fails to capture the breadth and the depth of 
one’s involvement in political consumerism. The following section therefore, will devise a 
cumulative Political Consumerism Index (PCI), consisting of the responsibility the consumer 
attributes to their purchasing decisions, the frequency with which they engage in such 
behaviour, in addition to its praxial elements. Unlike the combined measure for 
buycotters/boycotters above, the PCI attributes higher weight when the consumers engage in 
both buycotting and boycotting, as opposed to when they engage only in one of them. The PCI 
will thus be used as the dependent variable in Chapter 12. The following section will discuss 
the theoretical underpinnings behind the construction of the PCI, and will evaluate it in terms 
of validity and reliability. 
 
4. Constructing the Political Consumerism Index (PCI) 
 
Unlike other forms of political participation, as for example party or union membership, it is 
not possible to capture the full extent of political consumerism with a single-item question 
(Stolle et al., 2005). Nevertheless, although the discussion on the challenges and potentials of 
the creation of a simple and reliable empirical measure has recently received renewed 
attention (Gundelach, 2020), there still is “no population survey available that includes a variety 
of measurements of political consumerism” (Stolle et al., 2005, p. 10). One of the objectives of 
this thesis therefore, is to address this gap in the literature by constructing and employing a 
single valid and reliable survey tool to measure political consumerism that will be then used in 
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conjunction of the non-parametric analysis in Chapters 10 and 11 to shed some light on the 
underlying motivations of young political consumers. In a series of articles at the beginning of 
2000s, Stolle, Michelletti and Hooghe (2005; 2006), proposed the development of an Index of 
Political Consumerism, but this has been used thereafter only sporadically (Pellandini-Simányi 
and Gulyás, 2018) and has not gained academic traction. The present thesis will thus expand 
on this research, and will propose a variation of their Index of Political Participation which will 
then be used in the last chapter of this thesis to provide a definitive answer with regards to the 
differences and similarities of the phenomenon, among young people in Greece as opposed to 
the UK. 
The discussion in the previous sections has indicated that measuring political 
consumerism as a single unified concept may misinterpret the underlying motivations behind 
its two praxial components, namely positive and negative consumerism. However, although 
taking into consideration buycotting and/or boycotting separately instead of the cumulative 
measure (‘buy/boycotters’) may be much more revealing, it still fails to capture the breadth 
and depth of the phenomenon. It follows therefore, that an effective operationalisation of 
political consumerism will have to incorporate other elements than just its two behavioural 
components.  For Stolle et al. (2005; 2006), there are three conditions which need to be taken 
into consideration for a meaningful analysis of political consumerism as a form of political 
participation. These are a) behaviour, b) motivation, and c) frequency.  
The first condition refers to the two praxial components of political participation, as 
discussed and analysed above. It is self-evident that the PCI will actually have to take into 
consideration whether consumers buycott or boycott certain goods and services, for them to 
be effectively classified as political consumers. This implies that citizens who never make any 
independent consumer decisions, either because they do not have their own income, or 
because they do not engage in shopping, are automatically excluded from this form of political 
participation. Most existing large-scale studies only include a cumulative measure 
(‘buy/boycotters’), but as demonstrated, distinguishing between the different forms of political 
consumerism may reveal a different image of the phenomenon. For this reason, the PCI 
developed in this chapter will incorporate both positive and negative consumerism and will 
attribute additional weight for those political consumers who have engaged in both. 
The second condition refers to the motivation behind the action itself. According to the 
working definition of political consumerism (see Chapter 2), political consumerism refers to the 
act of deliberately buying or refusing to buy certain goods and services, for ethical, 
environmental and political considerations (Stolle et al., 2005). Consequently, it is possible that 
individuals buy fair-trade or organic products simply because they are partial to how they taste 
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or because they were on sale. For example, some people never go to McDonald’s (or other 
multinational fast-food franchises) not because they protest against the cultural hegemony of 
Americanism (Bové and Dufour, 2002) but simply because they do not like hamburgers. Stolle 
and Micheletti (2005, p. 11) thus argue that for political consumers to be classified as such, they 
need to be “motivated by ethical or political considerations, or at least by the wish to change 
social conditions, either with or without relying on the political system”. The second 
component of the PCI therefore will be capturing how responsible people feel with regards to 
the impact of their purchasing decisions, in relation to their environmental, ethical or political 
considerations; that is, the depth or content behind their consumption behaviour. 
Likewise, the third condition of the  PCI will refer to the breadth, or frequency behind 
these consumption patterns. Although an isolated act of political consumerism can be 
important in and by itself, and would automatically classify the agent of the action as a political 
consumer in the majority of published studies on the subject, the PCI proposed in this study 
suggests that the consistency of these actions is equally important. Regular involvement in 
political consumerism activities therefore, needs also to be considered and distinguished from 
sporadic engagement. The third component of the PCI therefore, will be capturing  the habitual 
commitment to political consumerism, with consumers who engage in it often, or almost 
always when they go shopping being attributed with greater weight in their PCI scores. 
Summarising therefore, the respondent’s engagement in political consumerism will be 
operationalised by a single scale, consisting of three components which will capture the 
participants’ behavioural, attitudinal and habitual patterns.  
Stolle and Micheletti (2005, p. 11) refer to the attitudinal component of their index, as 
the extent to which “respondents believe in the political effectiveness of buying certain 
products and services, in addition to their view on whether citizens in general have the 
responsibility to choose the ‘right’ company (ethically or politically speaking that is) from which 
to buy products and services”. However, it is important at this point to clarify that the 
attitudinal component of the PCI in this study will be capturing only the responsibility aspect 
behind one’s consumer decisions. The reason is that when testing the index for reliability 
through a Principal Component Analysis (PCA), the Perceived Consumer Effectiveness 
components scored outside the quadrant where the behavioural and frequency components 
lay. 
The exclusion of the Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) from the PCI as measured 
in this study, significantly improves the one previously developed by Stolle and Micheletti 
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(2005). Although the reliability test of their index22 was actually confirming that their PCI 
provided a reliable tool for the measurement of political consumerism as a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon, the factor analysis proved to be much more problematic. Their factor analysis 
conducted through a Principal Component Analysis (PCA), disclosed several difficulties as 
discussed in detail in their article, despite the progressive exclusion of several leading factors. 
They report that the more reflexive survey questions about whether respondents perceived 
boycotting as an effective tool, displayed low factor loadings during the PCA. This was also the 
case with respect to their industry-specific ethical considerations when choosing restaurants, 
banks, and paper products. As a result, attitudes did not load as sturdily on their index as 
behaviours did. For this reason, industry-specific questions were dropped from the PCI in this 
thesis, which instead perceives political consumerism as a phenomenon which transcends the 
various industries of any individual economic sector. Moreover, the inclusion of 13 items only 
for their attitudinal component seemed to be an overly complicated and time-consuming way 
of measuring political consumerism, especially for national polls and surveys which often suffer 
from financial and time constraints (Pontes et al., 2018); and would only hamper the 
subsequent use of the index in future studies. It can be argued that the reason the PCI did not 
gain traction in subsequent research on political consumerism is exactly because of its complex 
operationalisation. 
 In this study therefore, the measurement of the PCI scale will be reduced to a single 
manageable scale, consisting of only four variables and three components. These components 
are a) behaviour (‘BUY’ and ‘BOY’), b) attitude (measured as consumer responsibility ‘RES’), and 
c) habitual consistency or frequency (‘FRE’). The PCI in this chapter will thus assume the 
following form:  
 
PCI = (BUY+BOY) * (RES+FRE) 
 
The actual phrasing of the 4 questions included in the PCI therefore is as follows (see 
also Appendix II): 
• BUY: In the past 12 months, did you actively purchase one product or brand over 
another for ethical, environmental or political reasons? (0: No; 1: Yes). 
• BOY: In the past 12 months, did you actively refuse to purchase a product or 
brand based on ethical, environmental or political considerations? (0: No; 1:Yes). 
 
22 Cronbach’s alpha for their 13-items battery was .86; higher that the .70 reliability cut-off 
point, confirming that their index consistently measured the phenomenon. 
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• RES: How responsible do you feel with regards to choosing the 'right' brand 
when you go shopping? (0: Not at all responsible; 4: Very responsible). 
• FRE: How often do you purchase, or avoid purchasing certain products, services 
or brands for ethical, environmental or political considerations? (0: Hardly ever; 
4: Every time I go shopping). 
BUY and BOY are both dichotomous variables, which assume the value ‘0’ if the 
respondents have not deliberately purchased (buycotted), or if they have not purposely 
refrained from buying (boycotting),  a product or brand for political, ethical and environmental 
considerations in the previous 12 months. Conversely, they assume the value ‘1’ if the 
respondents have engaged in these activities. As a result, the combined behavioural 
component (BUY+BOY) assumes the value ‘0’ if the respondents have engaged in neither of the 
two activities; ‘1’ if they have engaged in either buycotting or boycotting only; and ‘2’ if they 
have engaged in both. The variable RES ranges from 0 (‘Not at all responsible’) to 4 (‘Very 
responsible’). Likewise for the variable FRE, which ranges from 0 (‘Hardly ever’) to 4 (‘Every 
time I go shopping’). As a result, the combined component (RES+FRE) may assume values 
ranging from 0 to 8. 
This means that if the respondent has engaged in either buycotting or boycotting or 
both (values 1 and 2), but they reported not being ‘responsible’ when they did, and they 
simultaneously reported doing so ‘Hardly ever’ in the past 12 months, the component 
(RES+FRE) will assume the value ‘0’, eventually nullifying the PCI. Conversely, if the respondents 
reported high responsibility and high frequency with regards to their consumer decisions, but 
they reported that they had not engaged in either buycotting or boycotting in the past 12 
months, the component (BUY+BOY) will similarly assume the value ‘0’, similarly nullifying the 
PCI. If however, the respondent has engaged in both buycotting and boycotting, (BUY+BOY) 
assumes the value ‘2’, eventually doubling their score in (RES+FRE). The PCI therefore takes the 
form of a continuous scale, ranging from 0 to 16. These interventions have thus led to the 
construction of a much more intuitive PCI, consisting of only four variables.  
Testing for reliability, the Cronbach’s Alpha score was above the conventional cut-off 
point of 0.700, suggesting that the PCI is highly reliable, precise, reproducible, and consistent 
from one testing occasion to another. That is, if the survey was repeated with a different group 
of respondents, then broadly the same results would be obtained. 
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Moreover, the PCI scale in this study is also reliable for both the subsamples of the UK 
(Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.720) and Greece (Cronbach’s Alpha: 0.734), further supporting the 
reliability of the scale.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The validity of an index instead, is the degree to which the tool measures what it claims 
to measure. Testing for validity using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) the PCI has been 
shown to be one-dimensional (Eigen Value: 2.480) and captures 62% of the variance in political 
consumerism. 
 
The analysis above therefore points towards an understanding of political consumerism, 
as consisting not only of its praxial components (buycotting and boycotting), as in the majority 
of other studies. Instead, in addition to buycotting and boycotting, the PCI includes also the 
attitudinal and frequency elements of the phenomenon. Consequently, the development of the 
PCI provides a state-of-the art contribution to the study of political consumerism. 
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An independent sample t-test revealed that the respondents from Greece (MGR=7.58PCI, 
SDGR=5.21) did not score significantly differently from those in the UK (MUK=6.50PCI, SDUK=5.34), 
(t(554)=2.41, p=0.016), indicating that there is not a statistically significant difference in the 
expression of political consumerism among young people in the two countries, as it can be seen 
in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a precise delineation of the conceptual varieties of political 
consumerism – namely positive and negative political consumerism - and has discussed their 
underlying character, independently from each other. The chapter began by introducing some 
of the several issue-related terms which have been used in the broad study of politically-
oriented purchasing behaviour. Terms such as ‘sustainable consumption’, ‘ethical 
consumerism’ or ‘green buying behaviour’ have been often used interchangeably. However, a 
closer examination on the use of such terms reveals that, eventually, all these terms are 
specialised, issue-specific sub-concepts in relation to the specific characteristics of a product, 
but they are not really separate forms of actions used to express a political preference. The first 
section of this chapter therefore has advocated that these may all be understood as subparts 
of the more general term of ‘political consumerism’.  
Figure 4: Mean score of the PCI per country 
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The second section of the chapter proceeded by suggesting that, in the study of political 
consumerism as a form of political participation, researchers should take into consideration 
both of the constituting behavioural expressions of the phenomenon - namely positive 
(buycotting) and negative (boycotting) political consumerism. It has therefore discussed 
buycotting and boycotting in their own rights and independently from each other.  It has made 
the case that the use of the general term ‘political consumerism’ as a unified conceptualisation 
of the phenomenon, when used interchangeably to signify either engagement in buycotts only, 
in boycotts only or engagement in either/or both, fails to capture the differing underlying 
motivations, values and attitudes behind its two separate behavioural expressions.  
Nevertheless, it has also discussed how examining only the behavioural components of 
political consumerism (whether individually or in their sum), runs the risk of ignoring the 
breadth (the responsibility behind the action) and depth (frequency, or habitual consistency) 
of the phenomenon. Therefore, the chapter concluded by proposing the development of a 
Political Consumerism Index (PCI) which has two key purposes: on the one hand, it is able to 
capture both the behavioural aspects of political consumerism (by attributing additional weight 
when the respondents have engaged in both buycotting and boycotting); on the other hand, it 
is simultaneously able to capture the responsibility and frequency of the said behaviour in a 
single intuitive index. The PCI has been tested for validity and reliability and will be used in 
Chapter 12 as the dependent variable, so as to provide a conclusive image about the factors 
underlying political consumerism among young people in the UK and in Greece.  
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Chapter 8: Methodology: Overview of the study procedure  
 
1. Research aim and objectives 
 
This thesis uses a mixed-method approach. The initial analysis of the focus groups conducted 
in the two countries informed the subsequent development of the survey questionnaire. The 
use of primarily quantitative research methods, in conjunction with qualitative data provides a 
comprehensive (and comparative) picture of political consumption in the UK and in Greece. 
The lack of conclusive empirical evidence in the available literature on the determining factors 
of political consumerism, has informed my research aim and objectives.  
Therefore, the overarching research aim of this thesis is: 
1. to identify and interpret the key drivers underpinning the changing patterns of 
political participation amongst young people, with particular emphasis on political 
consumerism, using a paired-country comparison research approach, among young 
people in the UK and in Greece. 
In order to achieve the overarching aim of the thesis however, the following research 
objectives need to be addressed: 
1. Firstly, it is necessary to gain insights concerning young people’s motivations for, 
and patterns of, political consumerism, through a series of focus groups conducted 
in the two countries; 
2. secondly, to inform the survey questionnaire with the insights gained from the focus 
groups, and devise an innovative measurement instrument for political 
consumerism; and 
3. finally, analysing the data from the survey, to identify the key drivers underpinning 
young people’s decisions to engage in political consumerism in the UK and in 
Greece. 
 
In this process however, having had indications from my preliminary analysis about the 
contextual influence of neoliberalism on young people’s decisions to engage in political 
consumerism, I have decided to expand the research objectives above. A final objective 
therefore is: 
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4. to examine the extent to which young people in the UK and Greece may be driven 
into political consumerism by the ‘push and pull effects’ of neoliberalism. 
 
2. Research questions 
 
Although Diamond (2008, p. 294) has argued that in order to build free, democratic societies 
around the world, both “leaders and citizens must internalise the spirit of democracy”, the 
present thesis has assumed a comparative individualist approach that moves beyond the usual 
elite-focused literature. Notwithstanding a continuous increase and expansion in political 
consumerist activities (Copeland and Boulianne, 2020; Gundelach, 2020), not much is known 
about their emergence and their political nature or about the profile of the political consumers 
(Baek, 2010; Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2017; Dhaoui et al., 2020). Following  Stolle et al. (2005) this 
doctoral research project acknowledges five areas of inquiry into political consumerism, which 
will be cumulatively pursued throughout this thesis: 
RQ 1: First and foremost, stands the question of operationalisation. How should we 
measure political consumerism? How can we make sure that this measure captures 
those young people who consistently and intentionally purchase, or refrain from buying, 
products or services for environmental, ethical or political considerations? Although the 
issue of measurement has recently received renewed interest (Gundelach, 2020), it 
remains an issue of critical concern, as we are still a long way from an intuitive, but 
comprehensive instrument which captures political consumerism’s praxial 
components, as well as the breadth and depth of the phenomenon. 
RQ 2: The second issue this thesis will address refers to the economic or market-
related predictors of the phenomenon. Given the centrality that political consumerism 
places on the market, would income levels, economic and market-related factors ‘pull’ 
young people to engage in it? Stolle et al. (2005, p. 252) posit that “income makes a 
difference here; citizens with deeper pockets might be able to afford ethical products 
(…) while those with more limited budgets might not”. Further to their subjective socio-
economic conditions, how does satisfaction from the market-environment or the 
internalisation of neoliberal governmentality affect their decisions to use the market as 
an arena for politics? 
RQ 3: A third issue of concern is how these economic conditions may affect the value-
orientations and the social embeddedness of young political consumers. Post-
modernisation literature (Inglehart, 1997, 2016) has consistently emphasised the role 
of the prevalent economic conditions during one’s formative years, towards the 
development and crystallisation of postmaterialist values. These in turn, have been 
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found to be associated with a perceived increase of lifestyle forms of political 
participation. However, this theory was developed in times of unprecedented economic 
prosperity. Would the same apply to young political consumers in the UK and in Greece, 
who are socialised in times of economic austerity instead? 
RQ 4: A fourth issue derives from social capital theory, which broadly put, suggests 
that embeddedness in informal networks, such as voluntary associations, in the form of 
generalised and particularised social trust, allows young citizens to overcome collective 
action problems (Putnam, 1995). Mobilisation theory (Almond and Verba, 1963) 
expands this rationale suggesting that networks and associations facilitate recruitment 
for political participatory acts (Almond and Verba, 1963). The theory of imagined 
communities (Anderson, 2006) in turn, implies that the personal outlook of the agent 
affects their conception of the ingroup and may further enhance the engagement of 
young people in participatory activities. Sloam and Henn (2018) have recently discerned 
the role of widening personal identity outlook, or cosmopolitanism, behind an alleged 
‘Youthquake’ in Britain. What is the role of the formation of individual and collective 
identities on young peoples’ propensity to engage in political consumerism? 
RQ 5: Finally, what is the relationship of political consumerism to more traditional 
forms of participation? From the standpoint of risk society and sub-politics (Beck, 1992), 
we should expect that political consumers would be less trusting of political institutions 
and would therefore utilise alternative ways of making their voices heard. Is political 
consumerism therefore ‘crowding-out’ institutional forms of political participation, and 
if so, to which extent is the traditional political arena responsible for alienating the 
young people, and thus ‘pushing’ them away from traditional repertoires of 
participatory action, towards more imaginative approaches such as political 
consumerism? Is such a relationship exclusive or does it instead imply a widening of the 
available political participation repertoires (Pickard, 2019b; Theocharis and van Deth, 
2018), so as to include both contentious and institutional politics?  
Of course, the issues above cannot be examined in isolation, especially since they are to a great 
extent interrelated, and contextual background information should therefore also be 
considered. This thesis will therefore assume a multi-layered process (Zorell, 2019c) with 
regards to the examination of political consumerism. The following sections will thus discuss 
the philosophical assumption and the methodological approach that will be utilised throughout 
this thesis. 
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3. Philosophical assumptions  
 
The term ‘social sciences’ refers to “the disciplined and systematic study of society and its 
institutions, and of how and why people behave as they do, both as individuals and in groups 
within society” (Pontes, 2019, p. 120) and encompasses several areas like psychology, 
sociology, anthropology, economics and political sciences (Halloran, 2010). The philosophical 
bases of social sciences therefore may be divided into a) ontological, b) epistemological, and c) 
methodological. The first relate to the existence of a ‘real’ and ‘objective’ world. The second 
links to how we can acknowledge this world and the forms this knowledge will take. Finally, the 
latter refers to the selection of instruments that may be used to acquire this knowledge 
(Corbetta, 2003, pp. 13–14). A clear distinction between these three components of social 
sciences is therefore needed in order to avoid confusion when recognising and discussing 
theoretical approaches to social phenomena (Pontes, 2019, p. 123). 
The two predominant ontological approaches in social sciences may be summarised as 
follows: essentialism comprises of the standpoint that phenomena are ‘real’, that is natural, 
inevitable, and biologically determined. Constructivism, instead rests on the standpoint that – 
although not any less ‘real’ – what we call external or objective ‘reality’ is a social construct and 
highlights language as the epistemological ‘tool’ by which we interpret experience. With 
regards to young people’s political participation, an essentialist ontological position would 
consider young people being fundamentally different from adults, demonstrating features that 
are common across cultures, and persistent across time. This thesis instead, perceives these 
differences as socially constructed outcomes of their nurture and the material, social and 
economic conditions in which they are being brought up. The approach taken in Chapter 2 on 
the definition of ‘young people’ has already assumed a clear constructivist standpoint on the 
ontological approach of this thesis. 
The purpose of this thesis therefore is not merely to identify the patterns with which 
young people engage in political consumption, but to inform our ontological understanding of 
how these patterns are being influenced by the prevalent socio-economic conditions during 
their socialisation, allowing for these patterns to be altered in a socially desirable way. The 
emphasis of this thesis on consumption as a post-modern phenomenon and lifestyle forms of 
political participation, according to young people’s own understanding of the concept, is 
indicative of this standpoint. For example, examining young people’s postmaterialist value 
orientations (Inglehart, 1997) is indicative of the constructivist ontological standpoint of this 
study. The postmaterialist thesis is focusing on the existence and the role of material conditions 
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prevalent during one’s socialisation in the development of their values and attitudes 
throughout adulthood. By implication, a change in these conditions could potentially alter 
young people’s focus, patterns and intensity of political engagement in the foreseeable future.  
This ontological position has in turn, informed the epistemological approach of the 
thesis. Two contrasting epistemological positions have dominated research in social sciences: 
‘Positivism’, which is often associated with quantitative research and ‘Interpretivism’ which is 
usually associated with qualitative research. The former advocates the application of the 
methods of the natural sciences to the study of social interaction (Pontes, 2019, p. 123). A 
purely positivist epistemological standpoint with regards to political participation would 
perceive the political engagement of young people as linked to essentialist attributes of being 
‘young’. For example Ackermann (2017) emphasises individual differences and personality 
traits of young people in explaining participation in protests. An interpretivist epistemological 
position instead, is predicated upon a methodological approach that “requires the social 
scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action” (Bryman, 2016; Pontes, 2019, p. 122). 
For instance, Sloam (2018) assumes an interpretivist epistemological position by seeking to 
understand the processes through which young people become politically active. Since the 
present thesis will utilise a primarily quantitative approach, its positivist dimension is self-
evident. However, the intention to interpret the processes through which young people engage 
in political consumerism is central to the aims and objectives of the thesis. Transcending thus 
the standard epistemological cleavage between positivism and interpretivism, the quantitative 
findings will be augmented by the qualitative insights from the focus groups, so as to identify 
and interpret the processes through which young people engage in political consumerism. 
 
4. Methodological approach 
 
This study will thus utilise a paired-country comparison method, within a multi-method 
research design. It initially conducted a series of focus groups in the two countries, the insights 
of which informed both the survey questionnaire and subsequently the theories utilised to 
support the findings. In other words, the research approach of this thesis utilises elements of 
grounded theory, whereby “theory emerges from the data” (Henn et al., 2009:184) through an 
iterative process. 
The architect of grounded theory, Strauss, defined the three elements any research 
design utilising grounded theory should include (Legewie and Schervier-Legewie, 2004): 
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• Theoretical sampling, refers to deciding which variables to examine next or whom to 
interview according to the status of theory generation. In other words, starting the 
analysis with the first samples, or transcriptions, and developing hypotheses from an 
early stage. 
• Theoretical sensitive coding, refers to generating theoretically robust insights from the 
data to explain the phenomenon under scrutiny. 
• The necessity of comparisons between contexts and phenomena to strengthen the 
theories developed. 
The research design of this thesis therefore, is based primarily on quantitative methods, 
while however, when appropriate, traces support from the qualitative data, that is the insights 
of the young people themselves, collected during the focus groups.  
According to Bergman (2008) multi-method analysis diverges from the traditional 
quantitative versus qualitative methodological cleavage by recognising how different research 
methods – when combined - may complement each other and “generate confident, well-
rounded research findings” (Robertson, 2009, p. 67). On the one hand, quantitative methods 
are particularly useful in understanding large data sets and allow therefore for comparisons 
across different cases. Such an approach however, when used in isolation, often lacks 
contextualisation, and therefore presents the difficulty of confidently explaining divergent 
findings. By way of contrast, qualitative methods remain restricted to much smaller population 
sizes. For the same reason however, they present the benefit of more in-depth and 
contextualised insights, which may allow for more convincing explanations behind particular 
findings (Kuehn and Rohlfing, 2010). 
Research on youth political participation has often acknowledged important differences 
between researchers’ and young people’s own understandings of politics (Henn and Foard, 
2014). Consequently, closed-ended survey questions alone, which ask about people’s 
participation, interest and trust in politics, are likely to result in a distorted representation of 
young people’s engagement levels. Conversely, research that introduces politics in general 
terms and relates it to young people’s own attitudes and experiences may yield significantly 
different findings. For example, a mixed-methods study of young people’s political engagement 
in Britain (Henn, Weinstein, and Wring, 2002), disclosed that participants held strong opinions 
when asked in focus groups about political issues that concerned them, despite their survey 
responses conveying an overwhelming disillusionment with formal party politics. 
The following sections therefore will outline the research design of the present study, 
which involves: a) a paired country comparison, using a combination of b) focus groups, in 
conjunction to c) survey questionnaire analysis. 
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a. Paired-country comparison 
The decision to conduct a paired-country comparison was informed by the concise advantages 
of this approach over large population studies on the one hand, and single-country case studies, 
on the other (Robertson, 2009, p. 39). With regards to the former, which usually aim to 
compare and contrast several countries at once, paired-country comparisons allow for more 
in-depth examination into the underlying factors behind the dependent variable. In this way, 
they avoid the conceptual stretching which is often detected in large population studies 
(Landman and Carvalho, 2016; Robertson, 2009). With regards to a single-country case study, 
a paired-country comparison approach also offers distinct advantages, since it allows the 
findings “to be tested across contrasting political, economic and social contexts” (Robertson, 
2009, p. 40) and therefore is able to generate more robust conclusions, instead of a crude 
description of a single national case.  
The decision to compare and contrast political consumerism in the UK and in Greece, 
has been dictated on the one hand by practical reasons, that is my personal access in these 
societies, but also on theoretical grounds because of their underlying economic and socio-
political differences, which Chapter 6 has already discussed in detail. With regards to political 
consumerism for example, by holding the dependent factor constant (that is political 
consumerism measured either in terms of buycotting and boycotting in Chapters 10 and 11, or 
by the PCI in Chapter 12), and contrasting it among the UK, that is a ‘Liberal Market Economy’ 
(LME) country, as opposed to Greece, a ‘Mediterranean – or Mixed- Market Economy’ (MME) 
country (see Chapter 6), has allowed me to unpack the country-specific factors which influence 
young people’s engagement in political consumerism, in each. Especially in view of the lack of 
studies examining the impact of neoliberalism on political consumerism, and the fact that the 
greatest part of existing research is based on large population studies or independent case 
studies instead (Copeland and Boulianne, 2020), a paired-country comparison approach is 
expected to offer useful insights in the field.  
 
b. Focus groups 
With the above in mind, this thesis assumed the position that focus group discussions were a 
particularly appropriate method for gaining insights concerning young people’s motivations for, 
and patterns of, political consumerism.  Focus groups allow participants to openly talk about 
the topic under examination in terms of their own frames of reference and have been 
previously employed elsewhere to study both consumer motivations (Bray et al., 2011), as well 
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as youth political engagement (Pontes et al., 2018) with similar numbers of participants and 
research designs to this study. 
This thesis therefore has followed the recommendations of Henn et al. (2009) according 
to which small groups are usually preferred during focus groups to minimise potential social-
desirability bias effects, especially in cases where young people may feel reticent in large 
groups to challenge opinions which are at variance with their own. Two focus groups were thus 
assembled in Greece and also two in the UK, each ranging in size from four to six young political 
consumers, aged 18 to 29 years of age23.  
Previous research (Hopkins and Williamson, 2012) has examined the links between 
neighbourhood design and preferred political participation modes. In order to minimise these 
effects, the focus groups in Greece were conducted both in the capital city of Athens and the 
rural town of Epidavros, to ensure representation from both urban and rural populations. 
Likewise, the UK focus groups took place in Nottingham, a large city in central England, and 
participants included young people from a mixed socioeconomic background, distinguishing 
between inner-city (socio-economically deprived) cohorts and outer-city (socio-economically 
advantaged) cohorts. However, during the analysis of the focus groups, there has been no 
attempt to compare insights according to residency, class or gender as sample numbers are too 
small to make generalisations across these variables. These factors however, have not been 
neglected during the analysis of the survey. 
The focus groups were arranged with emphasis on gender-balance. Although Kitzinger 
(2007) contends that focus groups are particularly conducive to feminist studies, allowing 
access to the interactional context of women’s lives, this study conducted mixed-gender focus 
groups instead. The intention was to capture how young people interacted in mixed groups 
when discussing their political consumerist motivations and how they responded to 
disagreements. The interactive dynamic of the mixed focus groups was a critical element 
shaping our selection of participants. The moderator and the assistant moderator used certain 
tactics to mitigate the danger of ‘dominant talkers’ – an issue that is particularly gender- and 
class-sensitive in focus groups (Henn et al,. 2009). These included tactfully asking participants 
to curtail their contribution, or by noting how they expressed certain points and how others 
 
23 In order to make sure that none of the participants had any previous theoretical knowledge 
on the topic of political participation or neoliberalism which could drive the discussion away 
from young people’s own understandings and towards existing theoretical paths, students of 
political and social sciences were excluded from the focus groups. 
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reacted to these - including gestures, posture or facial expressions - to ensure, as far as was 
possible, that all voices were encouraged, heard and amplified. 
  As mentioned above, the research approach of the focus groups utilised elements of 
grounded theory, whereby “theory emerges from the data” (Henn et al., 2009, p. 184) through 
an iterative process. Having thus introduced the general topic of political consumers’ 
motivations, the moderator offered participants opportunities to shape the course of key 
aspects of the discussion. Having conducted the focus groups, I coded their transcriptions 
thematically, searching for patterns and relationships within the data. Subsequently, I turned 
to theory in order to explain these patterns. Previous work on the subject (Bray et al., 2011; 
Hay, 2007; Stolle et al., 2005) did of course partly inform my thinking about which key themes 
to address, whilst however, remaining open to data-driven understandings emerging from the 
discussions. 
The eventual aim of the focus groups was to reveal important insights concerning the 
dynamics of young peoples’ engagement in political consumerist activities within a broad 
political, spatial and social context, in both countries. Given the exploratory nature of the 
research and the sample size, the qualitative part of my research design does not make any 
claims concerning the generalisability of the findings. Instead, the intention behind the focus 
groups was to enhance the knowledge from the literature review by accessing the young 
participants’ own understandings and frames of reference on the topic of political 
consumerism. Such insights would not have been possible to acquire alone by using a survey-
based study  involving a large number of participants. Figure 5 below presents the participants’ 
characteristics from both countries in terms of gender, age, occupation24 and residency, while 
the guide for the focus groups questions can be found in Appendix I. 
 
24 ‘NEET’ in Figure 5 stands for ‘Not in employment, education or training’. 
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Figure 5: Focus groups participants’ characteristics 
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c.  Survey questionnaire 
In turn, the quantitative part of this study has adopted an intensive cross-sectional research 
design. The survey questionnaire was developed online on Smart Survey platform25, the 
expenses for which were covered from the research grant provided by Nottingham Trent 
University. Several questions are adapted with permission from a survey on political 
participation of young people previously conducted by Henn et al. (2012). Others have been 
adapted from the European Social Survey (ESS)26 and the World Values Survey (WVS)27. 
However, I have personally created the majority of the questions and the survey design. An 
initial pilot test on a sample of 34 completed responses from Greece and 26 from the UK with 
respondents commenting on errors, omissions, unclear wording, and problems with question 
order.  This feedback allowed me to change the unclear language, question order and to include 
some additional questions. The responses of the test samples were then discarded. A full copy 
of the final survey is being provided in Appendix II.  
A convenience sampling method resulted in 1,114 survey responses created, 471 of 
which were only partially responded, yielding eventually 634 completed responses among 
young people, 18 to 29 years of age, from both Greece (n= 313) and the UK (n=321). Having 
conducted a scoping study of other PhD theses and peer-reviewed articles on youth political 
participation, the results indicated that such a sample size was reasonable, considering both 
the financial and time constraints of the study. For example, Long (2010) analysing ethical 
consumption in the state of Colorado utilised a sample of 463 completed surveys in his thesis, 
whereas Pontes (2019) in her thesis on a comparative study between Britain and Portugal 
utilised a primary sample of 257 and 297 completed responses respectively. Moreover, in their 
seminal and widely influential study on political consumerism, Stolle et  al. (2005) based their 
study on a sample of 372 university students from Canada, 284 from Sweden, and only 187 
from Belgium. 
The UK participants were recruited both at Nottingham Trent University and via other 
UK educational institutions and likewise for the Greek participants, from the National and 
Kapodestrian University of Athens. The selection of the above educational institutions was 
made because they provide relatively easy access to a large pool of respondents within the age 
cohorts of concern. The overall sample of the initial respondents was subsequently also 
disseminated to youth civil society organisations in both countries. The helpful approach of the 
representatives of Youth Mobility Centre (YMC) and the Youth and Lifelong Learning 
 
25 https://www.smartsurvey.co.uk/s/EN_Consumerism2018/ 
26 https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ 
27 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
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Foundation of Greece in Greece and Epic CiC in Britain, was invaluable with regards to the 
dissemination of the questionnaire. 
Although these contacts significantly facilitated the dissemination of the survey, the 
resulting collection of responses was lagging behind with regards to the agreed timelines, so I 
decided to personally disseminate the survey in open spaces in Nottingham, Cardiff, Stirling 
and London, in the UK and in Athens, Epidavros, and the island of Kythira in Greece. All of the 
young people who finally took part in the research were requested to sign an Informed Consent 
Form (see Appendix II), stating that they agreed to do so on an individual and voluntarily basis, 
and not as members of the organisations above. The following section presents the 
demographic and socio-economic profile of the overall sample. 
 
d. Profile of the overall sample. 
Across the whole sample (n=634) , 64.5% (n=409 respondents) reported that they had actively 
engaged in buycotts in the past 12 months, as opposed to 59.6% (n=378) who engaged in 
boycotts. The percentage of those who engaged in either buycotts or boycotts, reaches 73.2% 
(n=464) of the overall respondents, demonstrating that political consumerism has become one 
of the most widespread forms of political engagement among the young (Albacete, 2014; Stolle 
et al., 2010b; Ward and de Vreese, 2011). 
 
1.1 By country: 
With regards to the distribution of the respondents by country, out of the 634 respondents of 
the overall sample from both countries, 49.4% were respondents from Greece, while the 
remaining 50.6% were from the UK, for an almost equally divided sample (Table 1.1). 
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1.2 By gender: 
According to the latest wave (2017-2020) of WVS, women constitute 52.6% and men constitute 
47.4% of both Greece and the UK in the age category up to 29 years of age. Table 1.2 reveals 
therefore that there is an oversample of females over males in my sample: women are 
constituting 61.0% of the respondents and men 37.5%, whereas 1.4% of the total sample 
indicated ‘other’ or preferred not to answer.  
  
 
 
1.3 By age: 
In terms of the age of the respondents, data from the WVS indicates that young people up to 
29 years of age in Greece and in the UK constitute 18.1% of the overall population of both 
countries. All of the participants of my survey were  between 18 and 29 years old at the closing 
date of the survey (March 2019). Table 1.3 shows the distribution of the respective age of the 
respondents within this larger age cohort. The greatest part (44%) of the respondents were 
between 21 to 23 years of age. 
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1.4 Belonging into a minority: 
Table 1.4 illustrates the respondents’ self-reported belonging into a minority, whether ethnic, 
religious or sexual. The corresponding graph indicates that 76.5% did not belong into a minority, 
as opposed to 23.5% who responded that they belonged into one. 
  
 
1.5 Living with parents: 
Similarly, Table 1.5 displays the percentage of those participants out of the overall sample who 
were living with their parents (48.7%), as opposed to those who were living on their own 
(51.3%). These figures present a noteworthy difference from the available data from the latest 
WVS wave (2017-2020), according to which 64.0% of those up to 29 years of age live on their 
own. 
  
 
1.6 Primary household earner: 
In turn, Table 1.6 shows the percentage of those participants who were the primary earners of 
their household (20.5%) as opposed to those who were not (79.5%). Benchmark data from the 
WVS for both countries, reveal a similar tendency among the greatest part of young people up 
to 29 years of age not being the primary earner in their household (34.1% and 65.9% 
respectively). 
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1.7 Residence 
In terms of residence, Table 1.7 reveals that 56.9% of the respondents of the overall sample 
were living in a city or a town, whereas 41.6% were living in a village or in the countryside. 
These figures present a much more equal representation on the urban/rural divide, compared 
to the 86.7% of young people up to 29 years of age living in urban centres, according to the 
WVS.  
  
 
 
1.8 Subjective class 
The respondents were also asked to identify whether the tasks they often engaged in were 
predominately manual or intellectual. Table 1.8 shows that 66.9% of the respondents of the 
overall sample considered themselves as ‘mostly intellectuals’, as opposed 33.1% who 
considered themselves as belonging into the ‘mostly manual’ category28.  
 
 
28 The different categorisation of subjective class, and the lack of available data for the UK in 
the latest (2017-2020) wave of WVS do not allow for comparisons on this variable. 
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1.9 Relative income 
The respondents were also asked to indicate in which income group they would say their 
household belongs, compared to other households in their country. The resulting distribution 
for the overall sample is reported in Table 1.9.  
 
 
 
 
 
1.10 Education attainment 
The same applies for social class measured by education attainment. Table 1.10 reports the 
distribution of the overall sample according to educational attainment. The overwhelming 
majority were either university graduates or currently studying for their degree. 
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1.11 Employment status 
Finally, Table 1.11 shows that 59.8% were still in education, 27.6% were in paid employment 
and 8.2% were currently unemployed. According to the WVS (2017-2020) the figures for those 
up to 29 years of age in paid work was 43.9%; for those in education was 23.3%; and for those 
unemployed was 16.4%. There is therefore a noticeable over-representation of students in this 
survey, given that a great part of the respondents were recruited from (or around) university 
campuses in both countries. For the same reason, there also seems to be an under-
representation of those young people in paid work and those currently unemployed.  
 
 
 
 
5. Ethical considerations with regards to anonymity and confidentiality 
 
Prior to circulating the survey, I had obtained the relevant Ethical Approvals from the Ethical 
Research Committee of Nottingham Trent University, for both the qualitative (21/06/2018) and 
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the quantitative (19/07/2018) stages of my research. I was thus, aware of the risks to 
anonymity, confidentiality and privacy posed by all kinds of personal information storage and 
processing which could directly identify a respondent (e.g. questionnaire responses, audio-
tapes and e-mail records). Although accidental breaches of confidentiality were deemed highly 
unlikely, it was agreed that if I, or a member of my research team, would have indications of 
confidentiality being threatened, relevant records would be destroyed. The collection, storage, 
disclosure and use of research data complied with the Data Protection Act (1998)29 according 
to which all personal information collected was considered privileged information and was 
dealt with in such a manner as not to compromise the personal dignity of the participant or to 
infringe upon their right to privacy. 
 
6. Independent contribution to knowledge 
 
Through the multi-method research design outlined above, the original contribution of this 
thesis will be to identify the key drivers behind young people’s decision to engage in political 
consumerism, in the UK and Greece. 
Although both anecdotal and case-study evidence have long suggested that consumer 
behaviour such as the buycotting or boycotting of products and services for political, ethical 
and environmental reasons can take on political significance (Stolle et al. 2005), it will be the 
first time that such a study will be focusing on young people socialised in times of austerity, 
examining how the material conditions of relative scarcity at the time of their socialisation may 
have affected their propensity to engage in political consumerism. Moreover, and despite 
claims that political consumerism has become more widespread in recent years, it has not  been 
examined systematically in a cross-sectional comparative study between the UK and Greece. 
By doing so, not only will this thesis provide insights about the underlying behaviour, attitudes 
and value orientations of young political consumers in both countries; but it will also help in 
positioning political consumerism among the emerging repertoires of youth political 
participation, in a changing political context, where the political and the economic spheres 
become increasingly indistinguishable.   
Moreover, the literature review along with the preliminary findings, have identified – 
not unexpectedly, but unplanned for – an additional contextual factor behind the perceived 
 
29 Available at: www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1998/19980029.htm     
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rise of political consumerism in both countries, albeit in different directions in each. That is 
none other than the internalisation of neoliberal governmentality, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Disenfranchised and disillusioned by the seeming incapacity of the purely electoral-political 
sphere to respond to their individualised claims, and having internalised the neoliberal critique 
of democracy, the young empowered citizen-consumers will thus often search for the ‘political’ 
within the bounds of the marketplace and will be increasingly attracted to consumerist 
methods of political participation, such as boycotting and buycotting. Given the susceptibility 
of political consumerism to a neoliberal modus operandi, the lack of available literature 
problematising its emergence as a response to neoliberal principles is somewhat surprising. 
This thesis therefore will address this gap by connecting the declining levels of electoral 
participation among younger generations in post-crisis UK and Greece, to the expansion of 
political consumerism, within the contextual neoliberal ideological hegemony of the 
‘marketopoly’. It will thus be distinguishing between two broad sets of antithetical, yet 
complimentary, effects. Firstly, the internalised neoliberal critique of democracy emphasises 
the ‘push’ effect out of electoral politics. Secondly, young people’s internalised trust in the 
power of the market calls attention to the existence of a parallel ‘pull’ effect into the 
marketopoly, as a habitus of youth political participation. This conceptual cleavage has not 
been previously identified in the available literature of the subject.  
Moreover, Copeland and Boulianne (2020), in the latest meta-analysis on political 
consumerism published in May 2020, confirm that the overwhelming majority of studies on 
political consumerism operationalise it as boycotting (78 studies), significantly less 
operationalise it as buycotting alone (38 studies), while many of them blur the distinction 
between boycotting and buycotting (68 studies). Out of the latter, the most common approach 
is combining one measure of boycotting and one measure of buycotting into a single, 
dichotomous variable coded 0 if the respondent did not engage in political consumerism and 1 
if the respondent engaged in at least one mode of political consumerism. However, as it has 
already been discussed in Chapter 7 and will be demonstrated empirically in Chapters 10 and 
11, this approach fails to a) account for the differences between buycotting and boycotting, 
and b) account for the breadth and depth of the phenomenon. Ultimately therefore, this thesis 
will devise a simple and intuitive measurement tool for political consumerism, which will then 
be used in conjunction with the operationalisation approach above, to offer a more well-
rounded understanding of political consumerism in both countries. Although the discussion on 
the challenges and potentials of the creation of a simple and reliable empirical measure has 
recently received renewed attention (Gundelach, 2020), to my knowledge there still does not 
exist a “population survey available that includes a variety of measurements of political 
consumerism” (Stolle et al., 2005, p. 10). In this way, the present thesis intends to advance the 
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study of political consumerism among young people, and by extension the study of young 
people’s political participation. 
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Chapter 9: Exploratory study using focus groups: Motivations and 
neoliberalism 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Although several studies emphasise the need to develop an effective measurement of political 
participation activities beyond voting (Ekman and Amnå, 2012; Kousis and Paschou, 2017; 
Theocharis and van Deth, 2018), significantly fewer studies focus on young people’s own 
conceptualisation of political participation, and even fewer have done so in a comparative 
context (Pontes et al., 2018). With regards to political consumerism research which is also 
focusing on young people’s own understanding of the concept, the available research is 
virtually non-existent. This section aims to shed some light in this direction, providing an 
original contribution to knowledge with regards to a) studying political consumerism, b) in a 
comparative context (between the UK and Greece), c) among young people, d) and according 
to young people’s own conceptualisation of the phenomenon. 
 The present chapter will therefore present the findings of the focus groups conducted 
in the two countries. The chapter will be divided in two sections: the first part, will discuss the 
motivations of young participants behind their engagement in political consumerism. The 
second section will provide evidence for the neoliberal factors previously identified in Chapter 
6, associated with young people’s engagement in political consumerism in the UK as opposed 
to Greece.  
These findings have informed my understanding about young people’s own motivations 
and values behind the use of the market for ethical, environmental and political reasons, and 
have in turn assisted in the creation of the survey questionnaire, which will be used at the 
quantitative analysis of this thesis (in Chapters 10 and 11). 
 
2. Motivations of Political Consumerism 
 
Previous research indicates that there may be a difference behind the motivations of political 
consumers in different countries (see Chapter 6), with political consumerism in southern 
Europe demonstrating generally a more collective than individualistic orientation and being 
more rooted in local communities (Graziano and Forno, 2012). With this in mind, the 
participants of the focus groups were asked to discuss their underlying motivations to engage 
in political consumerism. In this way, they cumulatively came up with a list of six broad themes. 
These were subsequently analysed thematically and categorised according to their intended 
outreach, ranging from individualistic to more collective and eventually global outreach. These 
resulted in Q.21 of the survey questionnaire, and will be subsequently analysed in Chapter 10 
of the thesis, with the intention to identify whether young political consumers in the UK and 
Greece are driven by  different motivations. The following themes were thus identified: 
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a) Benefit my personal health 
b) Protect animal rights 
c) Support national economy 
d) Improve social ties with my community 
e) Support ethical production processes overseas 
f) Protect the planet and encourage environmentally responsible lifestyles. 
 
Generally, the focus groups participants in both countries expressed a perceived 
interconnectedness with respect to most of the points above, but also their assertion that 
consumption can indeed be action imbued with political meaning. A typical response30 among 
the participants in both countries was the following: 
Participant F: Since I started being a vegetarian, 3-4 years ago, I have eaten meat on 
very rare occasions. However, I have never bought meat products myself. Buying meat 
is no longer in my consumer options. And I believe that in not doing so I play my part in 
the whole. It is therefore a decision which has indeed political implications. 
 
However, the participants in Greece stressed consistently point b. Protecting animal 
rights, and they also demonstrated a significantly more national focus (c. Support national 
economy) than their UK counterparts with respect to their political consumerist motivations. 
This may be as a result of the prolonged austerity and the resulting recent economic hardships 
of the country at the national level (Grasso, 2018). A typical response from the participants in 
Greece was that: 
Participant D: Yes, I have buycotted Greek products, as part of the campaign for buying 
Greek. I am also buying organic and environmentally friendly products to the extent that I 
can. However, the first thing that comes in mind when I hear boycotting is boycotting 
products which have been tested on animals, and buycotting would be buying nationally 
produced products to boost the national economy. 
Nevertheless, although several participants’ initial motivation was associated with more 
individualistic concerns (a. Protecting my personal health and b. Protecting animal rights), they 
eventually evolved into having a more holistic understanding of their consumption 
implications, stressing eventually the importance of their consumption decisions on the 
environment on a global scale (f. Protect the planet and encourage environmentally responsible 
lifestyles): 
Participant F: [Me becoming a vegetarian] started by accident. I happened to watch 
some documentaries about animal brutality and I decided to give it a try. I decided to 
keep it up initially because I saw that I was not craving [eating meat]. Subsequently, I got 
 
30 Direct quotes are reported verbatim, with no changes made to correct grammatical errors. 
Use of ‘. . .’ within a focus-group quote denotes a pause by the participant; use of ‘(. . .)’ 
denotes contraction of text; use of ‘[ ]’ indicates the inclusion of text by authors to explain 
context. 
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more information about what being a vegetarian means, and my main consideration 
[now] is the environmental impact of my consumer decisions. It is also an ethical issue 
connected to the depletion of communal resources. So although it all started by 
accident, I sought information on my own. I do not know if I would still be a vegetarian 
if it was only for the ethical factor (animal brutality, for example). My main concern is 
the environmental one. 
 
Instead, the participants in the UK expressed predominately a simultaneous emphasis 
on d. Improving social ties in their community, and f. Protecting the planet and encouraging 
environmentally responsible lifestyles. The emphasis the UK participants placed on the need to 
support their local communities was expressed primarily in terms of a shared concern that the 
sense of community in their cities and neighbourhoods has been recently deteriorating. This 
was consistently a point of critical concern during the UK focus groups. This particular 
observation contrasts directly with the findings of Graziano and Forno (2012) that  political 
consumerism in southern Europe is generally more rooted in local communities.  
When asked about their fears, contributions and expectations (see Appendix I: C. Guide 
for Focus Groups) with regards to the general political environment in their countries, 
Participant K from the UK responded as follows, with a view shared by most:  
Participant K: So, my fears first: climate change, droughts, food security and (…) people 
not growing their own food and buying it from somebody else (…). I also fear about the 
lack of community in the area where I live (…). I have recently been involved in a 
community garden that has added so much in our local community. People come in with 
their kids and they are like “Oh, what is this? I did not know [certain plants] grew up like 
that, although I eat it all the time” (…). People make this connection that we need to 
take care of the environment around us and that food does not simply come from the 
supermarket shelves.  
Participant M assumed a similar approach when asked about his contributions:  
Participant M: My contributions is educating myself, learning about gardening and small 
scale community projects. At a larger scale studying at the university and learning about 
larger-scale solutions to [environmental] issues such as desertification. 
The findings of the focus groups above are confirmed by the results from the 
quantitative analysis of the survey questionnaire in Chapter 10, which reveals that political 
consumerism in Greece demonstrates a relatively more nationalistic outreach, whereas in the 
UK it is generally more rooted in local communities. However, young people in both countries 
perceive political consumerism as a means to promote environmentally responsible lifestyles.  
This section has thus established a) a set of broad motivations behind the phenomenon. 
The discussion then proceeded into b) exploring the ‘neoliberal’ factors that the participants of 
the focus groups associated with political consumerism. The following section will thus outline 
the focus groups findings in this direction. 
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3. Neoliberal factors influencing political consumption decisions  
 
Chapter 6 has identified in the literature different ways through which neoliberal 
governmentality, reinforced by the continuous marketisation of previously non-market social 
provinces, has inhibited young people’s participation, ‘pushing’ them away from institutional 
politics. Conversely, it has also discussed the different ways young people may instead be 
‘pulled’ into the market as an alternative political arena. 
This section will thus explore the factors  associated with neoliberalism that influence 
young citizens’ decisions to engage in political consumerism in the two countries and will 
provide insights from the focus group discussions with respect to their underlying motivations. 
Thematic analysis of the focus groups confirms the interplay of six ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, with 
regards to the effects of neoliberalism on young people’s motivations to engage in political 
consumerism, including important differences observed in Greece and in the UK. These factors 
are summarised below: 
• Neoliberal ‘push’ factors: 
a) External Political Efficacy (EPE): Inability of political actors, 
b) External Political Efficacy (EPE): Untrustworthiness of political actors, 
c) Internal Political Efficacy (IPE). 
• Neoliberal ‘pull’ factors:  
a) Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE),  
b) Availability of products in the market,  
c) Availability of product-related information. 
Each of these will be explored in the sections that follow:  
 
a. Neoliberal ‘push’ factors 
The focus groups revealed three neoliberal ‘push’ factors that underpin young people’s 
withdrawal from formal electoral politics but at the same time pulling them toward non-
institutional forms of political participation, including different forms of political consumerism. 
The first of these is a widely shared perception among the participants from both countries, 
that politicians and political parties are under-serving their constituencies. 
Previous research on the subject (Brown, 2015) emphasises that the pervasive and 
enveloping influence of neoliberalism has significantly weakened the responsive power of 
traditional political institutions in many advanced liberal democracies. As a consequence, 
political leaders are often obliged to concede to technocratic solutions when addressing 
economic and social problems. The recent imposition of austerity measures, designed by 
technocrats behind closed doors despite the opposing popular mandate in several European 
countries, illustrates what Habermas has referred to as the dismantling of democracy within 
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the EU (Diez, 2011) and the disenfranchising of citizens - particularly the young (Hart and Henn, 
2017). 
During the first focus group in Greece, participants returned repeatedly to the failure of 
the SYRIZA–ANEL coalition to capitalise on their victory in the July 2015 referendum and to 
deliver on their promise to alleviate austerity measures. This was viewed as a matter of critical 
concern, fuelling young people’s conviction that ‘politicians are unable to influence political 
outcomes, even if they were willing to do so’. Participants consistently used phrases such as 
‘their hands are tied’, especially when the discussion focused on EU politics: 
Participant F: This shows how the neoliberal establishment subverts public opinion 
(…). It shows that you are allowed certain choices but there are limits placed on 
these choices by bigger power structures; limits to what is acceptable under 
capitalism. When it comes down to challenging ideas such as the free market they 
are like… oh, well you are not allowed to decide that for yourself (…), elections are 
not allowed to change economic policies. 
Participants from the UK seemed to share similar views as typified by Participant S: 
Participant S: We were taught that a democracy follows the will of the people and 
it is as simple as that, while actually, there are many more interests at play and 
voting is only a small part of it (…). You can choose if you want your buses green or 
blue or whatever, but when it comes down to decide on the economic system of 
the country people have absolutely no say. 
These critical perspectives indicate a common perception of the young focus group 
participants that politicians are not only unable to influence political outcomes within a  
technocratic neoliberal economic environment, but that they are also considered as 
predominantly ‘self-serving elitists’ and as such inherently untrustworthy. These views are 
consistent with the neoliberal critique of democracy (Buchanan, 1978), which postulates that 
politicians are likely to govern in favour of their personal narrow interests instead of those of 
their voters, pointing back to a principal-agent problem - which makes them especially 
unresponsive to the demands of the under-represented youth. As a consequence, young 
people are likely to express this scepticism by diminished engagement with electoral politics, 
as long as their interests continue to be under-represented in the mainstream political arena 
(Hart and Henn, 2017). 
The discussion during the first Greek focus group revolved around the twinned 
problems of nepotism in the parliament since the restoration of democracy in 1974 as well as 
a generalised doubt that a young person could succeed in running for office and competing 
with the established political elite. Young people in both countries expressed their 
disillusionment with electoral politics, even though: (i) in their majority, they still intended to 
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vote and acknowledged that voting as a practice is important (Furlong and Cartmel, 2011); (ii) 
they exhibited a deep awareness about political issues (O’Toole and Gale, 2010); and (iii) they 
were committed supporters of democracy in principle (Henn and Foard, 2014).  
When asked whether they felt particularly disillusioned by democracy in principle, the 
UK focus group participants stated:  
Participant S: Not exactly democracy in itself. It is more about how democracy 
works in practice in the UK at the moment. I do not believe there is anything much 
better than democracy, but there are many ways in which democracy could get 
better. 
Similar views were expressed during the focus groups in Greece: 
Participant A: The kind of democracy we have now is a quite limited version. We 
have quite limited participation. Certain stuff are clearly not put up for debate. 
Especially things that might be happening on the European level where you cannot 
really challenge them democratically. But ultimately, the more democracy the 
better really (…). I am certainly not an anti-democrat at all. 
It is therefore only when they feel their voice is being heard and that the dominant 
political agenda particularly pertains to them, that they will exhibit a significantly more 
responsive disposition towards electoral participation. Only Participant O from the UK focus 
groups expressed his concern about democracy in principle (‘Democracy scares me!’), on the 
grounds that ‘…it disconnects people in power from ordinary people’; however, this participant 
added that they still intended to vote as this was the minimum they could do to make their 
voice heard. However, unlike the almost unanimous support for democracy (in principle) 
expressed by their counterparts in the UK focus groups, the views of the participants in Greece 
were relatively more mixed. For instance, Participant E seemed to be indifferent on the 
question of whether to vote or not, while Participants F and H were adamant in their intention 
of abstaining at future elections, and justified that position in terms of making a political 
statement (Amnå and Ekman, 2014) and reiterating their non-participation as a conscious 
political action (Fergusson, 2013). As Participant F stated, ‘I refuse to feed a system that lies to 
us! (…) I have absolutely no hope for the future; there is not a single chance that things will ever 
improve in any way’. 
In contrast to the neoliberal discursive dominance of non-participation as 
disengagement rather than as social exclusion (Fergusson, 2013), the young participants in 
Greece remained mindful of the responsibilities of the government to its citizens. However, the 
general consensus emerging from the Greek participants was that, given the inability of the 
state apparatus to respond to their pressing needs, the only viable alternative is radical 
collective action: 
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Participant E: It should be the case that with all individual responsibility we should 
be able to work together to trigger collective action which should then be picked 
up by the government. However this is hardly the case. Which connects to where I 
work, that is with refugees…and it connects back to how NGOs’ work is really 
positive on the one hand, but it is also taking this kind of responsibility away from 
the government. (…) it is the government that should help with unaccompanied 
minors and getting people jobs and getting people citizenships and getting people 
work permits. 
Participant F (also from Greece) replied to this particular observation accordingly:  
Participant F: People my age are tired of waiting results from the politicians (…). 
Tangible results do not come by ventilating our frustration in demonstrations 
anymore, and definitely not through the parliament. I do not need politicians to 
represent me and make decisions for me. Results come from individual 
responsibility taking, grabbing the bull by the horns and work collectively for a 
common goal no matter what that may be. 
This particular view suggests that political consumerism may indeed be crowding-out 
electoral participation among young people in Greece, whereas there is no support for such an 
effect in the UK. It also reflects the simultaneous individualistic and collective orientation of the 
political consumers of late modernity, an issue previously identified by Stolle and Micheletti 
(2013). In contrast, the UK participants expressed a relatively more economistic understanding 
of their civic duties when asked about how they could contribute in shaping politics in their 
country: 
Participant T: … one thing about the UK is that I do not feel I have been able to be 
effectively part of the decision making process (…) which I always found quite 
frustrating as my understanding is that since you pay taxes you should have the 
right to have your voice heard. That made me indifferent about politics in general 
(…) the only way I believe I contribute in anything, I would say, is by paying my taxes. 
The motivating factors behind young people’s disengagement from electoral politics in 
view of a hegemonic neoliberal governmentality is well supported from the available literature 
(see Chapter 6). The next section will proceed to examine the factors that emerged from the 
focus groups behind young people’s engagement with political consumerism.  
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b. Neoliberal ‘pull’ factors 
The previous section examined the ways through which neoliberal governmentality pushes 
young people away from the traditional (electoral-based) political sphere. As a response to the 
perceived practical failure of representative democracy, the adoption of free-market principles 
in almost every facet of political life echo the replacement of young people’s subjective 
understanding of citizenship from that of the sovereign citizen to that of the sovereign 
consumer. The neoliberal critique of democracy assumes that only this consumer-oriented 
democracy, or marketopoly (Lekakis, 2013), can adequately reflect individual preferences. The 
marketopoly therefore serves as a highly decentralised framework of political activity and 
presupposes an underlying trust in the market environment to respond effectively to young 
people’s concerns. Consequently, it ‘pulls’ the underrepresented and disillusioned young 
people from electorally-focused politics into the marketplace as an alternative political arena. 
This section will examine the ways through which this effect is being manifested in Greece and 
the UK. 
Three distinct - but interrelated - factors were identified during the focus groups which 
capture young people’s beliefs that the market environment is better equipped to respond to 
their political considerations and aspirations. These are: a) their Perceived Consumer 
Effectiveness (PCE) on prices of ethical products; b) their satisfaction with the availability of 
ethical over conventional products in the market; and c) their satisfaction with the availability 
and quality of product-related information for such products.  
In terms of their PCE on pricing, research by Bray et al. (2011) concludes that while 
consumers may generally prefer locally produced goods, they are reluctant to change their 
usual purchasing behaviour in favour of locally-sourced and ethical alternatives, if the prices of 
the latter are considered to be significantly higher. However, in our focus groups the 
participants from the two countries were divided on the topic of pricing. When asked if they 
would be willing to pay the extra cost usually associated with organic products, Participant R 
from the UK replied, with a view shared by all, that: ‘Definitely, as long as it is a reasonable 
price difference’.  
Instead, the participants from Greece typically perceived ethically-sourced organic 
products as luxury items, boosted by advertisement and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)  
schemes. The general consensus during the Greek focus groups was that their individual budget 
- and the economic precariousness of the country as a whole - impeded their preference for 
ethical choices, especially when purchasing food products.  This reflected a lack of PCE – a 
perception that they had no power to influence pricing.  A typical response was: 
Participant G: Sometimes [the price of organic products is] even 6-7 times higher. 
If I can buy a kilo of potatoes for 60 cents, I honestly do not see the reason to pay 
2.5 euros for organic ones. I honestly find it hard to understand how the Market 
logic is at play here. 
In terms of the availability of ethical alternatives in the market, Zorell (2019c) has 
suggested that although buycotters may demonstrate high levels of confidence in the existing 
160 | P a g e  
 
labelling schemes in principle, they may be lacking access to the said schemes in practice, 
emphasising the availability of opportunity structures as the focal point behind the proliferation 
of political consumerism. With this in mind, the participants were asked about their levels of 
satisfaction with regards to the variety of products in the market and the availability of 
independent, ethical or organic alternatives. Among the participants from the UK there seemed 
to be a widespread consensus that ‘You can buy everything all year around; there’s nothing 
seasonal in the UK’:  
Participant O: In the UK, (…) there is a lot of variety for everything. You can buy 
products of all levels and spectrums. England is one of the first countries in Europe 
that come in mind when we talk about commercialism. One of the first places that 
started placing attention to reusing clothes, with the whole vintage, second-hand 
clothing industry and made it acceptable to do so rather than having only poor 
persons doing so. 
By way of contrast, participants from Greece were typically sceptical of this alleged 
market availability, focusing instead on ‘an illusion of choice’: 
Participant B: I’d say in a lot of ways [our choice] is limited. Even though if lately, 
especially here in Athens, there are lots of different grassroots initiatives, they are 
quite fringe really. The supermarkets will sell pretty much everything [and] they 
have greater market share than any independent store. In neighbourhoods that are 
more wealthy or more politically engaged you also get a lot of independent green 
groceries, independent bakeries; sometimes farmer’s markets and the like. This 
creates an illusion of choice. But most people my age do not really get to choose. I 
think I read somewhere that 75% of the food market is owned by three supermarket 
chains.  
This view drew support from the rest of the participants in Greece: 
Participant F: When it comes to fair trade and organic, I feel that they are merely 
(…) a niche in the market and that explains their higher prices. I do not really believe 
they really make a difference when you consider the big picture.  
Thirdly, in terms of the availability of product-related information, Zheng and Chi (2015) 
drawing on the theory of planned behaviour, have established that the more informed 
consumers are about environmental issues, the greater their pro-environmental consumption 
will be. During the focus groups, participants from both Greece and the UK agreed that in the 
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age of information, environmental knowledge is almost entirely a matter of personal 
responsibility. However, whereas the participants from the UK emphasised the importance of 
personal responsibility for ‘educating [them]selves’ and ‘listening and learning’ when 
consuming for political, ethical and environmental reasons, their Greek counterparts were 
significantly more doubtful about the quality of product-related information in their country. 
Avoiding products or companies that have received bad press seemed important, especially 
among the UK participants. Instead, and consistent with Bray et al. (2011), their counterparts 
in the Greek focus groups demonstrated higher levels of cynicism and inertia in their purchasing 
behaviour. Participant G, who had previously stressed the importance of pricing on his 
purchase decisions, explained:  
Participant G: Generally, I am not sure I trust the information I get on certain 
products from the market [or] the information on the labels. Sometimes it feels it 
is exactly the same product just rebranded to accommodate the ‘alternative, eco-
friendly’ consumer. 
This perspective reflects Carrigan and Attalla’s (2001) emphasis on the correlation 
between time pressure, information overload and people’s negligence when it comes to 
consumers’ ethical behaviour. They argue that motives like selflessness or solidarity are often 
overridden by selective motives which can range from brand loyalty through to saving money, 
time and effort. After all, as another participant of the focus groups in Greece added:  
Participant I: There are many rumours about every major corporation. If I were to 
double check every rumour I would not have time for anything else.  
This attitude-behaviour gap in ethical consumption has been examined by 
Papaoikonomou et al. (2011), who discuss how brand loyalty may generate a consumer bias, 
so that the consumers would only believe positive information while overlooking negative 
messages. As a consequence, consumers’ loyalties to certain brands may cause them to be less 
motivated to purchase or actively seek ethical alternatives (Bray et al., 2011). Correspondingly, 
the higher their loyalty, the higher the consumer tendency to disregard bad practices allegedly 
committed by the company.  
To summarise, political consumerist instances raised by the participants in the focus 
groups in Greece seemed to be resulting primarily from their higher Internal Political Efficacy 
(IPE), following a generalised distrust towards traditional political actors, who were perceived 
as not only untrustworthy, but also unable to effectively represent their interests. This renders 
young people themselves as the primary agents of their political behaviour and has empowered 
them to search the political within the market – via a process which may be crowding-out their 
electoral engagement.  
Instead, and although not entirely unaffected by these same push effects, political 
consumerism among the focus groups participants in the UK seemed to be predominately 
driven by their underlying confidence in the capacity of the market environment to effectively 
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respond to their claims for ethical corporate agency. This was captured by their conviction that 
they are able to effectively promote desirable (and punish objectionable) production processes 
based on their environmental, ethical and political considerations - whereas their counterparts 
in Greece typically felt powerless to express their political concerns within the context of the 
market. Moreover, young people in the UK were also satisfied with both the availability of 
ethical alternatives in the market, as well the extent and quality of product-related information, 
whereas their counterparts in the focus groups in Greece demonstrated more cynicism with 
regards to both these factors. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the main findings deriving from a thematic analysis of the 
transcriptions of the discussions from the focus groups, utilising elements of grounded theory. 
The chapter has: a) established a set of broad motivations behind the phenomenon, and b) 
revealed the factors behind political consumerism associated with neoliberalism, as previously 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
Although the participants in both countries stressed that their political consumerist 
motivations are generally intertwined, the chapter has indicated that the motivations of young 
political consumers in Greece are primarily linked to: a) Protecting animal rights, and b) 
Supporting national economy. In contrast, young political consumers in the UK were primarily 
motivated by c) Improving social ties in their community, and d) Protecting the planet and 
encouraging environmentally responsible lifestyles.   
Moreover, evidence from the focus groups provides support to the claim (as previously 
discussed in Chapter 5) that neoliberalism has accelerated two contrasting dynamics that on 
the one hand push them out of the mainstream political arena, and on the other pull them into 
the market as a way for them to express their political contestations. When combined, these 
two mutually reinforcing dynamics may be motivating political consumerist behaviour among 
young people. These findings will be further examined in the quantitative part of this thesis, in 
Chapters 10 and 11; they provide an original contribution to knowledge in terms of the study 
of political consumerism - and by extension to young people’s political engagement - in the UK 
and in Greece.  
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Chapter 10: Push-Factors: Who are the political consumers and what 
do they believe about politics? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
For Micheletti et al. (2008, p. xiv) political consumerism stands for the “…consumer choice of 
producers and products on the basis of attitudes and values […] as well as ethical or political 
assessment of business and government practice”. As such, it is directed towards two targets: 
one that is connected to businesses, and one that is connected to the government. In turn, the 
analysis from the focus groups in Chapter 9, conceptualised those attitudes and values 
associated with the government as ‘Push factors’, expecting that the disillusionment from the 
institutional (predominantly, electoral) political domain pushes young people away from 
electoral politics. Instead, those values and attitudes that are associated with the market 
environment may instead be ‘pulling’ young people to engage in buycotting and boycotting 
practices in order to express their ethical, environmental and political concerns.  
Chapters 10 and 11 will thus examine each of these dynamics separately, with regards 
to buycotting and boycotting. In addition to these a third, second-order variable 
(buycotters/boycotters) has been devised out of the previous two, to include those who in the 
past 12 months had actively engaged in either or both buycotting and boycotting31. It should 
therefore not come as a surprise that this third variable will consistently report higher 
participation across all categories, compared to the other two. Although in the relevant 
literature, buycotts and boycotts are often treated as interchangeable and homogeneous acts 
under the term ‘political consumerism’ (Newman and Bartels, 2011) (see Chapter 7), the 
analysis in this and the subsequent chapter will illustrate that they often bear significant 
differences. Whereas buycotting is reward-oriented, and as such, more cooperative in nature 
and practice, boycotting is largely punishment-oriented, and reflects an element of resilience 
to the terms and conditions available within the market.  
For example, Barnes and Kaase  (1979) include boycotts in their list of ‘unconventional’ 
forms of political participation, alongside signing a petition, protests and demonstrations, 
occupying a building, or damaging property. It is therefore expected that boycotting will be 
 
31 Boycotting and buycotting were coded as ‘1’ if the respondent reported boycotting or 
buycotting one or more products for environmental, ethical or political considerations in the 
past 12 months and ‘0’ if the respondent did not. Likewise, buycotting/boycotting was coded 
as ‘1’ if the respondent reported either buycotting or boycotting, or both. The reported counts 
are those which were coded as ‘1’ in all three of the categories. 
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positively associated with other forms of participation that directly seek to change the status 
quo, or in other words what Tarrow (2011) refers to as ‘contentious politics’ and other scholars 
have termed ‘politics of dissent’ (Pickard, 2018; Zamponi and Fernández González, 2017). 
Instead, buycotting denotes the implicit acceptance of the terms and conditions of the market, 
as well as the political environment within which the market operates. Positive political 
consumerism therefore, is expected to be associated with more institutional or cooperative 
forms of political participation, such as intention to vote or intention to work with others for a 
political goal. For example, Neilson (2010, p. 1) has previously reported that people who are 
more trusting of institutions and are more involved in voluntary associations, are more likely to 
buycott than boycott, and elsewhere Adugu (2014, p. 1) has found that buycotting is more 
common among those with greater political efficacy and higher income levels.  
However, this perceived variance in the motives and orientation of buycotters and 
boycotters has been often overlooked in a great part of the available literature, which instead 
perceives political consumerism as a unified form of political participation (Newman and 
Bartels, 2011). Questioning thus the empirical approach which perceives political consumerism 
as a homogeneous act, this chapter will seek to disentangle the dynamics of positive and 
negative consumerism. The insights collected from the separate analysis of buycotting and 
boycotting will therefore be compared to the cumulative behavioural variable (engaging in 
either or both buycotting and boycotting) so as to demonstrate that this often fails to capture 
the idiosyncratic natures of positive and negative consumerism. 
The chapter will employ non-parametric statistical tests to  examine the relationship of 
political consumerism to a) the demographic characteristics of young political consumers, b) 
their interest in politics, c) their support for democracy in their country, and d) the extent of 
their participation in other forms of political engagement and community affairs (see Figure 6, 
Tables 1-4). These variables are generally expected to have a negative relationship to political 
consumerism in the two countries, pushing young people away from formal, state and 
government-oriented, institutional political affairs.  
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Figure 6: Conceptual map of factors influencing Political Consumption 
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2. Who are the political consumers in Greece and in the UK? 
 
This section will compare the demographic and socioeconomic attributes of boycotters and 
buycotters in Greece and in the UK. Tables 2.1.0 to 2.10.1 therefore, report the cross-tabulations 
for buycotters, boycotters and buy/boycotters across different categories, in Greece and in the 
UK. The variables analysed include gender, age, belonging in a minority, whether they are living 
with their parents, whether they are the primary earner in their household, residence, subjective 
class, relative subjective income, education and employment status.  
Chi-Square tests will be employed to test the relationships between these variables and 
the behavioural components of political consumerism (buycotting, boycotting and 
buycotting/boycotting). Chi-square is a non-parametric test that evaluates whether there exists 
an association between two categorical variables by comparing the observed pattern of responses 
in the cells to the pattern that would be expected if the variables were indeed independent of 
each other. Measures of statistical significance will therefore be reported and discussed both 
across the overall distribution (p-values), as well as within the categories (adj.res.) 32. It is therefore 
possible that a variable does not demonstrate a statistically significant relationship across the 
whole distribution (p>.05), but it does within the respective categories (adj.res.> ±1.7). Instead, if 
there is a statistical significance within all (or most) of the categories (adj.res.> ±1.7), this is likely 
to spill-over also to the p-values across the distribution (p<.05). All statistically significant values 
within the categories (adj.res.> ±1.7) will be reported in red next to the percentages. The same 
for the statistically significant p-values, which will be reported under the totals for each measure 
 
32 Measures of statistical significance (Pearson’s Chi-Square and p-values) among the whole 
distribution are reported at the bottom of each category for each activity. Instead, the adjusted 
standardised residuals (adj.res.) are reported next to the percentages of each respective category. 
This is important because it allows us to assess whether the observed cell counts are significantly 
different from the expected cell counts. Consequently, an observed value higher than the 
minimum cut-off point of ±1.7 indicates a significant relationship, while an observed value higher 
than the conventional cut-off point of ±2.0 indicates a highly significant relationship. Instead, an 
observed value between -1.7 and +1.7 indicates there is no significant difference of the observed 
cell counts to that of a normal distribution (Field, 2017). The adjusted standardised residual 
(adj.res.) should not be confused with ‘Adjusted R-Squared’ (Adj. R.), which will be used in 
Chapter 12 to measure the goodness of fit of the regression models. 
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of political participation; with the additional indication of asterisks according to their levels of 
significance (* p<.05,  ** p <.01, *** p <.001). 
The chapter will then proceed in the same format to comparatively discuss in section (3) 
young people’s interest in politics and elections; in section (4) their  attitudes with regards to 
democracy in their countries; and (5) how active they are in politics and community affairs. 
 
2.1 Gender 
Table 2.1.0 reports the distribution of the subsamples of Greece and the UK by gender. In both 
countries there is an oversample of female to male respondents. This was expected according to 
the bibliography (Sax et al., 2003), which predicts that women (especially students) respond at 
much higher rates than men in survey questionnaires, irrespectively of whether these are 
administered via paper, the internet, or some combination of the two. The greater representation 
of young women in the survey may also reflect a recently observed reversal in the traditional 
gender gap in political interest (Ferrín et al., 2019). 
 
 
Table 2.1.133 below, displays higher engagement of the Greek subsample than their UK 
counterparts in all three activities, across both genders. The table reveals that the females in both 
Greece and the UK were significantly more likely to have engaged in buycotting, having a positive 
 
33 This and all subsequent Chi-Square crosstabulations can also be found in Appendix III (p. 345) 
for ease of reference. 
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difference of 17.2% and 22.2% with respect their male counterparts. Likewise, for boycotting, 
where the females were more likely to have engaged in this activity, by 11.2% in Greece and 
20.6% in the UK. These differences are also evident in the cumulative category of 
buycotters/boycotters, where the females from Greece and the UK reported higher engagement, 
by 12.4% and 17.2% respectively. The observed values are significantly different form the 
expected values across all three activities (adj.res.>±2.0), confirming that political consumerism 
is statistically more prominent among women in both countries. These findings are consistent 
with the greatest part of the literature on the subject which portray political consumerism as a 
gendered form of political participation (Lorenzini and Bassoli, 2015; O’Neill and Gidengil, 2013; 
Stolle and Micheletti, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Age 
Table 2.2.0 reports the distribution of the respondents by age. The largest group of respondents 
in both countries belonged to the 21-23 age bracket (44.1% for Greece, and 43.9% for the UK).  
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The crosstabulations by age for both countries in Table 2.2.1 do not convey any clear trend 
of political consumerism with regards to age. The percentages of the young people who engaged 
in any of the three political consumerist activities are higher in Greece when compared to the UK, 
across almost all the age cohorts. However, the data does not demonstrate any statistically 
significant differences to the expected counts throughout the crosstabulations, and as such it may 
be deducted that age (at least those aged 18-29) is not statistically associated with political 
consumerism in Greece or in the UK. 
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2.3 Belonging into a minority 
With regards to belonging in an ethic, religious or sexual minority, the respective figures are 
reported in Table 2.3.0. Generally Greece is considered to have one of the most ethnically 
homogenous populations, with the WVS (2017-2020) reporting 98.8% of the respondents being 
white and only 1.2% being of Central Asian origins. The same figures for the UK according to 
YouGov (2011 Census) were 86.0% for white, 7.5% Asian, followed by Black ethnic groups (at 
3.3%) and Mixed ethnic groups (at 2.2%). The figures below therefore reflect partly the greater 
diversity among the overall population in the UK. The formulation of this particular question 
however, referred to the self-reported belonging of young respondents not only in ethnic, but also 
religious and sexual minorities.  
 
The intention was to capture whether political consumerism in any of its forms was 
associated with feelings of exclusion due to a self-reported belonging in a minority. However, 
although the crosstabulations reveal higher engagement of the Greek subsample in all three 
engagement categories, these are not statistically different from the expected count 
(adj.res.<±1.7) 
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2.4 Living with parents 
The same applies for the category ‘living with parents’ (Table 2.4.1). The distribution of the 
respondents reveals that more young people in the sample were still living with their parents in 
the UK than in Greece. As mentioned earlier, these figures are comparable with benchmark data 
from the WVS (2017-2020) which similarly reports a higher percentage of young people up to 29 
years of age living with their parents in the UK (37.5%) than in Greece (30.9%). 
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However, the Chi-square analysis does not reveal any statistical differences from the 
expected values, nor throughout the subsamples, nor within the respective categories for each 
form of consumer engagement. It may therefore be deduced that living with parents is not 
associated with the likelihood of engaging in political consumerism in either of the two countries.  
 
 
2.5 Primary household earner 
Table 2.5.0 reports that there are more people in Greece (24.0%) than in the UK (17.1%), who 
reported they were the primary earners in their household. Nevertheless, being the primary wage 
earner does not seem to be statistically associated with engagement in political consumerism; 
neither across, nor within the distribution (Table 2.5.1). 
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2.6 Residence 
In turn Table 2.6.0 reports the subsamples of young people living in urban or in rural areas. The 
figures in this category consisted of more young people living in or close to urban centres in 
Greece (69.3%), and less in the UK (46.5%). The survey seems to have an oversample of young 
people in the UK living in rural areas (53.5%). Benchmark data from YouGov from 201434 indicate 
83% of the overall population living in urban areas. Instead, the percentage of young people in 
Greece seems to be consistent with the figures from the WVS (2017-2020) which indicates 74.6% 
of the overall population are living in urban areas. 
 
34 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rural-population-and-migration/rural-population-201415 
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The reported figures in Table 2.6.1, reveal that buycotting is significantly more likely in 
Greek urban centres, than in rural areas. Instead, the opposite is true in the UK where positive 
consumerism seems to be significantly more prominent in rural than urban areas. With respect 
to negative consumerism, this continues to be a predominately urban phenomenon in Greece, 
with boycotting being 1.5 times more likely in Greek urban centres, than in Greek rural areas 
(71.0% over 48.4%), and this difference is highly statistically significant (adj.res. = ±3.9) at p<.01. 
However, boycotting in the UK does not demonstrate any significantly different counts between 
urban centres and rural areas. The same holds true for buy/boycotting, which is 1.25 times more 
likely (81.3% over 65.3%) to take place in urban centres than rural areas of Greece (adj.res.=±3.0).  
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Generally, it can be argued that buy/boycotting in Greek urban centres is higher (and 
statistically significant) than in the UK by almost 13 percentage points, painting the picture of 
political consumerism being primarily an urban phenomenon especially when it comes to 
boycotting. Instead, political consumerism is more popular in the rural areas of the UK (although 
not always significant), especially when it comes to buycotting (adj.res.>±1.7). Living in or close 
to urban centres has previously been reported to have a statistically significant, though moderate, 
association with environmental attitudes (Arcury and Christianson, 1993). Although this is not 
being confirmed from the present sample for the UK, there are strong indications that this is 
indeed the case in Greece. 
 
2.7 Subjective class 
Ferrer-Fons and Fraile (2013) have previously investigated whether social class influences the 
likelihood of engaging in political consumerism in Western Europe, through a multilevel analysis 
using European Social Survey data. They conclude that contrary to their hypothesis, social class 
continues to strongly affect the likelihood of being a political consumer. In this study however, 
this result is being marginally confirmed only for the UK, while there is no support found from the 
Greek subsample. 
 
 
 With regards to the subjective class variable (Table 2.7.0), 30.7% of the Greek subsample, 
self-reported they affiliate to the ‘Mostly manual’ category, as opposed to 35.5% of the UK 
subsample. Conversely, 69.3% of the Greek subsample reported affiliation to the ‘Mostly 
intellectual’ category, compared to 64.5% of the UK subsample.  
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When it comes to the crosstabulation of buycotters and boycotters with respect to 
subjective class, the ‘mostly intellectual’ respondents were 1.2 times more likely to have engaged 
in either or both of these activities (adj.res.=±2.3), for a cumulative 70.1% engagement, significant 
at p<.05. The same tendency is being revealed when it comes to boycotting (58.9% of ‘Mostly 
intellectuals’ over 49.1% of ‘Mostly manual’), with significance at the minimum cut-off point of 
±1.7 adjusted residual, whereas there is no significant relationship with regards to buycotting in 
the country. This observation portrays political consumerism in the UK as a primarily intellectual 
phenomenon, and that this in mainly due to negative consumerism. However, it also denotes that 
the cumulative measure of political consumerism, is not always able to capture these differing 
effects between buycotting and boycotting. 
 
 
The respective percentages for the Greek subsample do not demonstrate any statistical 
significance whatsoever, pointing to the direction that subjective class is not a determinant of 
their propensity to engage in political consumerism, unlike the UK, where subjective class still 
remains a resilient indicator of their consumer engagement, especially when it comes to 
boycotting. This observation reflects the persistence of class divisions as an indicator of 
unconventional political participation in the UK (Melo and Stockemer, 2014). 
 
2.8 Relative income 
Relative income was not associated with the consumer engagement of young respondents, 
neither in Greece, nor in the UK. The distribution of the subsamples is shown in Table 2.8.0 below:  
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The corresponding figures are not significant both across the three consumer activities, 
nor within the respective categories for the two countries. Only when it comes to boycotting, the 
69.9% of the respondents from Greece who belonged in the medium-high category reveal a 
positive significance above the expected count (adj.res.=+1.7), and the 46.5% from the UK who 
belonged in the medium-low revealed a negative significance (adj.res. = -2.2) to the expected 
count.  
 
This indicates that at least when it comes to boycotting, young people in Greece belonging 
in relatively affluent households are more likely to boycott, and young people in the UK belonging 
to less affluent households are less likely to engage in the same activity. The same applies for the 
67.7% of the buy/boycotters in Greece who belong in the lower relative income group who are 
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significantly less likely to engage in political consumerism. This is consistent with Baek (2010) who 
has previously found a negative relationship between income levels and political consumerism35. 
However, the relationship of relative income and political consumerism in this sample is not 
statistically significant across the whole distribution (p>.05). 
 
2.9 Education attainment 
Baek (2010), using data from the 2002 National Civic Engagement Surveys in the United States, 
has previously found that that people with a university education are significantly more  likely to 
boycott than buycott, while people with lower than high school education are more likely to 
buycott than boycott. It is therefore quite surprising, that the completed level of education of the 
respondents in this sample can hardly reveal any significant results.  
 
 
35 It is also worth noting that the percentages of buy/boycotting in Greece seem to be increasing 
as the respondents’ incomes rise, while in the UK the opposite holds true. As a result, young 
people in the UK belonging in the lower categories, are more likely to engage in buy/boycotting 
than their Greek counterparts; who are in turn, more likely to engage in the same activity if they 
belong to the higher income categories instead. Yet, there hardly is any statistically significant 
support for this claim. It will be nevertheless interesting, to examine in the subsequent analysis 
whether the allegedly higher postmaterialist values associated with the affluent socialisation of 
the Greek high-income cohorts will explain this perceived higher propensity to engage in political 
consumerism, and conversely if the lower income cohorts in the UK will demonstrate a more 
materialist orientation. 
 
Page | 179  
 
Table 2.9.1 shows that only the 69.3% of the Greek subsample with a university degree 
were significantly more likely to have engaged in buycotts (adj.res.=+1.7), whereas those with 
completed primary education in the UK were less likely to boycott, reversing Baek’s findings. 
However, the very small sample size of the respondents in the latter observation (n=3), along with 
the non-statistically significant observations (p>.05) across the distributions, do not allow for 
generalisations from this sample with regards to education attainment.  
 
 
2.10 Employment status 
The figures under employment status, however, reveal much more interesting insights. More 
respondents were in paid work in Greece at the time they took the survey (38.1%) as opposed to 
only 19.9%, in the UK. This difference is offset by the higher percentages of those who were in 
education in the UK (77.5%), as opposed to 47.2% in Greece. In turn, those unemployed in Greece 
were 14.7% of the subsample, while in the UK they were only 2.6%36. Benchmark data from the 
WVS (2017-2020) among young people up to 29 years of age, similarly reports a higher percentage 
 
36 An equal percentage of 4.5% in each country consisted of those who were permanently sick 
or disabled, those who were doing housework or were looking after other persons, and those in 
community or military service. These were classified as ‘other’ and were excluded from the 
analysis for ease of presentation. 
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of young unemployed in Greece (21.2%) than in the UK (13.3%). However, in this survey there is 
an oversample of young people in education. The WVS reports 31.9% for Greece and only 17.9% 
for the UK, whereas it seems that collecting responses close to university campuses in both 
countries has been responsible for an over-representation of students in the current sample 
(47.2% and 77.5% respectively). 
 
The distribution in Table 2.10.1 is significant for the boycotters (p<.05), and for the 
buy/boycotters (p<.01) from the UK only. Those in paid work from the UK cohort were more likely 
to have engaged in buycotts, boycotts or either of the two, with the figures being 72.1%, 68.9% 
and 82.0% respectively (all above the adj.res.= +1.7 threshold of significance). Conversely, those 
in unemployment were significantly less likely to have engaged in either of the three activities 
(adj.res.>+2.0). Surprisingly however, those unemployed in Greece were 3.5 more likely to have 
engaged in either or both of these activities compared to those unemployed in the UK (86.4% 
over 25%, significant at adj.res.>+1.7). The same holds true, when it comes to boycotting only, 
where the Greek unemployed cohort was 6.2 times more likely to have engaged in this type of 
activity (77.3% over 12.5%). Generally young unemployed people in Greece are more likely to 
engage in boycotts (adj.res.=+2.0), whereas young unemployed people in the UK are less likely to 
engage in the same form of activity (adj.res.=-2.5). 
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These figures are providing support to the claim that political consumerism in Greece acts 
as an alternative form of resilience in response to the relatively harder economic times the 
country has been facing (Kousis and Paschou, 2017).  Conversely, in the UK the phenomenon 
seems to be primarily popular among the young people who were in paid employment, 
supporting Zhang’s (2015) assertion that political consumerism is heavily skewed in favour of 
more affluent cohorts, even though this was not confirmed by the subjective relative income 
variable in section 2.8 of this chapter.  
In conclusion, apart from gender, there isn’t a situation where demographic and 
socioeconomic indicators have a uniform and consistent direction of impact in both countries. 
Noteworthy exception is gender where, consistent with previous literature (Long, 2010; Stolle 
and Micheletti, 2006), young females in both Greece and the UK demonstrate a much higher 
inclination to engage in either boycotting and buycotting. Moreover, age within the 18-29 bracket 
is not associated with engagement in political consumerism. Likewise, the categories ‘Belonging 
in a minority’, ‘Living with parents’ and being the ‘Primary earner’ in one’s household have been 
found to not be associated with political consumerism in either of the two countries, across any 
of the three political consumerist measures.  
Instead, we can note impact in one country that may not be reproduced in the other. For 
example, all three measures (buycotting, boycotting and buycotting/boycotting) are significantly 
more likely in the Greek urban centres, than in the Greek rural areas. The opposite seems to hold 
true in the UK, where however, only buycotting is a primarily rural phenomenon. Subjective class 
measured by ‘subjective income’ remains a resilient measure of young people’s consumer 
engagement, but only in the UK. Moreover, young ‘intellectuals’ are more likely to engage in 
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boycotts in the UK. In Greece instead, the figures reveal that subjective class is not statistically 
associated with political consumerism. The ‘relative income’ category reveals that young people 
in Greece belonging in relatively affluent households are more likely to boycott, and young people 
in the UK belonging to less affluent households are less likely to engage in the same activity. This 
observation partly confirms previous findings according to which boycotting is skewed in favour 
of relatively more affluent cohorts (Zhang, 2015).   
 Moreover, although it has been often assumed that education attainment is generally 
associated with higher levels of political consumerism (Long, 2010, p. 61), having a university 
degree in the current sample is statistically associated only with buycotting in Greece. 
Nevertheless, analysis of the employment status of the respondents discloses that in Greece, 
political consumerism is particularly popular among the unemployed, potentially as a tool of 
economic resilience (Kousis and Paschou, 2017). On the other hand, in the UK the phenomenon 
is primarily popular among the young people in paid employment, providing support to the 
hypothesis that political consumerism in the country is strongly connected to cohorts with higher 
purchasing power. This observation comes to support the argument laid out in Chapter 9 
according to which political consumerism in Greece is primarily associated with the discontent 
from the neoliberal market environment, whereas in the UK it is primarily a result of a series of 
pull-factors into the marketopoly.  
The demographic and socioeconomic indicators therefore, convey only a partial 
understanding of political consumerism in the two countries. However, trying to draw the profile 
of the young political consumer in the two countries, it seems we are referring to a) unemployed, 
b) females, c) living close to urban centres in Greece; whereas in the UK the phenomenon is 
particularly popular among a) intellectual b) females c) in paid work. The section that follows will 
inquire into the links of the beliefs and attitudes of young people in Greece and the UK in relation 
to their understanding of politics. 
 
3. Political consumerism  and young people’s views about, and engagement with  politics 
This section examines and compares the interest in politics of young political consumers in Greece 
and in the UK, against the three measures of political consumerism. Tables 3.1.0 to 3.6.1 
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therefore, deliver the Chi-Square tests37 for buycotters, boycotters and buy/boycotters across the 
indicators which capture the respondents’ attitudes and beliefs about politics. Consistent with 
Figure 6 (p.165), the variables analysed in this section include a) the respondents’ subjective 
definition of politics, b) their interest in politics, c) political knowledge, d) political orientation in 
the left/right spectrum, e) strength of partisanship, and f) support for organised protests38. 
 
3.1 Subjective definition of politics 
Consistent with Beck’s (1997) conceptualisation of ‘subpolitics’ as politics from below, the 
respondents were asked in an open-ended question to provide their own definition of what 
politics means to them. Their responses were then categorised as ‘top-down’ if they 
predominately involved the actions of politicians, political parties, a political elite, authority or an 
abstract and remote ‘government’. Conversely, they were categorised as ‘bottom-up’ if they 
primarily referred to ‘us’ ordinary people, individuals and individual responsibility-taking, and 
‘our’ community. For example, some typical examples of a ‘bottom-up’ responses were the 
following: 
• ‘Politics is everywhere, we are political beings after all. The way we move around in our 
society is a political act. And of course, the way we influence the world around us. This 
means we are (or try to be) self-aware and responsible citizens and that we care about 
our communities and society as a whole’;  
• ‘Personally speaking, everything is politics as it determines our way of living and therefore 
the way we are expressing ourselves, move and generally exist in this world’; 
• ‘The power to make decisions for the public good, the organisation of our communities 
and common living, the resolution of conflicts within our societies’. 
 Instead, examples of ‘top-down’ responses included the following:  
 ‘Political parties, their members and actions’;  
 
37 Measures of statistical significance (Pearson’s Chi-Square and p-values) among the whole 
distribution are reported at the bottom of each category for each activity. The adjusted 
standardised residuals are being reported next to the percentages of each respective category. 
 
38 The variable ‘support for organised protests’ is intended to capture young people’s views about 
this form of political participation. The actual ‘intention to demonstrate’ will be analysed in 
section 5.5, along other forms of formal, informal and online forms of political engagement. 
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 ‘I personally believe that the whole thing revolves around a global game of power and 
authority and not so much around the best interests of the people’; 
 ‘Political parties, parliament, government laws/legislation/policies, government ideas and 
who/what they support’. 
The ensuing distribution of the responses according to this categorisation is presented in 
Table 3.1.0. It is interesting to note that young people in the UK were much more likely to indicate 
a top-down or mostly top-down understanding of politics (74.3%), than were their counterparts 
in Greece (53.3%), by a difference of 21 percentage points. 
 
Table 3.1.1 reports the crosstabulation of the respondents’ subjective definition of politics 
with respect to buycotters, boycotters and those who engaged in either of the two. 
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The table discloses that boycotting in Greece is a tool primarily of those who adhere to a 
‘bottom-up’ understanding of politics. In other words, boycotting is being perceived as another 
way with which ‘we, as young people’ may influence the reality of the word around ‘us’. Instead, 
there are no other statistically significant differences across the rest of the categories. 
 
3.2 Interest in politics 
In turn, examining the variable ‘Interest in politics’ in Table 3.2.0 amongst young people in both 
countries reveals that this is skewed in favour of the higher levels of interest, which however is 
to be expected by those who took the time to respond to  a survey on political participation. 
 
At a first glance on Table 3.2.1, and if one was to judge only by the cumulative measure, 
political interest does not seem to have a significant relationship with political consumerism 
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(p>.05). However, when one looks at boycotting separately this is found to be statistically 
significant for both countries (p<.01 for Greece and p<.05 for the UK), and so is buycotting for the 
UK subsample (p<.05). This observation provides support to the argument that the cumulative 
dimension is a rather inefficient measurement of political consumerism, since examining each 
political activity separately conveys a very different image. In Greece buycotting is less likely to 
be used by those who have no interest in politics at all. In the UK instead, buycotting is primarily 
a tool of those who have a great deal of interest in politics. The significance of political interest 
becomes more centralised when it comes to boycotting, with those who had quite a lot of interest 
in politics being more likely to have engaged in it, in both countries.  
 
Generally, political consumerism, in either of its two forms, seems to increase along with 
political interest, both in Greece and the UK. More specifically however, boycotting seems to be 
primarily a tool of those in the middle of the distribution of political interest. Instead, buycotting 
is primarily a political engagement tool of either those who have a great deal of political interest 
as it happens for example in the UK, while conversely it is less likely to be utilised by the politically 
disinterested, as for example happens in Greece. This could be partly because boycotting has 
become a relatively mainstream activity in recent years targeting often a single company, or 
product at a time. Instead, buycotting requires arguably more in-depth information in relation to 
the practices followed by the companies being buycotted. 
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3.3 Political knowledge 
Although political interest has been shown to be a relatively strong indicator of political 
consumerism, especially when it comes to boycotting for both countries and buycotting in the 
UK, the same cannot be argued for political knowledge (Table 3.3.1). In this question, the 
respondents were asked to specify how confident they felt with regards to their level of 
knowledge of politics and political parties when it comes to deciding how to vote at election 
times.  
 
Across the whole distribution, there is not any significant relationship (p>.05) with regards 
to the extent of political knowledge of the respondents in either country, for any of the three 
political consumerist measures. Within the categories however, we may see that boycotting in 
Greece has a negative significant relationship (adj.res.>±2.0) with the 55.7% of those who were 
not very confident, and a positive one with the 70.2% who were fairly confident about their extent 
of political knowledge, indicating that boycotting in the country is a tool primarily of those who 
are moderately confident about what is going on in the political scene. This confirms similar 
findings by Baek (2010), who also reports that people with relatively higher levels of political 
knowledge are more likely to boycott than buycott. 
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Nevertheless, it is worth noting at this point that the formulation of this question might 
have influenced the responses. Although the previous question on political interest did not refer 
to political parties but generally on their interest in politics, this question explicitly referred to 
‘politics and political parties’. As it will be later demonstrated in section 3.5 and 5.1 to 5.8 political 
consumerism in consistently non-associated with variables that involve any reference to 
partisanship, or electoral processes. 
 
3.4 Political orientation 
The respondents were subsequently asked to position themselves with regards to their political 
orientation on the Left/Right spectrum. The distribution of their responses is reported in Table 
3.4.0. 
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Across all three types of activities and both countries, there are clear indications that 
political consumerism is primarily a tool of those positioning themselves in the far left 
(consistently significant above adj.res.=+2.0). Instead, the respondents who self-reportedly 
belonged in the centre were statistically less likely to have engaged in all three political 
consumerist measures across both countries. Both of these observations are consistent with 
previous research that portrays the centre-voters less engaged in political consumerism, and left-
wing voters more engaged in it (Terragni and Berg, 2007). 
Although those placing themselves as moderate right in Greece were statistically less likely 
to engage in buycotts, they were statistically more likely to have engaged in boycotts instead. This 
may be understood in the context of the widespread boycott campaigns on German products in 
the country, primarily associated with the right-wing parties. This difference would not be 
discernible from the cumulative measure only (which reports a negative sign for this category) 
and discloses the inefficiency of this measure to fully capture the intricacies of political 
Page | 190  
 
consumerism’s two separate behavioural dimensions. Moreover, it is worth noticing that the 
respective percentages demonstrate a decreasing trend in almost all dimensions, in both 
countries, as the respondents’ political orientation shifts to the right39.  
 
In conclusion, political orientation has been so far (along with gender) the strongest 
indicator of political consumerism among young people in Greece and the UK. Political 
consumerism, whether expressed as buycotts, boycotts or either of the two, is thus primarily a 
tool of those respondents who reported belonging in the far left in both countries, demonstrating 
diminishing trend as the political orientation of the respondents moves towards the right.  
 
3.5 Partisanship 
As have seen, political orientation is one of the strongest indicators of political consumerism in 
both the UK and Greece.  However, as analysis of Table 3.5.1 reveals, this does not spill-over to 
 
39 A noteworthy exception to this diminishing trend can be found at the 80% of the respondents 
of the far right in Greece (adj.res.= +3.8) who reportedly engaged in either or both of the two 
activities. However, the low reported frequency in this category for Greece (n=5), indicates one 
should be rather hesitant to interpret it as a clear indication of increased engagement of the far 
right in Greece in political consumerism. 
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partisanship. The respondents were asked to state if they usually think of themselves as being a 
supporter of one particular party or not40.  
 
 The figures demonstrate a widespread alienation of young people in Greece from party-politics, 
with 78.0% of the young respondents not being supporters of any political party – almost 36 
percentage points higher than in the UK. Young people in the UK instead were divided between 
not being a supporter at all and being a fairly strong supporter (42.1% over 42.4%). Also indicative 
of young peoples’ alienation from formal politics is that the figures for the “Don’t Knows” in both 
countries is greater or comparable to those who said they were strong supporters of a political 
party. 
 
40 Although throughout the variables in this section the ‘Do not know’ responses were dropped 
from the final analysis so that they would not skew the findings, in this particular category I 
decided to keep them since they are indicative of the alienation of young people from party 
politics.  
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Across the distribution, the data reveals no clear relationship with partisanship and 
political consumerism (p>.05). However, examining the relationships of partisanship within the 
respective measures of political consumerism we may discern somewhat more interesting 
findings. Firstly, we note that for the UK there is no relationship between party affiliation in any 
of the categories examined. Secondly, we may see that those who are unsure of their political 
affiliations in Greece are statistically less likely to engage in political consumerism in any of its 
forms. Thirdly however, we may also infer that the 78.7% of the political consumers in Greece in 
the cumulative measure are significantly more likely (adj.res.= +1.8) not to be a supporter of any 
particular political party. We can also see that this is primarily because of the 66.4% of the 
boycotters in the country in the same category (adj.res.= +1.7), although there is no statistical 
relationship with the buycotters. However, the cumulative measure fails to capture this 
significant difference.  
Therefore, and consistent with the discussion from the focus groups in Chapter 10, this 
observation provides further support for the hypothesis that in Greece young people are pushed 
out from party-politics. More specifically, young boycotters in Greece are significantly more likely 
to not be a supporter of any particular political party.  
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3.6 Support for organised protests 
Finally, the overwhelming majority of young people in both countries agree that people should 
be allowed to organise public meetings to protest against the government (Table 3.6.0).  
 
Although buycotting does not convey any significant relationship with support for 
organising protests, boycotting is being perceived as an alternative engagement tool for those 
who support organising public meetings to protest against the government in both countries. The 
reason may be that negative political consumerism is directly targeting certain unfavourable 
business practices within the market. In other words, boycotting may be understood as a form of 
economic protest, and as such, it is associated with organised protests against the government. 
Once again, the cumulative measure fails to capture this significant difference.  
 
In conclusion, the indicators on the respondents’ beliefs and attitudes about politics 
disclose a generally stronger explanatory power than the demographic and socioeconomic 
indicators discussed in the previous section. The analyses in sections 3.1 to 3.6, reveal that a) only 
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boycotting in Greece is associated with a bottom-up understanding of politics, instead of the 
domain of a remote political elite. Moreover, there is a strong statistical relationship between b) 
interest in politics and political consumerism among the respondents of both countries. Although 
however, political interest is strongly associated with political consumerism, c) knowledge about 
party politics is not associated with political consumerism in either of the countries. In turn, d) 
political identification with the far-left is associated with buycotting and boycotting in both 
countries while this association seems to be diminishing as we move towards the right. 
Nevertheless, this association is not reflected in party-politics. Instead, e) boycotting in Greece 
seems to be perceived as an alternative form of political participation for those young people who 
are not a supporter of any particular political party. Finally, f) support for organising protests in 
both countries is associated with boycotting, since this is being perceived as a form of market-
oriented protest. These findings contradict Giddens’ (1994) claim about the diminishing relevance 
of the left/right continuum. Instead, they provide support for the argument that political 
consumerism is primarily a tool of those young people who are affiliated to the ideological, but 
not to the political left as this is being expressed in contemporary party politics.  
  
4. Political consumerism  and young people’s views about elections, politicians and 
democracy? 
Previous research  has suggested that  although young people “do not feel that they can exercise 
real influence over decision-making” they continue to be strong supporters of democracy in 
principle (Henn and Foard, 2014, p. 2). This section will thus discuss the relation of democratic 
ideals and support for electoral processes with political consumerism in the UK and Greece. 
Sections 4.1 to 4.6 report and discuss the crosstabulations for buycotters, boycotters and 
buy/boycotters, across different indicators that are designed to capture young people’s support 
for and ideals about democracy. Consistent with the conceptual map of Figure 6 (p. 165), the 
variables analysed in this section will include a) the conviction that by voting they may change 
how their country operates (External Political Efficacy, EPE); b) their particularised trust towards 
politicians, c) the extent they believe they may influence the governance of their country (Internal 
Political Efficacy, IPE), d) their disillusionment from elections, e) their generalised trust, or how 
much they trust other people, f) their conviction that voting is a duty; g) how important 
Page | 195  
 
democracy in principle is for them, h) how democratic they deem their country to be, and finally 
i) their satisfaction with political information. 
  
4.1 External Political Efficacy 
Table 4.1.0 reports the distribution of young people’s conviction that by voting they may change 
how their country is being run, that is their levels of External Political Efficacy (EPE). 
 
Generally, young people’s EPE, does not convey any statistically significant results (p>.05) 
across any of the three political consumerist activities for either country (Table 4.1.1). However, 
it is worth noticing that buycotting seems to be primarily a tool of an unrepresented 52.8% of 
those who strongly disagree with the statement in Greece, whereas in the UK it is similarly a tool 
of a 48.4% minority of those who strongly agree with it (adj.res.=-1.8). This latter relationship 
persists and is even reinforced (adj.res.<-2.0) also for the other two measures, but only in the UK 
subsample. Political efficacy thus has a negative effect on political consumerism in the UK 
subsample, revealing that the young UK respondents are less likely to engage in political 
consumerism if they believe they may change their country by voting instead. In Greece however, 
young people are less likely to buycott if they also feel unable to influence their country by voting. 
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Despite concerns about a crowding-out effect of lifestyle forms of political participation, 
on voting (Putnam, 1995), Table 4.1.1 reveals instead a crowding-out effect of voting on political 
consumerism, at least in the UK. In other words, young people in the UK are significantly less likely 
to engage in either buycotting or boycotting if they strongly believe that by voting they can 
achieve tangible changes for their country. Consistent with the findings from the focus groups, 
young people in the UK with high trust towards electoral processes (EPE) are therefore less likely 
to resort to alternative forms of political engagement within the market. In Greece in turn, 
political consumerism seems to be generally unrelated to electoral processes. In other words, 
young people in Greece are equally likely to engage in buycotting or boycotting irrespectively of 
their views or support of electoral processes. An exception can be discerned for the highly 
disillusioned young people in Greece (‘strongly disagree’), who are also less likely to engage in 
buycotts as a means to attain change.   
 
4.2 Trust towards politicians EPE  
Analysis of the variable considered in the previous section in Table 4.1.1 captured the trust that 
young respondents have of electoral processes. This variable instead, intends to capture young 
people’s trust towards politicians. There may be discerned a robust negative link between 
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political consumerism and trust of politicians. Generally, young people in Greece seem to hold 
lower trust towards politicians, than do their counterparts in the UK (Table 4.2.0). 
 
However, this does not seem to be related to their likelihood to engage either in buycotts, 
nor in boycotts (p>.05). Instead, there is an overall significant negative relationship in the UK 
(p<.01), when it comes to the cumulative measure. This is found primarily within young 
boycotters in the country (p<.001), and to a lesser extent within buycotters (p<.05). In particular, 
those who do not have any trust in politicians at all, seem to be significantly more likely to engage 
in political consumerism in all its forms (adj.res.>+2.0). 
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Contrary to the expectations from the focus groups, it is young people in the UK, and not 
from Greece, who seem to be pushed out from institutional politics, since they perceive 
politicians as inherently untrustworthy (Hart, 2017). Instead, young people in Greece who believe 
that most politicians can be trusted are less likely to engage in either buycotting or boycotting, 
presumably since they believe that they may attain the desired results through the 
representations of politicians instead. 
 
4.3 Influence on governance IPE 
In turn, Table 4.3.0 shows that young people in both countries hold comparable levels of Internal 
Political Efficacy, that is that they have little confidence that they are able to directly influence 
the governance of their country. 
 
However, despite the opposite indications from the focus groups discussed in Chapter 10, 
there seems to be no statistical association between IPE and political consumerism (p>.05) for 
any of the three measures, indicating that the extent that young people believe they are able to 
influence the political processes in their country is not related to their likelihood to engage in 
political consumerism. 
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4.4  Disillusionment from elections 
The next question asked whether young people agreed with the statement that ‘Elections allow 
voters to express their opinions but don’t really change anything’ and was intended to measure 
the extent of their disillusionment from elections. The Greek subsample demonstrated a generally 
greater disillusionment with electoral politics than is evident among UK youth (Table 4.4.0). 
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Previous literature (Nonomura, 2017) portrays political consumerism as an alternative 
political participation tool among those young people who feel powerless to express their 
concerns through the electoral political arena. However, and contrary also to the expectations 
derived from the focus groups, Table 5.4.1 does not reveal evidence of any statistically significant 
relationship between young people’s disillusionment from politics and their propensity to engage 
in buycotts or boycotts.  
 
 
4.5 Generalised trust 
Table 4.5.0 reveals that young people in the UK are less trustful towards people in general than 
are their counterparts in Greece. 
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With regards to the association of the variable of generalised trust to political 
consumerism, Table 5.5.1 reports that there is no statistical significance across the full 
distribution for either country (p>.05). However, those who responded that ‘Some people can be 
trusted’ in Greece are significantly more likely (adj.res.>+2.0) to have engaged in political 
consumerism, and boycotting in particular (adj.res=+1.9). Unlike section 4.2 which found that 
political consumerism in Greece is less likely if young people trust politicians, here we find that 
boycotting is more likely if they believe that at least ‘some people can be trusted’. 
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Previously, Neilson (2010) has reported that more trusting people are more likely to 
buycott than boycott. Similar findings have also been reported by Baek (2010) and Copeland 
(2014a, p. 182). The explanation provided in the context of social capital theory is that buycotts 
are typically a much more private endeavour, and therefore, since individuals cannot know who 
else engages in it, they need to be more trusting of their fellow citizens than boycotters do. 
Instead, boycotts, are frequently more public in nature, since they often tend to be the result of 
coordinated public actions aimed to increase public awareness on certain issues, and therefore 
do not require high levels of generalised trust. However, this is not confirmed by the data in this 
study, where there is found instead an association of boycotts to generalised trust, and only in 
the case of Greece. However, the link between generalised trust and boycotting across the whole 
distribution in the country is statistically spurious (p>.05). 
 
4.6 Voting is a duty 
In the next question the respondents were asked whether they agreed with the statement that 
they would be seriously neglecting their duty as a citizen if they didn’t vote. Generally, 
respondents from Greece were relatively more sceptical about voting being a duty. Instead, UK 
respondents were relatively more ‘dutiful’ than those from Greece (76.4% of ‘agree’ and ‘strongly 
agree’, over 63.5% for Greece).  
 
The Chi-square tests (Table 4.6.1) do not convey any effect across the overall distribution 
(p>.05). In Greece there is no discernible relationship whatsoever neither within, nor across the 
distribution. Within the categories however, boycotting in the UK seems to be a tool of the highly 
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dutiful voters (adj.res.>±2.0), and this relationship spills over in the cumulative measure. 
Moreover, boycotting in the UK is also a means of engagement for a minority of those who either 
disagree with the statement (adj.res.=-1.7) or are indifferent to it (adj.res.=-2.0).  
 
In other words those young people in the UK who do not perceive voting as a duty, or 
those who are indifferent to this statement are less likely to engage in boycotts. It can thus be 
concluded that boycotting is a tool used primarily by the dutiful young citizens, but only in the 
UK. Copeland (2014a) has previously theorised that boycotting is associated with norms of dutiful 
citizenship, since as a punishment-oriented form of political participation it shares several key 
features with electoral politics. 
 
4.7 Support for democracy  
Unlike the previous variable which captures young people’s levels of support for voting, this 
variable is intended to capture the overarching democratic ideals of the respondents. ‘Support 
for democracy in principle’ is the strongest predictor of political consumerism in this section, 
especially by the Greek subsample. Table 4.7.0 displays the distribution of the responses per 
country. 
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Table 4.7.1 shows that support for democracy is related to buycotting both in Greece 
(p<.01), and the UK (p<.05). However, although boycotting is highly related to support for 
democracy in Greece (p<.001), it bears no significance in the UK. The same applies for 
buy/boycotting (p<.05). This is yet another very obvious example of why the cumulative measure 
of buy/boycotting is a rather inefficient measure of political consumerism, confirming Baek’s 
(2010), Koos’s (2012) and Zorell’s (2018) assertion, that boycotters and buycotters should be 
distinguished because their demographic backgrounds, participatory practices and democratic 
ideals are substantially different. 
 
Page | 205  
 
Nevertheless, within the categories there is the tendency that the more the young people 
from both countries value democracy in principle, the more likely they are to engage in political 
consumerism. Both buycotting and boycotting are consistently more likely (adj.res. >+2.0) to have 
taken place among those respondents who value democracy in their country as ‘Absolutely 
important’, confirming political consumerism as a form of political participation that reflects the 
democratic ideals of those who practice it. 
 
4.8 How democratic is my country? 
In turn, young people in the UK demonstrated a generally more positive assessment about how 
democratic their country was in practice (Table 4.8.0). 
The extent of how democratic the respondents believe their countries are in practice 
(Table 4.8.1) demonstrates a statistical relationship only for buycotters in Greece (p<.05), and this 
lies primarily among those who answered that their country is neither democratic, nor 
undemocratic (adj.res.<-2.0). Negative political consumerism was more likely to have taken place 
from the 73% who considered Greece being only fairly democratic; perhaps as a way of expressing 
their dissatisfaction with the quality of democracy in their country. Instead, the UK subsample 
does not reveal any significant relationships with democracy in practice in any of the political 
consumerist activities examined. 
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4.9 Satisfaction with political information 
Table 4.9.0 displays the satisfaction with political information in the two countries, with the Greek 
cohort being more dissatisfied that the one from the UK. 
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Nevertheless, satisfaction with the availability and the quality of political information does 
not reveal any significant relationships across the political consumerist activities for either 
country  (Table 4.9.1).  
 
 
To summarise, the analysis throughout this section confirms ‘Support for democracy in 
principle’ as the most robust indicator of engagement in political consumerism, primarily in 
Greece. The quality of democracy in practice, however, is only related to buycotting in Greece, 
whereas satisfaction with political information does not convey any statistically significant results. 
Interestingly, buycotting in Greece is an alternative form of political engagement for a minority 
who feel unable to change their country by voting, whereas in the UK political consumerism in all 
its forms is an engagement tool of those who have a great deal of confidence that by voting they 
may change how their country operates. Moreover, boycotting is primarily a tool of the highly 
dutiful voters only in the UK.  
Generally, the analysis of all the variables that relate to the government and elections, 
have displayed a spurious or no statistical association to political consumerism. This observation 
disassociates political consumerism from electoral political processes.  
Only boycotting may be perceived as a political tool of the highly dutiful young citizens, 
and only in the UK. However, this relationship may be because the phrasing of this question (‘I 
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would be seriously neglecting my duty as a citizen, if I did not vote’) which is only implicitly related 
to voting, and more related to ‘citizenship’. The same could be argued for  the variable ‘trust to 
politicians’ which demonstrates a negative relationship to political consumerism in the UK. In this 
case too, the distrust towards the politicians should not be misinterpreted as a negative 
relationship of political consumerism with elections. Instead, it is the perceived untrustworthiness 
of the politicians (and not the elections) which pushes young people towards political 
consumerism. Political consumerism should therefore be viewed as a form of political 
participation, separate from electoral processes altogether. However, this does not mean that it 
should also be perceived as separate from democratic ideals, since ‘support for democracy’ is 
positively associated with political consumerism in both countries. It can therefore be concluded 
that political consumerism is a) unrelated to elections and b) negatively associated with 
politicians, but c) positively associated with democracy in principle. 
Moreover, this section has also demonstrated that the beliefs about elections, politicians 
and democratic ideals are substantially different between young buycotters and boycotters 
(Baek, 2010; Koos, 2012; Zorell, 2018), and that the cumulative measure of political consumerism 
fails to capture such important distinctions. Furthermore, the emphasis of the analysis above has 
been quantitative with respect to several push-factors which were suspected that might be 
alienating young people from formal politics and drive them instead to participate within the 
market context. In other words, this section has examined whether there is less or more 
participation in political consumerism according to young people’s levels of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with elections, politicians and democracy respectively. However, according to 
Leighley (1995, p. 198) “…to account for more than ‘how much’ participation, we must 
conceptualise the participation decision not as a choice between activity and inactivity, but rather 
as a choice of a particular type of political act out of a set of potential acts”. The next section 
therefore will examine which other forms of a) formal political participation, b) informal political 
participation, and c) online political participation the young political consumers may also be 
involved in. 
 
5. Participation in politics and community affairs. 
 
As society experiences processes of civic change, reflected in the variables above, young people 
in particular will embrace novel ways of engaging with civic life, such as political consumerism. 
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Understanding the relationship between these new practices and established methods of political 
participation remains therefore an important field of research. The debate on whether political 
consumerism is ‘crowding-out’ participation in institutional politics, or whether the expansion of 
political repertoires within the market provides young people with an even wider array of political 
participation activities, in addition to those of formal, informal and online politics remains 
inconclusive (Gotlieb and Wells, 2012). This section seeks to shed light in this terrain by examining 
how active young buycotters and boycotters are in other forms of political participation and 
community affairs. 
This section will thus investigate the political consumers’ levels of engagement in three 
separate domains, namely in formal politics, informal politics and online engagement. 
Participation in formal politics will be measured by a) intention to vote in the next general 
elections, and by b) directly contacting an MP. In turn, engagement in informal politics will be 
measured by c) the intention to work actively with a group of people to address a public issue or 
tackle a problem, d) the intention to be active in a voluntary organisation, like a community 
association, a charity group, or youth club and e) the intention to participate in a protest, a rally 
or a demonstration, to show concern about a public issue or problem.  
According to the bibliography, it is expected that boycotting, as a conflict-oriented 
behaviour (Friedman, 1999) will be more strongly related to intention to demonstrate (Copeland, 
2014a). Moreover, it is also expected to be more associated with the variables measuring the 
formal dimension. Copeland  notes that boycotting is more likely to involve disputes between 
organised consumer groups and corporations, identifiable conflict and broad attention from the 
media, all of which are typically elements of traditional political campaigns. Although boycotts 
seldom involve the selection of government personnel, “they have the potential to influence 
elected officials’ public policy preferences indirectly, especially if they garner a substantial 
amount of media coverage” (2014a, p. 175). Instead, buycotting has arguably more in common 
with civic engagement than with traditional interest-based politics (Copeland, 2014a, p. 215) and 
therefore is more likely to involve informal, cooperative activity away from traditional political 
organisations (Zukin et al., 2006). We would therefore expect stronger association of buycotting 
with the variables ‘intention to work with others’ and ‘intention to volunteer’, than with the 
formal participation variables. Finally, online participation (Gibson and Cantijoch, 2013; Kelm and 
Dohle, 2018) will be measured by a) signing an electronic petition, b) the intention to simply share 
a link about an important social or political issue over a social networking site, and c) the intention 
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to create a group or a page on a social networking site, or a blog to inform others about an 
important social or political issue.  Previous research has reported a positive association of 
political consumerism to online forms of political engagement (Kelm and Dohle, 2018). 
 
5.1 Formal: Intention to vote 
The distribution of the responses with regards to young people’s intention to vote demonstrates 
that young people in the UK were generally more likely to vote in the next general elections than 
young people in Greece (Table 5.1.0)41.  
 
Generally however, the analysis on the variable ‘Intention to vote’ reflects the findings of 
the previous section (Tables 4.1-4.4) according to which political consumerism should be 
perceived as disconnected from electoral processes, as there is no discernible statistical 
relationships in any of the political consumerism measures used (p>.05). 
 
41 However, one should be cautious with the interpretation of this finding, bearing in mind that 
the collection of the survey questionnaire took place amidst a period of consecutive electoral 
rounds in the UK, which might have positively influenced their inclination to vote. 
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More specifically however, within the respective categories, we may discern that those 
who are ‘likely’ to vote in the UK, are less likely to have engaged either in buycotting or boycotting 
(adj.res.<-1.7), pointing towards a mild crowding-out effect of voting on political consumerism in 
the country. However, the 66.1% of the young UK sample who were very likely to vote, were also 
more likely to have engaged in buycotts, and this relationship also spills over to the cumulative 
measurement. Generally, the figures in Table 5.1.1 mirror those in ‘Table 4.6.1: Voting is a duty’ 
as it is reasonable to assume that those who perceive voting as a duty will also be more likely to 
demonstrate greater intention to vote in the elections when that time comes. Whereas however 
the dutiful political consumers in the UK were more likely to engage in boycotts, those who are 
very likely to vote in the next general elections are more likely to engage in buycotts instead 
(66.1%, adj.res.=+1.8). This relationship is also reflected in the cumulative measure of 
buy/boycotters, which however once again fails to inform us about the differing dynamics 
between buycotting and boycotting.  
 
5.2 Formal: Contact a politician 
With regards to likelihood of directly contacting an MP or a politician, there may  generally be 
discerned a sharp diminishing trendline for both countries (Table 5.2.0). 
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Moreover, the observation that market-oriented political participation is virtually 
unrelated to electoral processes gains further support from the analysis of the variable ‘Intention 
to contact your MP’, where there may be discerned no statistical association across the 
distribution (p>.05) for any of the three measures. Whereas however, those young people who 
are very likely to contact their MP in Greece (n=9) are more likely to have engaged in buycotts, 
those who are likely to have contacted their MP in the UK, are more likely to have engaged in 
boycotts instead (adj.res.>+1.7). Once again, the cumulative measure fails to capture this 
difference. 
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These observations further reinforce the ones in the previous section, according to which 
political consumerism is not related to formal methods of political participation, neither in terms 
of intention to vote, nor in terms of directly contacting an MP. At the very least, buycotting and 
boycotting do not seem to crowd-out electoral participation. On the contrary, political 
consumerism seems to be a tool among those young people who  are also likely or very likely to 
vote. This finding reasserts the observation in the previous section according to which market-
oriented participation is associated with the dutiful respondents, but only in the case of the UK. 
 
5.3 Informal: Intention to work with others 
Instead, the relationship of political consumerism to the intention to work with others for a 
common goal is much more robust. The distribution of the responses in Table 5.3.0 shows that 
this form of participation is more common in Greece, confirming the assertion of Graziano and 
Forno (2012) that collective forms of political participation are on the rise in southern Europe.   
 
 
With respect to boycotting, there is a robust statistical association of this variable for both 
subsamples (p<.001 for Greece and p<.01 for the UK). When it comes to buycotting however, only 
the Greek subsample is associated with the intention to work with others (p<.05), whereas 
buycotting in the UK is not associated with the intention to work with others for a common goal 
(p>.05). This observation may be reflecting the more individualistic nature of buycotting, 
especially in the UK, since purchasing a product for environmental, ethical and political 
considerations is something that usually happens individually each time one goes shopping and 
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thus requires lower levels of cooperation with others (Baek, 2010; Copeland, 2014a). Once again, 
this difference is not captured by the cumulative measure of buy/boycotting, where both 
countries display a highly significant relationship of political consumerism and intention to work 
with others (p<.001). 
 
Generally speaking however, it can easily be perceived in both countries the much 
stronger relationship of this informal and cooperative form of political participation to political 
consumerism, compared to the formal election-oriented forms of political participation in the 
previous two subsections. 
 
5.4 Informal: Intention to volunteer 
The same applies for the variable ‘Intention to volunteer’. The graph in Table 5.4.0 shows a more 
steep trendline for Greece than in the UK, an indication that this form of civic engagement is more 
popular on the overall in Greece than in the UK. 
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However, Table 5.4.1 reports that there is a relationship of ‘Intention to volunteer’ to 
political consumerism, consistent for all three measures in both countries (p<.05). Those who 
answered they are ‘very likely’ to work with others are also statistically more likely to have 
engaged in buycotting, boycotting, and buy/boycotting (adj.res.>+2.0) for both countries. 
Generally, the pattern that emerges is that the higher the intention to volunteer, the more active 
the young respondents will be in political consumerism for both countries. Nevertheless, the 
association of volunteering to political consumerism is generally more consistent for the UK. 
 
Theoretical support for this strong relationship of volunteering to political consumerism 
in both countries may be traced within the Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) and  has been 
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previously applied to political consumerism by Copeland (2014a, p. 175) in the US, without 
however delivering robust results. In the CVM, Verba et al. (1995) pose that the likelihood of 
engaging in civic and political behaviour is connected primarily on two factors, motivation and 
capacity. In that respect therefore, the higher perceived motivation of the Greek subsample to 
engage in volunteering (Table 5.4.0), may be counteracted by the higher available opportunity 
structures for volunteering in the UK.  
 
5.5 Informal: Intention to demonstrate 
The same applies for the variable ‘Intention to demonstrate’. Generally, Table 5.5.0 reports 
higher intention to demonstrate in Greece than in the UK. 
 
 
We should maybe remember at this point that the relationship between ‘Support for 
organised protests’ in section 3.6 was much stronger for the UK, especially among the boycotters, 
confirming Friedman’s (1999) proposed relationship of boycotting to demonstrations, on the 
grounds it shares common features with demonstrations, as for example that they both requires 
more organisation and attract more media attention. We should therefore expect a stronger 
relationship between boycotters and intention to demonstrate. Table 6.5.1 shows that this is 
indeed the case, at least for the UK, where boycotting is having a stronger relationship with 
intention to demonstrate (p<.001) than buycotting (p<.01). For Greece instead, the relationship 
between the participant’s intention to demonstrate is consistent at  p<.001 for both buycotting 
and boycotting. Once again the cumulative measure fails to capture these intricacies and reports 
a consistently high relationship at p<.001 for both countries.  
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The CVM of Verba et al. (1995) may once again provide support for these (minor) 
differences among the countries. Protests and large scale demonstrations have become an almost 
daily occurrence in the streets of Athens in the years after the ‘movement of the piazzas’ in many 
Mediterranean countries in 2011 (Leontidou, 2012, p. 1). It may therefore be argued that the 
opportunity structures for demonstrations are more widespread in Greece, just like the 
opportunity structures in volunteering associations are more widespread in the UK, and this might 
explain the variance in the findings of the last two variables.  
Nevertheless, the relationship of all three variables of informal participation, are 
significantly more strongly associated with political consumerism than the two variables of formal 
political participation at the beginning of this section. For example, Vrablinkova and Linek (2013) 
explain why protestors are not likely to vote. They claim that this group of citizens, although highly 
interested in politics, choose to bypass voting at elections, which is viewed as providing legitimacy 
to representative democracy. The same therefore may be claimed for political consumerism, and 
is consistent with young people’s own responses during the focus groups (see Chapter 9). 
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5.6 Online: Sign a petition 
When it comes to online forms of political participation, young people in the UK are more likely 
to engage in signing a petition than in Greece (Table 5.6.0). When it comes to young political 
consumers in both countries however (Table 5.6.1), this trend is being reversed, with those who 
responded they are ‘very likely’ to sign a petition being more likely to engage in political 
consumerism (99.6% in Greece over 77.4% in the UK, p<.001). 
 
 
 With regards to the distinction between positive and negative consumerism for those 
who are ‘very likely’ to sign a petition, young people in Greece demonstrate consistently higher 
engagement than their contemporaries in the UK (88.0% over 70.7% for buycotting and 81.9% 
over 66.9% in boycotting, all significant at adj.res.>+2.0). Generally however, there is a strong link 
between signing a petition and engaging in political consumerism for both countries. Across the 
whole distribution there is a significant statistical relationship  for Greece across all three 
measures (p<.01), while for the UK there is a statistically significant relationship at p<.001 for both 
the cumulative measure and boycotting, but not for buycotting (p>.05).  
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5.7 Online: Share a link 
The same holds true and is even reinforced for the intention to simply share a link about an 
important social or political issue over a social media site, such as Twitter or Facebook (Table 
5.7.0). The association between online participation and political consumerism has been 
previously well documented (Kelm and Dohle, 2018).  
 
The relationship between sharing a link or an article online and political consumerism is 
highly correlated for both countries across all three measures (p<.001). A noteworthy exception 
is the category boycotters in the UK where the relationship between the two falls at p<.05, which 
however remains statistically significant. Generally, the more likely young people in the two 
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countries are to share a link or an article on a social media platform, the more likely they are to 
also engage in political consumerism, with Greece demonstrating significantly higher percentages 
for the ‘very likely’ category than in the UK across all three measures (adj.res.>+2.0). This 
observation comes to be added to the consistently higher association of political consumerism to 
both informal and online forms of political participation. 
 
 
 
 
5.8 Online: Create a blog 
Academics often criticize online political action, referring to it as “slacktivism” (Morozov, 2009) 
or “clicktivism” (Karpf, 2010), characterising it as including low-risk and low-effectiveness forms 
of political participation which – for some - carries with it hidden dangers for the public sphere 
(Karpf, 2010, p. 1). It is admittedly much easier to share a link of an article online than to take the 
time and write that article yourself. Young people in the two countries are therefore less likely to 
write a blog than to sign a petition or to simply share a link. Also, Table 5.8.0 shows that this is 
less likely to happen in the UK than in Greece.  
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With regards to the likelihood of creating a group or a page on a social media site, or a 
blog to inform others about an important social or political issue, there is a statistically significant 
relationship (p<.01) only among buycotters in Greece. This may be because political consumerism 
is generally associated with the recent expansion of online sites which provide information about 
which companies to support with one’s consumer behaviour. However, this form of participation 
is much less widespread especially among boycotters in both countries, compared to simply 
signing a petition or sharing a link, which both presumably involve less costs in terms of time, 
effort and commitment. With this specific comparison, it is hard to avoid the portrayal of young 
people as lazy and self-interested. However, this standpoint would overlook the hight levels of 
engagement of young political consumers in both countries in community-oriented forms of 
political participation discussed above. 
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In general, despite claims that lifestyle forms of political participation may be crowding-
out electoral participation (Putnam, 1995), the analysis of the two formal participation variables 
in relation to political consumerism in this section indicate that there is little to no relationship 
between the two. It seems therefore that for the young political consumers in both countries, 
political participation is less about voting for political parties, and contacting politicians via email. 
Instead, they seem to be embracing offline, non-institutional forms of citizenship such as working 
actively with others to address a public issue of common interest; volunteering in a community 
association, a charity group, or youth club and participating in a protest or a demonstration. The 
collective outreach of these forms of political engagement contradicts the standpoint that 
political consumerism is an inherently individualistic form of political participation. When it comes 
to online participation, young political consumers are embracing its non-institutionalised variants, 
like signing an online petition or sharing an already existing link or blog to inform others about a 
social or political issue they consider important. Instead, creating a blog or a social media page 
themselves, is only a tool among young buycotters in Greece. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has initially sought to analyse the demographic and socioeconomic profile of 
young political consumers in Greece and in the UK. Although the demographic and socioeconomic 
indicators in section 2 reveal a generally spurious association with political consumerism, the 
analysis indicates young political consumers in Greece as being especially a) unemployed, b) 
females, c) living close to urban centres. In the UK instead, political consumerism is particularly 
popular among a) intellectuals b) females c) in paid work.  
In turn, the indicators on the respondents’ beliefs and attitudes about politics in section 3 
reveal a generally stronger association than the demographic and socioeconomic indicators. As a 
result, it can been deduced that a) boycotting in Greece is associated with a bottom-up 
understanding of politics, b) political interest is strongly associated with political consumerism in 
both countries, although this is not also reflected in terms of c) knowledge about party politics. 
Moreover, political consumerism in both the UK and Greece d) is predominately a left-wing  
phenomenon and diminishes as the ideological orientation of young people shifts towards the 
right. However, although the ideological orientation of the respondents demonstrates a robust 
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association with market-oriented political participation, the same cannot be said about 
partisanship. On the contrary, e) boycotting in Greece seems to be perceived as an alternative 
form of political participation for those young people who are not supporters of any particular 
political party. These findings contradict the alleged diminishing relevance of the left/right 
continuum under postmodernism (Giddens, 1994). Instead, they provide support for the 
argument that political consumerism is primarily a tool of those young people who are affiliated 
to the ideological left, but not to the political left as this is being expressed in contemporary party 
politics in their countries. Finally, this section reconfirms the previously well-documented 
association of  negative political consumerism with f) support for organising protests in both 
countries (Friedman, 1999). 
The perceived lack of connection between political consumerism and electoral processes, 
but not to ideological orientations is being reinforced in section 4. Despite the concerns that 
lifestyle forms of political participation are crowding-out electoral participation (Putnam, 1995), 
the analysis of this section indicates that this is not the case, at least when it comes to political 
consumerism, which is generally unrelated to voting and elections. This observation supports the 
standpoint that political consumerism should therefore be viewed as a distinctive form of political 
participation, independent from electoral processes altogether. Nevertheless, a widespread 
distrust towards politicians may indeed be pushing young people away from electoral processes, 
towards market-oriented political participation, but only in the UK. This observation therefore 
provides support for the claim set out in Chapter 9, but only partially: although distrust towards 
politicians may indeed be pushing young people away from elections, political consumerism 
should generally be understood as entirely unrelated from electoral political participation. 
However, this does not mean that it should also be viewed as separate from democratic ideals, 
since ‘support for democracy’ is positively associated with political consumerism in both 
countries. It can therefore be concluded that political consumerism is a) unrelated to elections 
and b) negatively associated with politicians, but it is c) positively associated with democracy in 
principle. 
Further support in this direction is being provided in section 5, which reports that there is 
little or no association between political consumerism and either a) intention to vote or b) 
intention to contact a politician. Instead, there is a strong statistical association between non-
institutional forms of citizenship such as c) working actively with others to address a public issue 
of common interest, d) volunteering in a community association, a charity group, or a youth club 
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and e) participating in a protest or a demonstration. The same applies for online forms of political 
participation, such as f) signing a petition, or g) sharing a link of political content on a social media 
platform, although only young buycotters in Greece do not demonstrate signs of indolence when 
it comes to h) creating this content themselves, by writing a political blog. 
These findings may be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, the continuous 
hollowing-out of the nation-state (Jessop, 2013) has rendered elections as irrelevant to young 
political consumers in the two countries. Long (2010, p. 12) argues that “less regulation and power 
leaves ordinary citizens searching for novel methods to manage risk since traditional political 
avenues are less effective. Ethical consumption is an ideal method of risk management for 
ordinary citizens”. This tendency is being reinforced, especially in the UK, by a continuous distrust 
towards politicians (Henn and Foard, 2012), which is pushing young people in both countries into 
alternate, informal and more community-oriented forms of political participation such as 
volunteering, working actively with others, or demonstrating. The collective outreach of these 
forms of political engagement contradicts the perception that political consumerism is an 
inherently individualistic form of political participation. Instead, this collective orientation of 
political consumers is being expanded even further into the online realm, forming a global, online 
imagined community (Anderson, 2006). In this way, young people’s individual consumption 
patterns reflect their desire towards a collective, cosmopolitan identity (Sloam and Henn, 2018).   
The personality outreach of the political consumers will therefore be further examined in 
the following chapter, along with those market-related factors which are expected to pull young 
people into the marketplace as an alternative political arena.   
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Chapter 11: Pull-factors, motivations and personal orientation. 
 
1. Introduction  
The thematic analysis of the focus groups in Chapter 9 has distinguished between two 
antithetical, but complimentary effects with regards to political consumerism. It argued that on 
the one hand, the neoliberal critique of democracy accentuates a ‘push’ effect on young people 
away from electoral politics, and into the commercial domain. Nevertheless, the analysis of 
Chapter 10 has only partially confirmed this claim. Whereas distrust towards politicians may 
indeed be crowding-out electoral participation, electoral processes in themselves seem to be 
statistically unrelated to political consumerism. The same however cannot be argued with respect 
to democratic ideals, since political consumers in both countries demonstrate high support for 
democracy in principle. As a result young people are more likely to engage in informal, 
community-oriented forms of political participation and online forms of political engagement, 
than in voting or contacting a politician.  
On the other hand however, the perception that as consumers young people may be able 
to influence the production processes and product prices, the availability of ethical products and 
product-related information, as well as the variety of retailers, suggests the existence of a ‘pull’ 
effect into the market as a field of political participation. All these factors point to the direction 
that a generalised trust in the market environment, and a widespread confidence that the 
invisible hand of the market is able to effectively regulate consumer needs, as the neoliberal 
dictum suggests, may also be  influencing young people’s likelihood to engage in political 
consumerism. This chapter will therefore examine these market-oriented factors that may pull 
young people into the marketopoly as an alternative arena of political participation, along with 
young people’s motivations to do so and their personality outreach.  
Consistent with Figure 6 (Tables 5-8, p.165), these will thus include a) their consumer 
behaviour, b) their consumer motivations, c) their personal values, and finally d) their personality 
outreach (individualistic or cosmopolitan). Having provided a first instance of the relationships of 
political consumerism to these broad categories, Chapter 12 will subsequently employ stepwise 
linear regressions to conclusively define those characteristics that demonstrate the greatest 
weight in determining political consumerism, measured this time by the PCI. 
 
Page | 226  
 
2. Consumer behaviour pull-factors 
The variables that will be examined in this section include the variables under Table 5: Consumer 
behaviour, in Figure 6 (p.165). They will thus consist of a) Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) 
for the world as a whole, b) Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) in relation to their local 
community, c) satisfaction with the available range of products and services, satisfaction d) with 
range of prices, d) with range of retailers, e) with market information, and f) whether they tend 
to act alone or in response to an organised campaign. Finally, the section will examine young 
people’s g) support for market competition, and h) their support for free-market economy. 
 
6.1 Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) World 
Studies within the field of consumer studies (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002), define the PCE as the 
extent to which people have confidence in their individual consumer behaviour as a means for 
solving environmental issues. Given the conceptualisation of political consumerism as an 
individualised-collective action (Micheletti, 2003), that is, as an action that lingers between the 
individual and collective orientations of the political consumers, this section will divide the 
collective orientation of PCE in two separate dimensions. Section 6.1 will therefore examine the 
perceived effectiveness to bring about the desired change in the world as a whole, whereas 
section 6.2 will  discuss the perceived effectiveness to bring about the desired change in their 
local community. The aim of this distinction is to identify where exactly the collective outreach of 
political consumers lies. 
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 Table 6.1.0 shows that PCE-World is higher among young people in Greece than in the UK. 
The crosstabulation in Table 6.1.1 shows that the PCE-World is statistically associated with the 
cumulative measure of buy/boycotting for both Greece (p<.05) and the UK (p<.01), with 7.4% 
more people in Greece than in the UK (77.4% over 70.0%). Generally, the higher the belief 
that  their consumer behaviour is able to bring about the desired change for the world as a whole, 
the greater young people’s involvement with political consumerism. What this measure fails to 
portray however, is that this relationship exists only for buycotting, where the figures for both 
countries are significant at p<.01, while there is no significant relationship with boycotting.  
 
Once again, Friedman’s (1999) conceptualisation of boycotting as a conflict-oriented 
political behaviour may explain this difference. Boycotting is therefore expected to be less 
associated with measures of effectiveness of the said behaviour. Instead, buycotting, as a form of 
political participation that rewards companies for socially desired behaviour is more likely to be 
utilised if one strongly believes in the effectiveness of their consumer behaviour to bring about 
change in the world. 
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6.2 Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) Local 
In turn, as we may see from the trendlines of the two countries in Table 6.2.0, PCE-Local is also 
relatively higher among young people in Greece than in the UK.  
 
In this case however, the crosstabulations in Table 6.2.1 demonstrate more highly significant 
relationships of political consumer engagement for Greece compared to the UK for all three 
measures. 
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As expected, the higher the PCE-Local, the higher the likelihood to engage in political 
consumerism in both countries. The cumulative measure bears a significant relationship at p<.001 
for Greece and p<.05 for the UK, and indicates a greater participation in Greece (76.8%) than in 
the UK (69.5%). Again, this lies primarily among buycotters in both countries (66.9% in Greece 
and 62.2% in the UK). However, this time there is also a statistically significant relationship for 
boycotters in Greece too (p<.01) but no significance for boycotters in the UK. It seems therefore, 
that the more the PCE  moves from global concerns to concerns pertinent to young people’s local 
community in Greece, the more boycotting is understood as an effective tool that may promote 
desired change. 
6.3 Satisfaction with available range of products and services 
Table 6.3.0 shows that young people in the UK are generally more satisfied with the range of 
products and  services in their country. 
 
However, there is found to be no significant relationship between the young people’s 
satisfaction with the available products and services and the likelihood to engage in political 
consumerism.  
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This variable was intended to capture the influence of the availability of opportunity 
structures on young people’s political consumer engagement (Zorell, 2019c). However, the 
available opportunity structures, at least with regards to the range of products and services, does 
not seem to have an impact on young people’s decision to engage in political consumerism. If 
anything, there seems to be a negative relationship of young people who are satisfied and very 
satisfied with the available range of products in both countries, to their likelihood to boycott. It 
can be presumed that if they are generally satisfied with the range of products and services, they 
see no reason to punish the companies behind the products. 
 
6.4 Satisfaction with range of prices 
The opposite holds true for their satisfaction with the range of prices. Generally, young people in 
the UK seem to be relatively more satisfied with the existing prices, whereas the almost flat 
trendline for Greece in Table 6.4.0 indicates that young people in the country are in their majority 
neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied.  
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Although there may be discerned no statistically significant relationships across any of the 
three political consumerism measures for either country, within the categories for boycotters we 
discern the opposite dynamic than in the previous variable. That is, young people in both Greece 
and the UK seem to be more likely to punish companies by boycotting, if they do not agree with 
their pricing. 
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6.5 Satisfaction with variety of retailers  
With regards to satisfaction with the variety of retailers, such as big malls as opposed to local, 
independent stores for example, the almost flat trendline for Greece indicates that this is not a 
big issue of concern. Young people in the UK instead are rather satisfied with the availability of 
retailers in the country. Indeed Participant O in the focus groups had said: “In the UK, (…) there is 
a lot of variety for everything. You can buy products of all levels and spectrums. England is one of 
the first countries in Europe that come in mind when we talk about commercialism. One of the 
first places that started placing attention to reusing clothes, with the whole vintage, second-hand 
clothing industry”.  
 
 
Nevertheless, it seems that there is a significant relationship (p<.05) of those young people 
in the UK who are ‘Not at all satisfied’ and ‘Not satisfied’ with the variety of retailers to engage in 
political consumerism in either of its two forms. Instead, young people in Greece who are 
dissatisfied with the existing variety of retailers tend instead to protest by boycotting and thus 
punish the said retailers (p<.05).  
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Although the table does not tell us which retailers are those the young people are satisfied 
or dissatisfied with, Neilson (2010, p. 223) has previously informed us that buycotters tend to be 
supporting smaller, local, or independent brands because they feel that in this way they are 
making a noticeable impact in their local community. Instead, the logic behind boycotting is 
centred on discrediting the market leaders as a way of influencing changes in the industry as a 
whole. 
 
6.6 Satisfaction with market-related information  
Moreover, (and despite the opposite claims of some of the participants in the Greek focus groups 
) young people in both countries seem to generally have a positive image with regards to market-
related information available in their countries.  
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In particular, when this information is compared to the satisfaction from political 
information in the two countries (see Table 4.9), we may see that that young people in both 
Greece and the UK are more satisfied with market-related information than with political-related 
information. This is especially the case in Greece, where the satisfaction from political information 
demonstrates a particularly steep trendline. 
 
 
However, as in the case of political information, this is not significantly related to their 
likelihood of engaging in political consumerism. Although the percentages of young boycotters in  
both countries seem to be increasing the more dissatisfied they are with product-related 
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information, only young people in the UK who are ‘Not at all satisfied’ demonstrate a statistically 
significant tendency to boycott. Generally however, it seems that satisfaction from product-
related information is not statistically related to political consumerism.  
 
 
6.7 Acting alone or in organised campaigns 
The same applies to the question of whether young people usually act alone or as part of an 
organised campaign when they shop. The overwhelming majority in both countries said they 
often acted on their individual basis when they go shopping.  
 
With regards to the distribution of this majority in buycotters and boycotters, although 
there are no statistically significant relationships across the whole distribution, young buycotters 
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in the UK seem to be statistically more likely to act alone when they buycott, confirming the more 
individualistic orientation of this form of political consumerism compared to boycotting. However 
this is not the case for Greece, where there is no statistical significance nor across, or within any 
of the three measures. 
 
 
6.8 Support for market competition 
When asked to indicate what they tend to believe about the benefits and drawbacks of 
competition in the market on a 10 point scale, ranging from 1 (Competition is harmful: It brings 
out the worst in people), to 10 (Competition is good: It stimulates hard work and new ideas), 
more young people in both countries responded in favour of the latter, with the UK cohort 
indicating more support to market competition than the respective cohort in Greece, by almost 
10 percentage points (59.4% in Greece, compared to 69.2% in the UK).  
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According to the discussion in Chapter 6 on political consumerism as a neoliberal form of 
political participation, it is expected that the higher the positive outlook on the capacity of market 
to bring about the desired change by stimulating hard work and fostering the development of 
new ideas, the higher the engagement of young people in political consumerism.  
When it comes to the UK cohort, the discourse on market competition is not statistically 
associated with the likelihood of young people to engage in political consumerism. Nevertheless, 
it is worth noticing that unlike Greece, the percentages of those who engaged in any of the three 
political consumerist activities in the UK are greater (or equal) among those in favour of market 
competition on the grounds that it stimulates hard work and new ideas, than among those who 
deem market competition as essentially harmful. This dynamic, although not statistically 
significant, is consistent with the intuitive standpoint that political consumerism presupposes a 
form of internalised neoliberal governmentality, which ‘pulls’ young people to express their 
ethical, environmental and eventually political contestations within neoliberal marketopoly. 
However, when we look into the crosstabulation of political consumers from Greece with 
respect to market competition, we see instead that an overwhelming majority (97.0%) of those 
who believed that competition was harmful in Greece, had engaged in either or both of political 
consumerist activities within the previous 12 months. This relationship is statistically significant 
above the conventional cut-off point of +2.0 adjusted residual. The same holds true for the 
separate activities of buycotting and boycotting (adj.res.>+2.0) in Greece where the figures were 
77.2% and 74.0% of those who believe that market competition is essentially harmful since it 
brings out the worst in people. Conversely, there is an opposite, negative, relationship for those 
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who believe that competition is good, and this is again statistically significant across all three 
measures (adj.res.< -2.0). Moreover, the relationships across all three political consumerist 
activities for Greece are all highly significant at p<.01, providing further confidence for the 
interpretation of these findings.  
 
Although previous research on the subject (Lekakis and Forno, 2017) has empirically 
argued that political consumerist instances in the European south stem from an ideological 
critique of capitalism and market competition, the statistical findings above are rather counter-
intuitive. Moreover, they are confirmed statistically for the first time, providing thus an original 
contribution to knowledge on the subject. 
 
6.9 Support for free market (Schwartz index). 
Although the formulation of the previous question is part of the WVS questionnaire42 on political 
values and has been previously used elsewhere in political research (Oorschot et al., 2008; Poloni-
Staudinger and Wolf, 2019), the surprising nature of the findings above called for further scrutiny. 
For this reason, I decided to introduce late an additional question in my survey design, which 
intended to capture young people’s neoliberal governmentality, so as to further assess whether 
there was indeed a relationship between neoliberal governmentality and political consumerism 
in Greece, as the findings of the analysis of the previous question indicated. The ‘free market 
 
42 Available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
Page | 239  
 
index’, was first used and validated by Schwartz et al. (2010), based on the observations of 
Feldman (1988). The late introduction of this 4-item index in my survey explains the lower 
population number in Table 6.9.0. 
This index therefore consists of four separate questions, which are then combined into 
one single index. The respondents were asked how much they agree with the following 
statements: a) it would be a good idea to privatise all of the public enterprises, b) the less the 
government gets involved with business and the economy, the better-off this country will be, c) 
there should be more incentives for individual initiative even if this reduces equality in the 
distribution of wealth, and d) all high school and university education should be made private 
rather than controlled and supported by the government. This last question is particularly 
pertinent to the livelihoods of young people. It is not surprising therefore that the formulation of 
this set of questions attracted much lower support for free enterprise, compared to the one on 
market competition.  
  
The analysis of the free enterprise index holds overall significance only for buycotting in 
Greece and buy/boycotting in both cohorts at p<.05. Nevertheless, those who completely 
disagree with free enterprise in both countries, are consistently more likely to consume politically 
in any of its forms (adj.res.> +2.0), whereas those who completely agree with it are significantly 
less prone to political consumerism only in Greece (adj.res.>+2.0 and adj.res.>+1.7 for buycotting 
and boycotting respectively), confirming the findings of the previous question. 
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We seem to be confronted therefore with what may be termed the ‘Paradox of Political 
Consumerism’. In other words the findings from the analysis of the last two variables demonstrate 
that those young people with the greatest dissatisfaction from market economy and market 
competition will choose an inherently market-oriented means of political participation to express 
their ethical, environmental and political contestations. This surprising finding deserves further 
scrutiny and with thus be discussed in more detail in a separate section at the conclusions of this 
thesis (see Chapter 12, section 3) .  
 
3. Motivations of political consumerism 
Previous research (Gotlieb and Wells, 2012; Neilson, 2010; Zorell, 2019e) indicates that there is a 
considerable variation with regards to the motivations of political consumers. With this in mind, 
Chapter 9 discussed the underlying motivations for engaging in political consumerism among the 
participants of the focus groups. Analysing the focus groups qualitatively identified a set of six 
broad motivations, which were then ranked according to their intended outreach, ranging from 
individualistic to more collective and eventually global outreach. This section will analyse these 
motivations quantitatively, with the intention of identifying differences and similarities in the UK 
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and Greece with respect to buycotters, boycotters and those who engage in either or both of 
these activities.  
The following themes will thus be examined: engaging in political consumerism to a) 
benefit my personal health, b) support local producers and improve social ties within my 
community, c) support national economy, d) support ethical production processes overseas, e) 
protect animals and support animal rights, and lastly f)  protect the planet and encourage 
environmentally responsible lifestyles. Figure 7 presents the distribution of the responses of 
those who said they were willing to pay more for each of these reasons. 
 
 
7.1 Personal health 
As it may be seen in Table 7.1.0, both cohorts were willing to pay more for a product or service if 
they believed this would benefit their personal health. The percentages are similar across both 
countries, with 86.1% in Greece and 87.3% in the UK. 
Figure 7: Motivations by country, % of those who said they are willing to pay more for each. 
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Nevertheless, the crosstabulations on Table 7.1.1 show that this particular motivation has 
a statistical significance only with the buycotters in Greece (p<.05), whereas for the buycotters in 
the UK there is a significant relationship within the categories (adj.res.>± 2.0), showing that 
benefitting one’s health is a statistically significant motivation, but only among buycotters. Once 
again, the analysis of this variable discloses the inefficiency of the cumulative index to discern the 
individual underlying motivations behind the two separate behavioural aspects of political 
consumerism.  
 
 
7.2 Local producers and social ties  
In turn, supporting local producers and fostering social ties in their communities, seems to be 
much more associated with all three political consumerist measures in both countries.  
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Once again, this relationship is stronger for buycotters (p.<.001), than for boycotters in 
both countries.  The nature of buycotting as a positive form which rewards desirable production 
practices is particularly compatible with this motivation, as it is expected that buycotters would 
be more likely to buycott local produce in order to support their local community in practice. 
However, although boycotters are generally punishing companies or producers for undesirable 
business practices, they are significantly more likely to also support local producers, showing the 
interconnectedness of the two forms of behaviour (Table 7.2.1).  
 
The analysis of this variable has been one of the most strongly associated with political 
consumerism in both Greece and the UK so far and demonstrates the strong community 
orientation of political consumerism as a form of political participation. 
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7.3 National economy  
The focus groups indicated that supporting national economy was associated particularly with 
buycotting, especially among the participants in Greece. Indeed, the ‘Buy Greek’ campaign was 
considered at the time the survey was administered as a popular way of supporting the national 
economy. This is reflected in the distribution of the responses in Table 7.3.0, where young people 
in Greece were more willing to pay a higher price so as to support their national economy by 5.5 
percentage points, compared to the UK.  
 
This is also reflected in Table 7.3.1, especially among the buycotters in Greece (p<.001) 
who were significantly more likely to be willing to pay more to support their national economy, 
although there is no overall significant relationship for buycotters in the UK, and among 
boycotters in either country. It is surprising however, that when it comes to the cumulative 
measure for the UK there is a significant positive relationship for the 71.4% of buy/boycotters 
who considered supporting national economy as a motivation behind their consumer decisions. 
This however, does not seem to be reflected neither in their buycotting, nor in their boycotting 
behaviour. Once again this observation supports the standpoint that  the cumulative index is not 
always a reliable measure for political consumerism. 
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7.4 Fairtrade and ethical production overseas 
Supporting fair-trade and ethical production overseas has been a much more popular motivation 
amongst the young people in the UK, than in Greece, by a difference of 11.4 percentage points. 
 
Nevertheless, it seems that in addition to supporting local producers and fostering social 
ties, the ethical element of political consumerism as captured by this variable is one of the most 
important for young political consumers in both countries, at p<.001 for all three measures. 
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7.5 Animal rights  
The same holds for the next variable ‘Protect animals and support animal rights’. Table 7.5.0 
reports that 71.9% in Greece and 77.8% in the UK are willing to pay more to support animal rights. 
 
Although support for animal rights is more widespread in the UK (Table 7.5.0), young 
political consumers in both countries are significantly more likely to support animal rights, with 
the intention of eventually protecting animals. This suggests that the ethical dimension captured 
from the previous variable does not remain limited to an anthropocentric understanding of 
morality (Capra, 2007), but instead extends towards deep-rooted ecological considerations 
(Naess, 1995).  
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7.6 Environmentally responsible lifestyles 
This insight gain further support from the analysis of the variable ‘Promoting environmentally 
responsible lifestyles’. Table 7.6.0 shows again that environmental concerns  are extended 
beyond protecting animals and animal rights to the environment as a whole, especially among 
young people in the UK.  
 
Nevertheless, among political consumers in both countries promoting environmentally 
responsible lifestyles is significantly related to political consumerism across all three measures. 
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To conclude, the analysis in this section demonstrates that political consumerism is mostly 
related to community-oriented motivations. The understanding of young political consumers 
however seems to be that this community does not remain limited to their immediate 
neighbourhood, but extends to include the animal world and, even further, the environment as a 
whole. Consequently, their ethical considerations also extend across these dimensions. Instead, 
individualistic concerns in relation to one’s personal health seem to be supported only by 
buycotters in Greece. Likewise, their ethical obligations towards national or state actors are 
statistically significant only amongst buycotters in Greece. The analysis of the motivations of 
young political consumers in this section seems to be consistent with the findings from section 5 
in the previous chapter, which has similarly indicated no association of political consumerism with 
other formal (national or state-oriented) forms of political participation. Instead, it has revealed 
a positive relationship with community-oriented forms of participation such as volunteering or 
working with others for a common goal, extending even further towards online – and thus global 
– imagined communities. 
This perceived conceptual expansion of the ontological identification of young political 
consumers, begs the question of whether an expanded personal outlook may be associated with 
political consumerism. The following section will therefore explore this dimension. 
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4. Personal orientation 
The findings from the previous section indicate that there is a significant motivational expansion 
of the political consumers in both countries. Although buycotters in Greece may indeed act with 
individualistic motivations related to their personal health, a connection to a broader community 
(whether physical or imagined) of likeminded political consumers with whom they share common 
concerns and goals seems to be enabling young people to get further mobilised in political affairs. 
Indeed, Micheletti (2003, p. 56) refers to political consumerism as an individualised form of 
collective action, that is as both a bridging and a bonding political activity which “creates 
cooperative settings, behaviours, and trust” among people who share similar values. Gotlieb and 
Wells (2012) argue that identification with other political consumers can help to foster a 
cooperative spirit which in turn helps to mobilise collective action around consumer issues even 
further. Moreover, Atkinson (2012) posits that political consumerism provides opportunities for 
individuals to forge durable ties in their local communities. This in turn implies the development 
of social capital which has been theorised to be essential for engagement in cooperative forms of 
political activity (Putnam, 1995). Although, this study has found a spurious association of 
generalised trust and a negative association of particularised trust in the UK (Tables 4.1 and 4.5) 
with respect to political consumerism, this section will seek to examine the direct relationship of 
personality orientation to political consumerism.  
Following Gotlieb and Wells (2012) the specific contribution of this section therefore is to 
note whether a distinction between an individualistic, as opposed to a collectivist, personality 
outlook is associated with political consumerism. In view of the expanded motivational 
orientation of political consumers discussed in the section above, it is expected that engaging in 
political consumerism will be more likely for those respondents who identify with a more 
expanded personality outlook. 
 
8.1 Individual outlook 
Starting by examining the individual outlook of young people, that is the belief that they primarily 
identify with one’s self, Table 8.1.0 shows that young people in the UK generally hold a more 
individualistic outlook (90.7%), compared to  Greece (77.6%).  
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Among political consumers in the two countries however, Table 8.1.1 shows that there 
seems to be no statistical association between individualistic outlook and the likelihood to engage 
in political consumerism (p>.05), in any of the three measures.  
 
 
8.2 Local community outlook 
In turn, young people in Greece have reported a higher affiliation with their local community 
(Table 8.2.0). More than three-quarters (76.4%) of the respondents from Greece held a local 
community outlook, compared to 66.7% in the UK. As it was expected, these figures are 
comparable to the local community motivations (‘Support local producers and enhance social 
ties’) in Table 7.2.1. 
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Nevertheless, when it comes to political consumers, it seems that it is mostly buycotters 
who have reported a greater local-community outlook (p<.05).  Once again, the nature of positive 
consumerism is particularly compatible with this community-oriented personal outlook. It is thus 
expected that buycotters, having a higher community-oriented personal outlook would be more 
likely to purchase local products in order to foster social ties among members of their community. 
 
 
8.3 National outlook 
In turn, Table 8.3.0 displays that the national outlook of the young respondents was reportedly 
higher in the UK (69.5%), than in Greece (63.3%). However, in Table 8.3.1 we may see that it was 
those young people who were more affiliated with their nation in the UK, that showed a lower 
likelihood to engage in political consumerism in the cumulative measure (p<.05).  
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In other words, there is a statistically significant negative relationship (adj.res.>+2.0) 
between political consumerism in the UK and the national outlook of the respondents. This 
observation further supports the insights from the previous sections that political consumers are 
either not related at all, or negatively associated with the concept of the state or the nation and 
consequently to formal, state-oriented forms of political participation. 
 
 
 
8.4 European outlook 
Expanding the conceptualisation of young people’s personal outlook even further, when it comes 
to identification beyond one’s country, but with Europe as a whole, the respondents in Greece 
reported higher levels (72.8%) than those in the UK (65.4%). 
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However, despite the higher overall figures of European outlook in Greece, Table 8.4.1 
indicates that political consumerism is statistically more likely among young people with a 
European outlook in the UK (73.3%, adj.res.= +1.7). This is primarily due to the young buycotters 
in the country, who are likely to engage in this form of activity by 66.7% (adj.res.> +1.7) if they 
have a European outlook. 
 
 
It should be noted however, that this variable should only be interpreted as the mirror 
image of the analysis on the national outlook in the previous section, as the pro-European 
narrative in the UK at the time the research took place was inexorably associated with a more 
liberal, left-wing, or even cosmopolitan agenda (Sloam and Henn, 2018).  
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8.5 Cosmopolitan outlook 
Respondents were subsequently asked whether they agreed with the statement that they 
predominately perceived themselves as ‘citizens of the world’. It is therefore probably as a result 
of the pre-electoral polarisation in the country that UK cosmopolitan orientation was reported 
almost on a par with Greece (Table 8.5.0), although Greece is arguably historically much less 
exposed to the relatively high cultural diversity that characterises the UK (Warde et al., 2008).  
 
The crosstabulation of cosmopolitan outlook to political consumerism however, reveals a 
positive association, especially among buycotters in the both countries (p.<.05). This relationship 
spills over to the cumulative measure only for the UK. Cosmopolitanism therefore seems to be 
linked primarily to positive political consumerism, in both Greece and the UK, but also for 
boycotters in Greece (adj.res.>2.0). 
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The sections above have demonstrated that, consistent with the latest literature, political 
consumerism is increasingly related to an expanded ontological conceptualisation of the self. 
Contrary to older research (Stolle and Micheletti, 2006) which has portrayed political 
consumerism as a (predominately) individualistic form of political participation, this study 
confirms later conceptualisations (Copeland, 2014b; Gotlieb and Wells, 2012) which describe 
political consumerism as a form of individualised-collective action, instead. In particular, whereas 
individual outlook has been found to bear no association with political consumerism in any of its 
forms, neither in Greece, nor in the UK, the analysis reveals that buycotting is particularly 
associated with a local-community-oriented and a cosmopolitan-oriented outlook in both 
countries. It would be more accurate therefore to start describing political consumerism as a 
community and cosmopolitan-oriented form of political participation, instead. 
Moreover, the two variables that are referring to formal institutional formations, whether 
in relation to the national or the European levels, convey only weak statistical associations, and 
only for the UK. However, although national outlook in the UK is negatively related to the 
cumulative measure of political consumerism, European outlook demonstrates a positive 
association, instead. We should not however forget at this point that the collection of the survey 
responses in the UK took place amongst the Brexit negotiations, where the discourse between 
the national and European orientation of the British political scene was at its height. This 
observation therefore may be rather reflecting a conservative versus liberal political orientation 
(Duch and Taylor, 1993; Graaf and Evans, 1996), which has been associated by-and-large with the 
national versus pro-European pre-electoral political cleavage in the country (Zappettini, 2019; 
Zmigrod et al., 2018). Section 4.4 has, after all, already demonstrated that political consumerism 
is strongly associated with a left-wing (and thus a relatively more liberal) political agenda. 
Furthermore, these observations are consistent with the conclusions in section 5 in 
Chapter 10, with regards to the probability of young political consumers participating in other 
forms of political action. Those findings have similarly shown that political consumerism is not 
associated with formal, institutional forms of political participation, such as voting and contacting 
a politician. Instead, the young political consumers were particularly active in informal forms of 
political participation operating within and aiming towards cooperation for change in their local 
community (such as intention to work with others and intention to volunteer), and to online forms 
of political participation, which can be argued that they are linked to a global imagined, and thus 
cosmopolitan,  orientation.  
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5. Postmaterialism 
Although the connection of postmaterialist values to political consumerism is rather intuitive, and 
the academic consensus on the theoretical level is in favour of the existence of such a relationship 
(Copeland, 2014b), empirical evidence connecting political consumerism to postmaterialism to 
this day remains inconclusive, if not contradictory. In their seminal study, on a sample of 
undergraduate students from Canada, Belgium, and Sweden, Stolle et al. (2006) report a strong 
connection between postmaterialism and political consumerism. In a similar vein, Baek (2010) 
posits that political consumers place more emphasis on pollution and environmental concerns 
(demonstrating postmaterialist values) than non-political consumers. However, he also reports 
no significant differences with respect to other postmaterialist concerns such as racial equality, 
or abortion rights. In contrast, Andersen and Tobiasen (2004) using a representative sample of 
Danish citizens, conclude that postmaterialist values do not increase the likelihood of engaging in 
political consumerism.  
Another common criticism of the postmaterialist thesis with regards to its application to 
political consumerism, is the one that refers to a northern bias in both its theoretical and empirical 
focus. Micheletti herself (2017, p. 32) in an article titled ‘Reflections on “Political virtue and 
shopping”’ which was published almost 15 years earlier, admits that “This is a very important 
criticism that I agree with fully”. With a few recent exceptions that focus on Latin America 
(Echegaray, 2015) and on eastern and central Europe (Pellandini-Simányi and Gulyás, 2018), the 
overwhelming bulk of relevant literature focuses on established democracies in the northern 
hemisphere. The cases of Scandinavian countries (Sønderskov and Daugbjerg, 2011; Tobiasen, 
2004), Canada (Trillo et al., 2012) and the United States (Baek, 2010; Katz, 2011) have been 
particularly overemphasised. This section therefore will examine the relationship of 
postmaterialist values to political consumerism in the UK and Greece aiming to shed light on the 
differences and similarities of the phenomenon between the European north and the European 
south. 
Moreover, unlike the majority of studies on the relation of postmaterialism and political 
consumerism (Copeland, 2014b; Micheletti, 2003) which, for convenience, use Inglehart’s (1971) 
original 4-item index, this study used instead the expanded 12-item index developed later for the 
WVS in response to criticisms (Abramson, 2011; Davis and Davenport, 1999) about the validity of 
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the original index43. The respondents who scored between 1-3 were classified as ‘Pure 
materialists’ while those who scored between 10-12 were classified as ‘Pure postmaterialists’ 
instead. Likewise, those who scored between 4-6 were classified as ‘Mixed postmaterialists’ and 
between 7-9 as ‘Mixed postmaterialists’.  
Table 9.1.0 displays the distribution of the scores in this 12-item postmaterialism index, 
among the respondents from Greece and the UK. The corresponding graph demonstrates a 
surprisingly higher postmaterialist value orientation in Greece as opposed to the UK. This is 
counterintuitive since the Greek cohort was presumed to be less affluent and more severely hit 
by the current global recession and austerity policies. 
 
Further statistical tests were therefore performed to confirm whether this perceived 
difference in postmaterialist values was statistically significant. A Levene’s test revealed a 
significant difference in the variances of the respondents from Greece and the UK, F(1,632)= 4.42, 
p=.036. As such, the difference in the means between the two groups using a Welch’s t-test was 
also tested. This revealed that there was a statistically significant difference in the Postmaterialim 
scores between Greece (MGR=2.85Pmat, SDGR=0.99) and the UK (MUK=2.44Pmat, SDUK=1.05), 
t(631.6)=5.08, p=.00) (see Figure 8). 
 
43 The actual phrasing of the 12-items postmaterialism index can be found in pp.342-343 of the 
survey questionnaire in Appendix II. 
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The findings contradict Inglehart’s scarcity hypothesis which assumes that people 
socialised in conditions of relative affluence are more likely to demonstrate postmaterialist value 
orientations. Although one should not underestimate the recent conditions of (relative) economic 
contraction in the UK as a result of the financial crisis and their effect on the livelihoods of young 
people in the country, austerity and economic fragility remains more evident in Greece. For 
instance, the World Bank44 reports the UK in 5th place in the ranking of GDP out of 196 countries 
in 2019, whereas Greece was reported at the same time in 52nd place. Moreover, examining 
whether this perceived statistically significant difference in the postmaterialism index could be 
related to an over-representation of higher-income respondents from Greece, the data in Table 
3.8.0 display almost overlapping trendlines for the two countries in terms of subjective relative 
income. 
 
44 www.data.worldbank.org  
Figure 8: Bar graph (with ±1 standard deviation error bars showing mean score of the 
Postmaterialism index, for Greece and the UK. 
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Nevertheless, in terms of the connection between postmaterialist values and engagement 
in political consumerism among the buycotters and boycotters in the two countries, there was 
found to be a robust positive relationship, consistent across all three measures (p<.001), both in 
Greece and the UK.  
 
However, the observation of  the difference on the postmaterialist scores of the young 
people in the two countries raises important concerns about the interpretative power of the 
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postmaterialist index, which deserve thorough attention and will thus be  discussed in a separate 
section in the concluding chapter. 
 
6. Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the crosstabulations of a series of pull-factors which were 
expected to be attracting young people towards engaging politically within the neoliberal 
marketplace. However, the analysis of the two variables intended to capture the respondents’ 
support for market competition or the support for free enterprise have both surprisingly been 
found to be negatively associated with political consumerism, especially in the case of Greece. In 
other words the respondents with the greatest dissatisfaction with market competition and the 
neoliberal principles of free-enterprise will choose an inherently market-oriented means of 
political participation to express their ethical, environmental and political contestations.  We are 
therefore confronted with what may be termed the ‘Paradox of Political Consumerism’. This 
surprising finding deserves further scrutiny and will therefore be discussed in detail in the 
following chapter. 
Moreover, contrary to the expectations derived from the focus groups and discussed in 
Chapter 9, this chapter has demonstrated that a) satisfaction with the range of products, b) 
satisfaction with the range of prices available in the market, and c) satisfaction with market-
related information are not statistically associated with political consumerism in either country. 
Satisfaction with d) the variety of retailers is only associated with boycotters in Greece and 
buy/boycotters in the UK, displaying however a statistical relationship primarily among those who 
reported not being satisfied with the existing availability of retailers. Instead, the analysis of the 
two Perceived Consumer Effectiveness variables, whether e) with regards to the world as a whole, 
or f) with regards to the respondents’ local community, has revealed that they are both - as 
expected - key factors behind young people’s decision to engage in political consumerism, and 
more so with regards to buycotting. 
This observed relationship of buycotting to both the local and the global consumer 
effectiveness, has driven me to further explore the association of political consumerism with 
regards to the political consumerist motivations derived from the analysis of the focus groups. 
The findings of this section confirmed those in the previous one, with young people’s engagement 
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with political consumerism being significantly more likely as the respondent’s motivations shift 
from individual to collective and eventually towards global motivations.  
In order to examine this relationship even further, the next section proceeded to examine 
directly the association of political consumerism with the respondents’ personality outlook; that 
is their reported identification with an ever-expanding imagined community. The findings from 
this section provide even further evidence for a strong relationship between political 
consumerism and both a) a local-community-orientation and b) a cosmopolitan-orientation. A 
noteworthy exception has been c) the discerned negative association of a national personal 
outlook and political consumerism in the UK. These observations therefore render  political 
consumerism no longer as an individualised-collective form of political participation as previous 
literature was suggesting (Micheletti, 2003), but rather as a collective-cosmopolitan form of 
political participation instead, which however also reflects d) the postmaterialist value 
orientations of the young political consumers in both countries. 
Chapter 12, will bring the discussion of these insights together by conclusively identifying 
the driving factors behind young people’s political consumerist decisions in the two countries. 
The chapter will conclude by discussing and problematising the main findings.  
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Chapter 12: Conclusion: Drivers of Political Consumerism in the UK as 
opposed to Greece 
 
1. Introduction  
Chapters 10 and 11 have discussed buycotting and boycotting independently from each 
other, and have made the case that the use of the general term ‘political consumerism’ as a 
unified conceptualisation of the phenomenon, used interchangeably to signify either engagement 
in buycotts only, in boycotts only or engagement in either/or both, fails to capture the differing 
underlying motivations, values and attitudes behind these two separate behavioural expressions. 
Chapter 7 has previously discussed how examining only the behavioural components of political 
consumerism (whether individually or in their sum), runs the risk of ignoring the breadth (the 
motivation behind the action) and depth (the frequency, or habitual consistency) of the 
phenomenon. This concluding chapter therefore, will conclude the analysis by testing the Political 
Consumerism Index (PCI) developed in Chapter 7 which, on the one hand captures both the 
behavioural aspects of political consumerism (BUY+BOY), while it simultaneously captures the 
responsibility (RES) and frequency (FRE) of the said behaviour in a single index, according to the 
following formula: 
PCI = (BUY+BOY) * (RES+FRE) 
The PCI will therefore be used in this chapter as the dependent variable under 
examination, so as to provide a definitive answer to the questions a) who are the young political 
consumers in the UK and Greece, and b) what are their underlying motivations, values and 
attitudes with regards to politics and the market. Finally, it will c) trace the similarities and 
delineate the differences between the two counties. The chapter will conclude d) by outlining, 
discussing and problematising the main findings of the thesis and providing directions for future 
research. 
 
2. Drivers of political consumption in the UK and Greece 
Having developed and subsequently validated the PCI as a continuous scale (ranging from 0 to 16) 
provides the benefit of utilising it as the dependent variable in a stepwise linear regression 
analysis to reveal the relative weight of each of the variables analysed in the previous two 
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chapters. The primary advantage of stepwise regression analysis is its computational efficiency. 
In other words it provides a simple but efficient method of identifying the relative weight of a 
multitude of factors with regards to the dependent variable (Field, 2017), which in the case of this 
study is young people’s engagement with political consumerism in Greece and in the UK. 
Although, its performance is arguably not as good as some alternative methods (Tibshirani, 1996), 
its ability to effectively manage large amounts of potential predictor variables, and automatically 
fine-tune the model so as to choose the best predictors from the available options, makes it ideal 
for the analysis in the present section. This means that  if two or more predictors in the model 
are highly inter-correlated, only one will make it into the model. Consequently, this method 
allows for narrowing down the perceived relationships discussed in the previous two chapters 
into a handful of predictors for each country, making it thus possible to draw a conclusive profile 
of young political consumers in each country under examination. 
Table 10.0.0 therefore presents the results from the comparative Stepwise Linear 
Regression analysis. This final model demonstrates an adjusted R-squared (Adj.R2) of 0.415 for 
Greece and 0.413 for the UK, indicating that the model accurately predicts 41.5% and 43.2% of 
the variation of political consumerism in Greece and the UK respectively. The R-squared value 
ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating perfect predictive accuracy. Since the R-squared value is 
adopted in various research disciplines, there is no standard guideline to determine the  level of 
predictive acceptance. Henseler  (2009) proposed a rule of thumb for acceptable Adj.R2 with 0.75, 
0.50, and 0.25 being described as substantial, moderate and weak respectively. However, it is 
worth remembering that an Adj.R2  of 0.60 or higher is generally required for studies in the natural 
sciences since the behaviour of particles and molecules are generally easier to accurately predict.   
Instead, an Adj.R2  as low as 0.10 is generally accepted for studies in the field of arts, humanities 
and social sciences because human behaviour is markedly more unpredictable. As a consequence, 
a model that accurately predicts more than 40% of the variation of human behaviour as this model 
does, can be safely assumed that it conveys – at least - a moderate predictive power. 
The analysis of all of the factors discussed in the previous chapters, excluding however, 
for covariances between them (Stepwise Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter ≤ 0.050, Probability-
of-F-to-remove ≥ 0.100) result in a set of eleven predictors of political consumerism among young 
people aged 18 to 29 years in both countries. These factors will be each presented in the sections 
that follow, while their effects are summarised in Figure 9. The differing size of the bars indicate 
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therefore the relative weight (or the relative strength of the effect) of each independent variable 
on the PCI.  
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 Figure 9: Comparative factors influencing political consumption in Greece and the UK. 
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a.  Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) to their local community: 
Political consumerism in both Greece and the UK is being driven by the PCE of the respondents 
with regards to their local community, and more so for Greece (b=0.261, p<0.001) than for 
the UK (b=0.197, p<0.001). Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) have previously suggested that PCE 
is a critical factor in explaining environmentally-friendly consumer behaviour. However, this 
section reveals that political consumerism is predominately associated with the PCE in 
relation to one’s local community. Although Tables 6.1.1 and 6.2.1 have previously 
demonstrated that both PCE for the world as a whole and PCE for their local community were 
significantly associated with the likelihood of engaging in political consumerism, the 
regression analysis in this section has unsurprisingly detected some covariance between the 
two variables. As a result, ‘PCE – World’ has been dropped from the final model, in favour of 
‘PCE – Local’ when accounting also for the attitudinal (RES) and frequency (FRE) components 
of political consumerism, as captured by the PCI. However, although the PCI attributes 
additional weight when the participants have reportedly engaged in both buycotting and 
boycotting, it fails to inform us which of the two is primarily associated with the independent 
variable. Returning to Table 6.2.1 however, we may see that PCE-Local is primarily associated 
with buycotting in both countries, but also boycotting in the case of Greece.  
 
b.  Intention to demonstrate:  
Another common determining factor of political consumerism in both countries is the 
intention to demonstrate. Vrablinkova and Linek (2013) have previously suggested that 
although protestors are highly interested in politics, they often choose to bypass voting at 
elections, as they refuse to provide legitimacy to representative democracy. It seems 
therefore that young protesters in both countries are more likely to engage in political 
consumerism instead, as a means of expressing their political objectives. During the focus 
groups both the young political consumers from Greece and the UK were consistently in 
favour of organised protests. Although during the focus groups Participant F from Greece had 
said “People my age are tired of waiting results from the politicians (…). Tangible results do 
not come by ventilating our frustration in demonstrations anymore, and definitely not 
through the parliament”, it seems that participating in demonstrations is significantly more 
associated with political consumerism than voting is. Although Table 3.6.1 has previously 
indicated that support for organised protests is associated only with buycotters in the UK, 
Table 5.5.1 subsequently confirmed that the actual intention to take part in a demonstration 
is statistically significant for both countries. This is also confirmed from the analysis of the PCI, 
where ‘intention to take part in a demonstration’ is a common driver for political 
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consumerism in both countries, with weights 0.216 (p<0.01) for Greece and 0.155 (p<0.05) 
for the UK, respectively. 
 
c. Promoting environmentally responsible lifestyles: 
The political consumers from both Greece (b=0.219, p<0.01) and the UK (b=0.248, p<0.001)  
were also significantly more likely to be willing to pay more to promote environmentally 
responsible lifestyles. Table 7.6.1 has previously indicated that this variable has been one of 
the most consistently related to both buycotting and boycotting in both countries. When 
asked to write a letter to their ‘future self’ during the focus groups Participant L from the UK, 
capturing these environmental motivations, stated: 
“I am writing urging you to boycott the production of X product. It is detrimental to 
the environment, humanity and the planet earth as a whole and you therefore need 
to play your part in promoting environmentally responsible lifestyles. We all need to 
act now to encourage the new age of technology and that comes through boycotting 
products that are not only unnecessary but also wasteful and damaging the planet”  
 This variable therefore captures the expanded motivational outreach of the political 
consumers in both countries, as it was also shown in Tables 7.1.1 to 7.6.1.  
 
d. Online: Signing a petition: 
Finally, the last common driving factor behind young people’s engagement in political 
consumerism tested in the stepwise linear regression model (Table 10.0.0) is signing a 
petition online, and more so in Greece (b=0.224, p<0.01) than in the UK (b=0.174, p<0.01). 
From Table 5.6.1 we may see that ‘signing a petition’ online did not demonstrate a statistically 
significant relationship among buycotters in the UK, when only the behavioural (BUY and BOY) 
aspects of political consumerism were being considered. However, it seems that accounting 
also for the responsibility (RES) and the habitual engagement (FRE) of the political 
consumerist behaviours (BUY+BOY) via the PCI, renders the variable ‘signing a petition’ as a 
statistically significant predictor of the likelihood of young people to consume politically. 
Previous research has shown that online participation is being perceived as less costly 
and thus more accessible especially during times of economic hardship, which is when 
Pacheco and Plutzer (2008) anticipate decreasing levels of participation. Calenda and Meijer 
(2009) and later Espinar-Ruiz and Gonzalez-Rio (2015) have previously demonstrated that 
there is a positive relationship between time spent online and several forms of political 
participation. Theocharis (2011), focusing explicitly on Greece, contradicts these findings 
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(Weiss, 2020). Instead, he reports that although spending time online is more likely to 
cultivate a postmaterialist value orientation, this postmaterialist mindset is associated with a 
general disinterest in political participation. The research for this doctoral thesis indicates that 
this disinterest may indeed hold for its institutional variants, but not for political 
consumerism. Instead, young political consumers in both Greece and the UK are embracing 
non-institutionalised, online variants of political participation, like signing an online petition, 
presumably so as to promote the environmentally responsible lifestyles captured in the 
previous variable. 
 Figure 10 therefore graphically illustrates that among the four common factors 
discussed so far in this chapter, a) PCE-Local, b) Intention to demonstrate and c) Intention to 
sign a petition demonstrate a higher weight on the PCI in Greece than in the UK, whereas 
young people in the UK are d) willing to pay more to promote environmentally responsible 
lifestyles, than in Greece.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e. Gender: 
In turn, gender is a statistically significant predictor of political consumerism only in the UK, 
where political consumers are statistically more likely to be women (b=0.263, p<.001). 
Scholars have previously proposed as an explanation that women are more prone to pursue 
their political participation in non-hierarchical and decentralised ways and in arenas that 
relate to their everyday lives (Ackelsberg, 2003). Stolle and Hooghe (2004) suggest that just 
like other lifestyle forms of political engagement, political consumerism appeals more to 
Figure 10: Common derivers between the UK and Greece 
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women as it circumvents the restrictions of membership and personal interaction. Moreover, 
traditional and essentially patriarchal gender roles which perceive women as the primary 
household caretakers, have been employed as a possible explanation. For instance, the term 
‘momism’ has been used in older studies (Eliasoph, 1998) referring to values of nurturance 
and compassion as drivers of political participation. It has thus been claimed that traditional 
gender roles will encourage women to be more concerned about the quality of products 
purchased with regards to the effects of their consumption to their family, especially when it 
comes to food products and home appliances. More recent research (Gotlieb and Wells, 
2012) reports a similar factor weight to this study among all the ages examined. However, 
Stolle et al. (2010) report that although there is still a small gender difference in the overall 
descriptive statistics, gender becomes a non-significant indicator of political consumerism in 
multivariate analysis for the 18-29 age group.  
Nevertheless, this study concludes that political consumerism can indeed be 
perceived as “an engendered form of political participation” for the 18-29 years age cohort, 
when attitude and frequency are being taken into consideration, but only for the UK. 
However, gender is not a statistically significant predictor of political consumerism, as 
measured by the PCI, in Greece. This observation is consistent with the findings in Table 2.1.1 
where gender demonstrated a lower statistically significant relationship for buycotters in 
Greece (p<.01) and a non-significant one for boycotters (p>.05). 
 
f. Age: 
This section demonstrates the concrete advantage of the PCI, as opposed to using only the 
behavioural factors of political consumerism. Table 2.2.1 has previously portrayed political 
consumerism as statistically non-associated with relative age within the 18-29 cohort, when 
accounting only for the behavioural elements of political consumerism (BUY and BOY). 
However, measuring political consumerism with the PCI, that is accounting for the 
responsibility (RES) and frequency (FRE) of the said behaviour (BUY+BOY), age becomes a 
statistically significant predictor (b=0.205, p<.001) for the UK.  
This finding indicates that the older UK participants within the 18-29 age group are 
more likely to engage in political consumerism than those at the younger end of this age 
group. This observation may be interpreted in terms  of Milbrath’s (1977) life-cycle effect, 
according to which the younger respondents may still be lacking those civic skills that foster 
their civic engagement, and as such it parallels a similarly observed life-cycle effect in voting 
(Wass, 2008). With respect to political consumerism however, it may also mean that younger 
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people are still lacking the income (and thus the consumer power) to engage politically 
through their purchasing decisions. This latter interpretation gains support from the 
crosstabulations in Table 2.8.1: ‘Relative subjective income’, and Table 2.10.1: ‘Employment 
status’. The first one shows that, those young people in the medium-low category of 
subjective relative income were significantly less likely to boycott in the UK, whereas the latter 
has showed that those in paid work in the UK were significantly more likely to buycott 
(adj.res.=1.7), to boycott (adj.res.=2.3), or to engage in either of the two (adj.res.=2.3). 
Instead, those unemployed in the UK were found to be statistically less likely to engage in 
either of these actions (adj.res.<-2.0). 
 Nevertheless, the data indicate that age is indeed a predictor of political consumerism 
in the UK, when one accounts not only for its behavioural components, but takes also into 
consideration the breadth and depth of the phenomenon. 
 
g. Local-community personality outlook: 
Although Graziano and Forno (2012) have previously suggested that political consumerism in 
southern Europe is more rooted in local communities, this is not confirmed by this study. 
Table 7.2.1: ‘Support local producers and promote social ties in my community’, has 
previously displayed a statistically significant relationship of both buycotting and boycotting 
in both the UK and Greece. Likewise, the analysis of this variable, i.e. ‘Local-community 
personality outlook’ has been shown in Table 8.2.1 to be statistically significant (p<0.05) only 
for buycotters in both the UK and Greece. However, when one accounts for the frequency 
and responsibility components of political consumerism as captured by the PCI, this factor 
has been found to be statistically associated only for the UK (b=0.165, p<0.01).  
The inclusion of this variable in the final model for the UK, further supports the 
conceptualisation of political consumerism as a community-oriented form of political 
participation, as discussed in section 4 of Chapter 12. However, it simultaneously reflects the 
emphasis that the participants from the UK focus groups repeatedly placed on the need to 
preserve and support their local community. Participant K had said “I also fear about the lack 
of community in the area where I live. I believe in things being solved (…) with the active 
involvement of all the members of my community”.  
 
271 | P a g e  
 
h. Postmaterialist values: 
Table 9.1.1 indicated a strong statistical association between postmaterialism and political 
consumerism for both countries (consistently below p=.001). In this final stepwise linear 
regression model (Table 10.0.0), postmaterialism is shown to be a statistically significant 
predictor only for the UK (b=0.133, p<.01). However, the observation of the higher 
postmaterialist scores of the young people in Greece than in the relatively more affluent UK 
has already raised concerns with regards to the interpretative power of the postmaterialist 
index. Although postmaterialism has been surprisingly found to be significantly higher in 
Greece, it shows as a predictor only for the UK in the final model. This may indicate one of 
two things. It either implies that, although there are more young postmaterialists in Greece 
than in the UK, these same Greek postmaterialists are not significantly more likely that UK 
postmaterialists to engage in political consumerism when taking into account the depth (RES) 
and breadth (FRE) of the phenomenon. However, given the particularly robust statistical 
association of postmaterialism both to buycotting and boycotting in both countries in Table 
9.1.1, it is safer to argue that the findings from the regression analysis in Table 10.0.0 
indirectly reflect in their sum the postmaterialist value-orientations of young people in both 
countries. 
 According to the accepted definition of political consumerism as ‘consumption for 
political, ethical and environmental reasons’ (that is essentially postmaterialist reasons), 
postmaterialism is –almost by definition - expected to be associated with political 
consumption. Moreover, postmaterialism has been previously shown to be associated with 
an array of extra-institutional behaviours like lifestyle and DIO politics (Pickard, 2019c) and 
cosmopolitanism (Sloam and Henn, 2018), which both have been shown in the previous 
chapters to be strongly associated with political consumerism. 
However, the relationship between postmaterialism and political consumerism in 
particular may not be so straightforward. On the one hand, political consumption, as a 
lifestyle form of political action that expresses simultaneously the community and global-
oriented motivations of young people is expected to be highly associated with 
postmaterialism. After all, engaging in political consumerism for ethical, environmental and 
political considerations involves, almost by definition, the use of non-materialist criteria when 
making consumption decisions. Copeland (2014b, p. 216) discusses political consumerism as 
a postmaterialist phenomenon and argues that it “entails the use of non-materialist values 
when making material choices about consumption” as for example when buying groceries, 
dairy and meat products. She therefore explicitly concludes that “to purchase or avoid 
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products in light of ethical, environmental, social, or political considerations is45 to add 
postmaterialist considerations to materialist choices” (2014c, p. 264). The interrelationship of 
postmaterialist motivations for purely materialist choices therefore is likely to blur the picture 
of the association of postmaterialism as a separate variable, to political consumption. 
Indeed, Inglehart’s theory of value change is equally known for its interpretative 
power, as well as for the criticisms that have followed it (see Abramson, 2011). With regards 
to the reliability of Inglehart’s index, that is whether the index actually captures what it claims 
to be capturing, critics (Duch and Taylor, 1993; Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Graaf and Evans, 
1996) suggest that postmaterialism is merely a proxy for other values or beliefs. With regards 
to the effect of postmaterialism on political participation in general, the consensus is that 
both materialist and postmaterialist values influence participation, but in opposite directions. 
For example, McLeod (2001) finds that while postmaterialist values increase the likelihood of 
following the news and participating in politics, materialist values decrease the likelihood of 
participating in politics. However, other researchers (Brooks and Manza, 1994), insist that 
distinguishing between materialist and postmaterialist values is not intrinsically useful when 
examining political participation, since as they argue these are not mutually exclusive. In other 
words, both materialist and postmaterialist values could motivate people to participate in 
political affairs. For example, in one of Inglehart’s latest publications with Norris (Inglehart 
and Norris, 2016), they anticipate a retroactive reaction, especially from the older, less 
educated white men who, motivated by the erosion of their privileges brought by the 
economic decline, will reject postmaterialist values, reverting back to more traditional norms. 
This ‘cultural backlash’ may in turn reinvigorate their participation, especially in response to 
populist appeals. However, this is not the case for young people in Greece who, although 
socialised in time of economic hardships, demonstrate remarkably high postmaterialist 
orientations.  
The perceived association of postmaterialism with respect to political consumerism 
therefore, may mean either of the following. Firstly, materialist values, could also be 
associated with higher engagement in political consumerism. With regards to the relation of 
the materialist components of Inglehart’s 12-item index to political consumerism for example, 
the element ‘Maintaining order in the nation’ could be associated with nationally-oriented 
buycotting. Indeed, and although in Table 8.3.1 we saw that national outlook is negatively 
associated with the cumulative measure of political consumerism in the UK, Table 7.3.1 
demonstrated that support for the national economy is statistically associated with buycotts 
 
45 Italics added for emphasis. 
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in Greece, and this relationship is also discernible with respect to the PCI, as we may see in 
Table 10.0.0. Moreover the  materialist elements ‘Stable economy’, or ‘Fighting rising prices’ 
of Inglehart’s index could in a similar vein be interpreted as confounded with ‘satisfaction 
with range of prices’ in Table 6.4.1, where however, this study found no statistical relationship 
with political consumerism.  
Secondly, postmaterialist values may be similarly unrelated to political consumerism. 
For instance, the postmaterialist component ‘Giving people more say in important 
government decisions’ of Inglehart’s index is very similar to the variables examined in Table 
4.1.1: ‘By voting I can change my country’ and Table 4.3.1: ‘Influence on governance’. 
However, in both of these cases this study has found no statistical relationship with the 
propensity of young people to engage in political consumerism. 
The robust statistical association (p<.001) however of both buycotting and boycotting 
to postmaterialism for both countries in Table 9.1.1 points towards a third direction. Although 
postmaterialist values may indeed be associated with higher engagement in political 
consumerism, this may be due to other confounding factors. For example, scholars argue that 
Inglehart’s index is primarily a proxy for ideology; with conservatives favouring materialist 
values, and liberals endorsing postmaterialist values instead (Graaf and Evans, 1996). 
Likewise, Duch and Taylor (1993) maintain that it is instead progressive liberal ideology and 
support for democratic norms which increase unconventional political participation, not 
postmaterialist values per se. Indeed, this study has previously demonstrated in Table 3.4.1, 
that buycotting in Greece and boycotting in both countries are strongly associated with a 
leftist (and thus liberal) ideological orientation, and that buycotting in both countries and 
boycotting in Greece is associated with support  for democracy in principle (Table 4.7.1).  
Moreover, Inglehart’s postmaterialist component ‘Progress towards a less impersonal 
and more humane society’ could be confounded to the collective and communitarian 
orientations of political consumers, as captured in Table 7.2.1: ‘Support local producers and 
social ties in my community’, or Tables 5.3.1: ‘Intention to work with others for a common 
goal’ and Table 5.4.1: ‘Intention to volunteer’, which have all been found to have a positive 
relationship with political consumerism. Likewise, the postmaterialist element ‘Trying to 
make our cities and countryside more beautiful’ may similarly reflect the support of political 
consumers for environmental concerns, as captured for instance in Table 7.6.1: 
‘Environmentally responsible lifestyles’, which again has been found to have a positive 
relationship to political consumerism both through the Chi-square tests, as well as through 
the regression analysis on the PCI. Furthermore, it can be argued that Inglehart’s 
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postmaterialist component ‘Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money’ 
is likely to be associated with a generalised rejection of market competition (Table 6.8.1)  or 
free enterprise (Table 6.9.1 ). Indeed, rejection of the former has a clear positive relationship 
with political consumerism across all three measures, but only for Greece; whereas rejection 
of the latter has a positive relationship for the cumulative political consumerism measure for 
both countries.  
In general, the postmaterialist elements of Inglehart’s index mentioned above seem 
all to be part of a left-wing, libertarian, democratic and environmental political agenda, and 
therefore seem to coincide to a great extent to the findings from the regression analysis in 
Table 10.0.0, indicating that the effect of postmaterialist values may already be captured by 
the rest of the variables in the table.  
Finally, even if postmaterialism generally is indeed associated with higher levels of 
engagement in political consumerism, this is not necessarily the case with regards to other 
forms of participation (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002). It should be expected that since 
postmaterialists have arguably more psychic energy available for politics, postmaterialism 
should also increase the likelihood of engaging in all forms of political participation, including 
voting, or contacting a politician. However, in Tables 5.1.1 and 5.2.1 we saw that this is not 
the case, since the (postmaterialist) political consumers in both countries are significantly less 
likely to engage in elections or to contact politicians, in favour of informal and online forms 
of political participation instead. 
Although the Chi-square tests in Table 9.1.1 have demonstrated postmaterialism to 
be individually associated with both of the behavioural aspects of political consumerism (in 
both the UK and Greece), the points above raise noteworthy concerns about the reliability of 
the postmaterialist index. Nevertheless, when one accounts also for a) political 
consumerism’s responsibility and frequency components, along with b) the confounding 
effects of the other statistically significant variables for each country, postmaterialism is 
conclusively shown to be a determining factor only for the UK.   
In conclusion, this can mean one of two things: either a) postmaterialism is associated 
more with the responsibility and frequency components of the PCI scores in the UK, or b) 
there exists a confounding effect of the 12-item postmaterialism index with the other factors 
in the model. Since however, the PCI scores of the two countries have been shown to be non-
statistically different from each other (see Figure 4, in Chapter 7), it follows that the remaining 
drivers only for the Greek cohort in this final model should be implicitly capturing also the 
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respondents’ underlying postmaterialist values. It may therefore be argued that the observed 
link between the postmaterialism and political consumerism corroborates the link between 
the rest of the drivers of political consumerism revealed in Table 10.0.0, but it remains a 
statistically significant predictor only for the UK. However, the absence of postmaterialism as 
a predictor for Greece in the final model does not negate the robust statistical association of 
postmaterialism, at least to the behavioural elements of political consumerism, for both 
countries, as previously revealed in Table 9.1.1. 
The following sections will thus discuss those drivers which have been found 
statistically significant only for Greece, and which may be implicitly capturing the surprisingly 
high postmaterialist score of the ‘Grexit generation’. 
 
i. Support national economy: 
The first variable which has been found exclusively related to Greece in the final model, does 
not fit the rationale laid out in the previous section and points towards a third interpretation 
for the absence of postmaterialism in the final model for Greece. The motivational element 
‘support for national economy’ has been found to be statistically associated only for Greece 
(b=0.142, p<.05). The inclusion of the variable ‘support for national economy’ as a predictor 
for Greece in the final model in Table 10.0.0, may therefore partly explain the absence of 
postmaterialism in the same model for Greece, despite the robust statistical association of 
postmaterialism with the behavioural elements of political consumerism for both countries, 
in Table 9.1.1. The section on postmaterialism above has already discussed how this variable 
is very similar and may thus be associated with the materialist components ‘Maintaining order 
in the nation’; ‘Stable economy’; or ‘Fighting rising prices’ of Inglehart’s 12-item 
postmaterialism index, effectively excluding postmaterialism from the final regression model 
for Greece. 
Although the relevant literature perceives political consumerism as a predominately 
postmaterialist phenomenon (Copeland, 2014c), it often overlooks nationally motivated 
political consumerism, or ‘economic nationalism’ (Lekakis, 2015), which has been shown to 
be particularly prominent in southern Europe under austerity. For example, the previous 
section has already discussed how materialist values may indeed be associated with higher 
engagement in nationally-motivated buycotting. Moreover, during the focus groups 
Participant D from Greece has asserted, in a statement supported by most, that “the first 
thing that comes in mind when I hear about (…) buycotting would be buying nationally 
produced products to boost national economy”. Indeed, Table 7.3.1 has already 
276 | P a g e  
 
demonstrated that ‘support for national economy’ is statistically associated with buycotts in 
Greece (p<.001), although this does not also coincide with a similarly statistically significant 
association of ‘national outlook’, as it has been shown in Table 8.3.1.  
This positive relationship between ‘support for national economy’ is thus also 
discernible with respect to the PCI in Greece. Whereas political consumerism in the UK has 
been shown to have a predominately community-oriented character, in Greece there is an 
observed national-oriented character instead, although this is not reflected in a higher 
nationalistic orientation of young people in Greece.  
 
j. Party affiliation: 
The following two variables for Greece have been found to have a negative relationship with 
political consumerism (see Figure 9). Although Henn et al. (2017) have previously reported a 
negative association of party affiliation for young postmaterialists in the UK, Table 10.0.0 
indicates a negative relationship of party affiliation to political consumers only in Greece, 
where young people are being ‘pushed out’ of party politics (by a relative effect of -0.138, 
significant at p<.05).  
As in the discussion on the relative importance of ‘Age’ for the UK, this finding also 
demonstrates the comparative advantage of the use of the PCI, instead of the dichotomous 
behavioural measures of political consumerism. It is worth remembering that Table 3.5.1 had 
revealed no association between ‘party affiliation’ and political consumerism (p>.05), neither 
for buycotters, nor boycotters, in any of the two countries. Only within the categories was 
there discerned a statistically significant association for boycotters for those who were ‘not a 
supporter’, and a negative association among those who were unsure of their political 
affiliations (‘Don’t know’). However, dropping the ‘Don’t Know’ from the final model and 
taking into consideration both the responsibility and the habitual consistency behind the 
actions has rendered this variable a statistically significant predictor of political consumerism 
in Greece.  
Young boycotters in Greece therefore are being pushed out of party politics, since they 
are statistically less likely to be a supporter of any particular party, confirming thus the 
lifestyle character of this form of political participation in the country.  
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k. Support for market competition  
The financial crisis has allowed for important insights into the relation of neoliberal policies 
and the informal political participation of young people (Sakellaropoulos, 2012; Sotiris, 2010, 
2014; Zamponi and Fernández González, 2017), but less so with regards to political 
consumerism. Chapter 6 has already discussed political consumerism as an inherently 
neoliberal phenomenon. Given that political consumerism operates within a neoliberal 
economic framework, this gap in the literature is somehow surprising. Based on the insights 
from the focus groups this thesis has therefore assumed that neoliberal governmentality 
impacts on young people’s engagement with political consumerism because of the outcomes 
from two inter-related dynamics: on the one hand neoliberal governmentality pushes young 
people away from institutional participation, and on the other it pulls them to express their 
political concerns within the bounds of the market. 
Nevertheless, in Table 6.8.1 we saw a clear rejection of the rules of competition 
among young political consumers in Greece, on the grounds that these are intrinsically 
harmful as they bring out the worst in people. Similarly, Table 6.9.1 identified a negative 
relationship between young people’s support for free enterprise and buycotting in Greece 
and the cumulative measure for both countries. Neoliberalism therefore, measured as 
‘support for market competition’ is a statistically significant driver for political consumerism 
in Greece, demonstrating a strong negative effect of 0.254, significant at p<.001. This finding 
provides support to the claim laid out in Chapter 10, that neoliberalism pushes young people 
in Greece away from institutional politics. Indeed, the inclusion of the variable ‘party 
affiliation’ above, in the final model indicates that young people in Greece are less likely to be 
a supporter of any particular political party, revealing their dissatisfaction with the supply of 
political options. 
It could thus be argued that we seem to be confronted with what may be termed as 
the “Paradox of Political Consumerism”. In other words, the findings from the analysis of the 
two variables in relation to market competition and free enterprise have demonstrated that 
those young people in Greece with the greatest dissatisfaction from free market economy 
and market competition will choose an inherently market-oriented means of political 
participation to express their ethical, environmental and political contestations. This paradox 
will be discussed in the section that follows. 
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3. The paradox of political consumerism and directions for future research. 
 
In order to explain the paradox of political consumerism, we may seek to understand how 
different scholars have previously attempted to explain the paradox of political participation 
discussed under the Rational Choice theory in Chapter 3. Olson (1965) coined the phrase ‘the 
paradox of political participation’ to describe the perceived phenomenon that people tend to 
vote even though the rational actor should choose to abstain from elections. The theory 
posed that since the marginal probability of each voter to determine the outcome of any 
particular electoral round is minimal, the cost of voting would always surpass its benefits and 
therefore the rational agent should choose to abstain (Feddersen, 2004). As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the most common approaches used to resolve this paradox involve a) reviewing 
downwards the costs of participation; and b) expanding the weight of the benefits involved 
in participating. 
 
a.  Reviewing downwards the costs of participation. 
With regards to a) reviewing downwards the costs of participating in political consumerism, 
the rational agency model would predict that engagement in political consumerism should be 
optimised where there is the greater satisfaction with: the availability of certain ethical-
labelled products; the prices of these ethically-labelled products; the variety of retailers in the 
vicinity of the consumer; market information for these products, and vice versa. When it 
comes to political consumption, these may be considered as increased ‘political 
opportunities’ (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993) according to the mobilisation theory. 
According to the rational agency model of political participation, one would expect 
that the dissatisfaction from these market features would disincentivise young people from 
engaging in political consumerism, whereas satisfaction from the same market features 
would instead indicate a relatively lower cost of political consumerism, and therefore higher 
engagement in it. However, the analysis of these variables in Tables 6.3.1 to 6.6.1 reveals the 
reverse dynamics, insofar as young people who are dissatisfied with the existing range of 
products, prices, retailers and market information will choose an inherently market-based 
form of political engagement such as political consumerism. For example, those who are 
satisfied with the range of products (Table 6.3.1),  are less likely to boycott; and those who 
are not satisfied with the range of prices are more likely to boycott (Table 6.4.1); those not 
satisfied with the variety of retailers are generally more likely to score highly on all three 
279 | P a g e  
 
measures of political consumerism (Table 6.5.1); and finally those not at all satisfied with 
product related information in the UK are more likely to boycott (Table 6.6.1).  
These observations therefore, indicate that the approach of a) reviewing downwards 
the costs of participation, is not able to provide an effective explanation for the paradox of 
political consumerism, and if anything complicates the image even further. Instead, they paint 
a picture of political consumerism as a form of political participation that expresses  primarily 
dissatisfaction and dissent (Pickard, 2018). On these grounds, it is thus not surprising that 
political consumerism is strongly associated with ‘intention to demonstrate’ as well as with 
‘signing a petition’ on the online realm, as discussed in the sections above.  
 
b.  Expanding the weight of the benefits involved in participation. 
With regards to the second approach, that is b) expanding the weight of the benefits involved 
in participating, the variable ‘support for democracy’ has been previously used to explain a 
rational agent’s decision to participate in elections (Feddersen, 2004), and may thus also 
provide a more plausible explanation with regards to engagement in political consumerism.  
For any (rational) individual to choose to participate therefore, their long-term 
benefits from participating should outweigh the costs involved. In order to satisfy this 
condition, the greatest part of researchers who approach the paradox of political 
participation have tended to emphasise the weight of the benefits involved with participating. 
This approach was developed based on Downs’ own observation (1957, p.266) that one of 
the factors of a rational agent’s long-term calculated benefits from voting should incorporate 
the value of voting per se. This was captured by the ‘Democracy Value’ (or D-Value), which 
represents the long-term value that individuals attribute to preserving democracy and 
democratic values in their country (see Chapter 4).  
The D-value therefore, represents the personal satisfaction or in rational agency 
terms, the benefit from fulfilling one’s civic obligations; in other words their duty to vote 
(Feddersen, 2004, p. 101). This has been addressed in the questionnaire of the present thesis 
by the following two questions.  Firstly, ‘How important is democracy for you?’ which  aimed 
to capture the relative importance that the young people in the UK and Greece attribute to 
the long-term benefits of preserving democracy in their country. Secondly, the question 
‘Voting is a duty?’, which in a similar way intended to capture the relative importance of 
voting as a civic duty. Both of these questions have previously (Galais and Blais, 2016; 
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Wattenberg, 2015) been employed in explaining young people’s political participation in 
general.  
With respect to political consumerism in particular, Gotlieb and Wells (2012) have 
previously reported that the dutiful cohorts were significantly less likely (b= -0.47, p<.001) to 
engage in political consumerism46; however, this doctoral study has found a significantly 
positive relationship between both variables ‘Voting is a duty’ and ‘Support for democracy’. 
More specifically, ‘Voting is a duty’ has had a positive relationship with boycotters in the UK 
and ‘Support for democracy’ for all three political consumerist measures, for both countries 
among those who deemed democracy as ‘Absolutely important’ (Tables 4.6.1 and 4.7.1). 
This approach is therefore based on a generalised and subjective cost-benefit analysis 
of participation. It emphasises the significance of subjectivity of ideological factors and soft 
incentives as a basis for engagement in political consumerism, instead of the importance of 
immediate gains which are typically considered less important (Leighley, 1995).   For example, 
if one places increased value on postmaterialist concerns, such as self-expression or the 
freedom of speech, as the UK respondents do in this study, their decision to participate will 
be entirely rational, since the benefits (self-expression) will outweigh the costs involved (time 
and resources), even though they may be dissatisfied by the actual products, prices, and 
retailers. The approach therefore of expanding the weight of the benefits involved in 
participating may indeed be a plausible explanation behind young people’s engagement in 
political consumerism, despite their generalised rejection of neoliberal values. 
 
c.  Movement of affluence or movement of crisis? 
The present thesis has examined political consumerism among young people as a form of 
political participation, and has therefore traced support for the phenomenon in the relevant 
literature. Yet, another field of research that may be in the position to offer a plausible 
 
46 This difference however is explained by the different measures involved in their study. 
Gotlieb and Wells, quite arbitrarily defined their ‘dutiful’ cohort in generational terms, as 
“those born prior to 1946” (2012, p. 216), in contrast to baby-boomers and generations X and 
Y. Instead, this study captures the actual value orientations of young people aged 18-29 in 
both the UK and Greece, providing a much more accurate portrayal of the values of young 
people. 
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explanation for the perceived paradox of political consumerism, draws from social 
movements theory, and could offer a fruitful direction for future research.  
Vráblíková (2015), examining why young people engage in protests, discusses two –  
usually presented as competing - theories. She claims that we can expect two types of 
protests, on the one hand ‘protest of affluence’ and on the other ‘protest of crisis’, which each 
are related to a different set of predictors. Examples of the former can be found in the new 
social movements of the 1960s which were understood as a result of postmaterialist 
generational shift and “emphasized symbolic politics and recognition of alternative identities” 
(Vráblíková, 2015, p. 1). Contemporary anti-austerity movements instead, mobilise in 
response to the “economic and political crisis of capitalism and get active around issues of 
socio-economic inequalities and material redistribution” (Della Porta, 2015; Vráblíková, 2015, 
p. 1). Given the perceived association between engagement in protests and political 
consumerism (Table 5.5.1) it would make sense to further examine the phenomenon in light 
of social movements theory instead.  
Drawing from Kerbo (1982), Vráblíková claims that movements of affluence 
correspond to the ‘well-off’ postmaterialist theories and explain participation in ‘new social 
movements’ types of protests, such as environmental, civil and minority rights movements 
that mobilised first in 1960s. These are being understood as a result of a post-materialist value 
change and as such, they are usually more common among financially secure people. Instead, 
movements of crisis usually originate from grievance due to a relative shortage of socio-
economic resources and are therefore performed by those who are “experiencing life-
threatening conditions whose improvement became the purpose of their mobilization” 
(Vráblíková, 2015, p. 4). The recent uprising of the Black Lives Matter movement, in response 
to the assassination of George Floyd, as a response to a historically persistent police brutality 
against members of the underprivileged black community in the US, is a recent example of 
movements of crisis.  
With regards to its application on political consumerism, recent research suggests that 
a similar theoretical framework may also apply to the expansion of political consumerism in 
response to the economic crisis. Della Porta (2015) examines political consumerism as part of 
a new wave of ‘grievance’ movements, such as the contemporary anti-austerity movements 
or the Occupy movement before them. Unlike the new social movements of the 1960s, which 
were driven primarily by postmaterialist concerns, these contemporary ‘grievance’ 
movements bring “the class and capitalism back” (Della Porta, 2015, p. 1). These forms of 
social movements (of which political consumerism is part) are being performed by the “losers 
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of neoliberalism” (Vráblíková, 2015, p. 4), that is by the poor, excluded and marginalised 
groups, who seek an alternative way of getting their voices heard. Vráblíková (2015, p. 1) 
claims that “the ‘well-off’ postmaterialist explanation should still explain participation in the 
first type of movements, while grievance theory will probably account for participation at the 
new contemporary wave of activism, such as anti-austerity demonstrations or the protests of 
unemployed, homeless, radicals, and ethnic minorities”. 
It is therefore the grievance theory of social movements that best explains 
participation in contemporary political consumerism in Greece, whereas political 
consumerism in the UK better fits with the description of a movement of affluence. This 
standpoint would also explain the inclusion of postmaterialism in the final model for the UK, 
although the Greek cohort was found to have scored significantly higher in the 
postmaterialism index. This claim gains further support form Table 2.7.1: ‘Subjective class’, 
which reported political consumerism in the UK as being statistically more likely among young 
intellectuals in the UK. Conversely, it also draws support from Table 2.10.1 which reported 
that political consumerism in the UK was statistically more likely among young people in paid 
work (and therefore more financially secure), whereas instead it was statistically more likely 
among young unemployed people in Greece. 
Moreover, the common drivers of  political consumerism in the final model presented 
above, namely a) increased perceived consumer effectiveness, b) intention to demonstrate, 
c) promoting environmentally responsible lifestyles, and d) signing petitions in the online 
realm,  indicate that in both countries this is associated with the politics of dissent both in the 
real and online world (‘intention to demonstrate’ and ‘ intention to sign petitions online’); 
driven by an internalised neoliberal governmentality (‘perceived consumer effectiveness’) 
which pulls young people to express their environmental concerns (‘promoting 
environmentally responsible lifestyles’) within the bounds of the marketplace.  
Nevertheless, political consumerism in the UK is also being driven by e) gender, with 
females being significantly more likely to participate in it. Previous research has explained the 
impact of gender on political consumerism in terms of an anachronistic conceptualisation 
which ascribes women as the primary household caretakers (Eliasoph, 1998), or even in terms 
of the standpoint which imputes women with an inherent “ethic of care” (Micheletti, 2004, 
p. 256). From this standpoint therefore, it could be argued that it is their resilience to the 
traditional patriarchal gender roles, which triggers the participation of the often excluded and 
oppressed young females into political consumerism, as a form of political participation which 
bridges a long standing gender gap in electoral participation (O’Neill and Gidengil, 2013; Stolle 
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and Micheletti, 2006). Under this standpoint, we could infer the impact of gender on political 
consumerism in the UK, in the context of grievances theory. 
The rest of the UK-related factors however, that is f) age, g) local community and h) 
postmaterialist values paint the picture of political consumerism in the country being part of 
movements of affluence. Most importantly, postmaterialism is directly associated with 
movements of affluence, since it was developed to explain the rise of such movements in the 
1960s. Secondly, the emphasis that young political consumers place on their local community 
may be related to the rural character of the phenomenon in the UK as opposed to its urban 
character in Greece (Table 2.6.1). ONS reports higher disposable income levels in rural 
England than in urban areas (Office for National Statistics, 2018), which again portrays 
political consumerism in the UK as adhering to a ‘movement of affluence’ conceptualisation. 
Finally, with regards to age, it can be claimed that the older young people are within the 18-
29 year old age cohort, the more consumer power they have to engage politically within the 
market. This is further supported by the observation that political consumerism in the UK is 
popular among those in paid work, unlike Greece where it is primarily a tool used by young 
unemployed people (Table 2.10.1).  
Instead, the factors related only to Greece, that is i) support national economy, and 
the negative relationship with j) party affiliation and k) support for market competition, 
depict political consumerism in Greece as being predominately a movement of crisis, since it 
is practiced by young people who are driven by (materialist) motivations in relation to their 
national economy, their disillusionment with party politics, and their rejection of neoliberal 
policies. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to identify the underlying drivers of  political consumerism among 
young people in the UK and compare them to those in Greece. This chapter has identified 
these drivers in both countries by considering the findings from the analysis of the survey 
(Chapters 10 and 11) and the insights generated by the young focus groups participants 
(Chapter 9). An examination of a series of push and pull factors in Chapters 10 and 11, has 
offered a comprehensive representation of the phenomenon in the two countries. In order 
to do so however, it was necessary to devise an original and intuitive Political Consumerism 
Index (PCI) (Chapter 7) which has allowed for the analysis of  political consumerism in Chapter 
12 not only in terms of its behavioural dimension, but taking also into consideration its 
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breadth and depth,  offering thus an original contribution to knowledge in the field of young 
people’s political participation.  
 
a. Main findings 
Given its aim and objectives therefore, this thesis has revealed that  political consumerism is 
generally unrelated to voting and elections, negatively associated with views of politicians, 
but positively linked to democratic values and to an expanded personal outlook of the 
respondents. The environmental orientation of young political consumers in both the UK and 
Greece was a common predictor of their likelihood to engage in political consumerism, with 
the ‘Promoting environmentally responsible lifestyles’ motivating young people in both the 
UK (b=0.248, p=.001) and Greece (b=0.219, p=.01).  
As members of a Mixed Market Economy, the Grexit generation was expected to show 
higher levels of disillusionment from institutionalised politics and distrust in politicians, than 
was the Brexit generation who were socialised in an Liberal Market Economy. Indeed, the 
findings of this chapter indicate that party affiliation is statistically negatively associated with 
political consumerism only for Greece. Instead, young people in the UK were expected to 
demonstrate higher levels of conviction about the effectiveness of the market to influence 
political and non-political outcomes. However, contrary to the expectations, although 
Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) to their local community has been shown to be a 
statistically significant predictor for political consumerism in both countries, it is significantly 
higher in Greece (b=0.261, p=.001) than in the UK (b=0.197, p=.001). Moreover, the preferred 
political consumerist practices were expected to be expressed in different ways too: a 
bottom-up, local-community orientation was expected among young people in Greece, as 
opposed to more top-down approaches in the UK. However the findings of this chapter 
indicate that local community outlook is a statistically significant predictor for the UK only 
(b=0.165, p=.01), whereas support for national economy is a statistically significant factor for 
Greece (b=0.142, p=.05).  
Furthermore, political consumerism seems to be primarily an elite-challenging form 
of political participation in both countries, with intention to demonstrate being a statistically 
significant predictor for both Greece (b=0.216, p=.01) and the UK (b=0.155, p=.05). Moreover, 
in both countries political consumerism is associated with online forms of political 
participation, with the variable ‘intention to sign a petition online’ being a statistically 
significant predictor for both Greece and the UK (b=0.224, p=.01; b=0.174, p=.01). Age 
(b=0.205, p=.001) and gender (b=0.263, p=.001) are significant predictors of the phenomenon 
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only in the UK. Moreover, there are indications that political consumerism in the UK should 
be understood as a movement of affluence, whereas in Greece it is better perceived as a 
movement of crisis, with ‘support for market competition’ being statistically negatively 
associated with political consumerism in the country (b=-0.254, p=.001). More research in this 
direction is however, deemed necessary. 
On the whole, the main findings of this thesis can be graphically summarized as 
follows. The radar chart below (Figure 11) shows that political consumerism in Greece is 
determined by the seven factors as indicated:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Likewise, Figure 12 demonstrates that political consumerism in the UK is being 
determined by the following eight factors, instead. Only factors a) Perceived Consumer 
Effectiveness (PCE) b) Intention to demonstrate, c) Promoting environmentally responsible 
lifestyles, d) Signing a petition online are common to both country cohorts. The key 
differences between the two are that e) Gender, f) Age, g) Local-community personality 
outlook, and h) Postmaterialist values are key predictors of young people’s political 
consumerism in the UK but not in Greece; while i) Support national economy, j) Party 
affiliation, k) Support for market competition are statistically significant drivers in Greece but 
not in the UK.  
Figure 3: Factors influencing political consumption in Greece 
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Although one of the primary factors associated with political consumerism in both 
countries was found to be a leftist ideological orientation (Table 3.4.1), this has not been 
discernible in the final model. The best way therefore to summarise the findings of this thesis 
is in the words of young people themselves, who when asked during the focus groups if they 
felt they belonged to the ‘left’, responded: 
Participant L: I feel part of a global movement that is centred around social justice and 
solidarity among the people (…) and this is best practiced first in our everyday 
interactions and our immediate community. 
Moderator: Yes, but where does this place you on the political spectrum? 
Participant L: I do not know…and I do not really care, to be honest. 
 
b. Directions for future research 
Nevertheless, the present thesis has also disclosed a conceptual paradox, whereby young 
people in Greece with the greatest dissatisfaction with respect to the free market economy 
and market competition will choose an inherently market-oriented means of political 
participation to express their ethical, environmental and political concerns. The final sections 
of this chapter therefore provide directions for future research, in order to respond to this 
paradox. The statistical analysis in Chapters 10, 11 and 12 indicate that although a) reviewing 
Figure 4: Factors  influencing political consumption in the UK 
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downwards the cost of participation (as the rational agency and the mobilisation model of 
political participation would suggest) is unlikely to be able to provide an adequate 
explanation, b) expanding the weight of the long-term benefits involved with participation, 
and c) analysing political consumerism in light of social movements theory may be a more 
fruitful course of action. 
Of course, further research still needs to be conducted, especially in different 
geopolitical and socioeconomic contexts so that an even more comprehensive understanding 
of young people’s engagement in political consumerism may be established. Since a simple 
and intuitive measurement tool for political consumerism has now been devised, and a first 
understanding of the drivers of the phenomenon in the UK and Greece during recession has 
been acquired, more emphasis should hereafter be placed on the ways in which this 
understanding may influence policies that can effectively enhance young people’s 
engagement with politics and political consumerism in particular. For instance, policy makers 
who are responsible for youth engagement and civic education programmes which seek to 
foster young people’s political engagement  in either country, may benefit from considering 
the differing motivations and value orientations of young people, as evidenced by this study. 
 Moreover, although this study has validated and administered the PCI in countries of 
the European north compared to the European south, it needs also to be applied and 
validated in countries and communities beyond the global capitalist north, so as to eventually 
transcend the Eurocentric and North-American focus of the overwhelming part of existing 
literature on the subject. This would allow politicians, policymakers, political scientists, and 
youth advocacy agencies and organisations to gain a deeper understanding of the drivers of 
political consumerism and by extension lifestyle forms of political participation, and allow for 
better policies and strategies to address young people’s concerns and encourage them to 
better engage with the different aspects of politics. After all, as the young people themselves 
said during the focus groups “the more democracy the better, really” (Participant A); but 
“there are many ways democracy could get better” (Participant S). 
 
c. Original contribution to knowledge and final remarks 
The present thesis has therefore highlighted and compared the main drivers behind young 
people’s engagement with political consumerism in the UK and in Greece. This is important 
because very few existing research studies have until now considered  the phenomenon of 
political consumerism a) through a mixed-methods comparative research design, b) between 
a northern and a southern European country, c) in times of austerity, d) according to young 
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people’s own frames of reference, e) accounting not only for its behavioural dimension, but 
taking also into consideration the breadth and depth of the phenomenon, and f) surprisingly 
enough, the effect of neoliberal governmentality on an inherently market-oriented form of 
political participation, such as political consumerism.   
Chapter 2 therefore, has specified who are the young people in political participation 
research and has defined what exactly we mean by political participation. Chapter 3 has 
discussed and problematised the most widely-used theories in political participation research 
which would subsequently be used throughout the thesis to contextualise its analysis. 
Chapter 4 has discussed the emergence of political consumerism as a result of the 
convergence of the citizen and the consumer, whereas Chapter 5 introduced neoliberalism 
as the underlying ideological framework within which political consumerism operates. 
Chapter 6 in turn, discussed political consumerism at the country level, and delivered an 
empirical overview of its expressions in Greece, as opposed to the UK. The inconsistencies of 
the existing measures of political consumerism and the factors that have been associated with 
it in previous research, were discussed in Chapter 7, which also developed and validated the 
PCI, a new instrument for measuring political consumerism. Chapter 8 laid out the 
methodological approach that would be used in the empirical part of the thesis. Chapter 9 
reported the main findings from a series of focus groups conducted in the UK and Greece, 
which subsequently informed the quantitative analysis of the survey questionnaire in 
Chapters 10 and 11. Ultimately, Chapter 12 utilised the PCI so as to conclusively identify the 
main drivers of the phenomenon in the two countries, providing thus an original contribution 
to knowledge in the study of political consumerism among young people in a time of austerity. 
There is no question that the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic is already transforming the 
political landscape as we previously knew it. The full extent of its impact on our individual 
livelihoods, our healthcare system and the economy as a whole is yet to be seen. 
Nevertheless, it is also bound to change our overarching consumption priorities, as well as 
what we deem as ‘political’. While on the one hand, it has already arguably amplified the pre-
existing divisions of wealth and privilege around the world, it has also rekindled our interest 
about the sustainability of the environment, the protection of our communities, and 
ultimately the greater common good. We are already planting urban gardens in our back 
yards, we are sewing masks for our healthcare workers, and we are leaving a fresh carton of 
milk on our neighbours' doorstep.  
In this changing socio-political context therefore, and in view of the aim and objectives 
of this study, this PhD thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by examining the 
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main factors behind young people’s political consumption decisions. In order to do so, it has 
developed a valid and reliable instrument to measure young people’s political consumerism, 
and has tested it in a comparative study among young people in the UK and in Greece, so as 
to identify the main drivers of the phenomenon in each. This thesis therefore offers an original 
contribution that advances the academic discourse on the political participation practices of 
young people, with particular emphasis on consumption as a way of bringing about the 
desired change towards the world they want to live in. _ 
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Appendix I:  Focus Groups 
 
A. Participant’s Information Sheet: 
 
1. Information about the project: 
  
My name is George Kyroglou and I am conducting my PhD research project in Politics at 
Nottingham Trent University. 
 
I am investigating what motivates young people to engage in non-electoral forms for 
political participation, as for instance in boycotts and buycotts – which together are termed 
“Political Consumerism”; by comparing the contemporary young generations of Britain and 
Greece. 
 
2. Why have I been chosen/asked?  
 
You have been chosen because you belong to the groups of people that we want to talk 
to, namely young people 18-25 years of age, residing either in Britain or Greece. 
 
3. What do I have to do?  
 
You will be asked to attend a focus group organised and delivered by the researcher and 
an assistant. The group will last about 60 minutes and will involve up to 5 other participants. 
The group will be asked to share views and experiences on a range of issues relating to 
your perception of Politics, political participation and shopping decisions. We will be taking 
notes and audio recording the event and only the research team will listen back and 
transcribe key themes from the audio recording.  
There are no right or wrong answers to the focus group questions. We want to hear many 
different viewpoints and would like to hear from everyone. We hope you can be honest 
even when your responses may not be in agreement with the rest of the group. In respect 
for each other, we ask that only one individual speak at a time in the group and that 
responses made by all participants be kept confidential. 
 
 
4. Data protection, Anonymity and Confidentiality 
 
All information you provide will be securely kept on a password protected computer. No 
names or other personal data will be identified within the research process unless you 
specifically consent to this. Data from the focus groups will be kept securely and fully 
anonymised. Names and other identifying features will not be used in any reports. Any 
demographic information we collect and use will be used purely to provide context to any 
quotations in the report. Any personal and sensitive data (for example, names, ethnicity, 
age, gender) will not be kept with the data collected from the focus groups. Your data will 
be coded so that only the researchers will be able to link your comments or data to your 
name. All data will be presented in reports, presentations or other final summaries in a 
summarized format so that no one will be able to identify you from your comments or data. 
All data will be fully anonymized immediately after the end of the focus groups, after which 
you will not be able to request withdrawal of your data. 
 
 
 
334 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
5. Participation, Withdrawal And Rights of Research Participants 
 
You can choose whether to be in this study or not. You may withdraw consent at any time 
without academic or other consequences of any kind. You may exercise the option of 
removing your data from the study, any time before or during the focus groups. After the 
focus groups however, all identifying information will be removed and all focus group 
responses will become anonymous and thus it will not be possible for participants to ask 
for their data to be removed from the study. 
You may also refuse to answer any questions you don’t want to answer and still remain in 
the study. The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise that 
warrant doing so. You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your 
participation in this research study.  
 
6. Whom to contact? 
 
If you have any query about the focus group you can speak directly with the researcher. I 
can be contacted via email here: georgios.kyroglou2016@my.ntu.ac.uk . 
 
Alternatively, my supervisor, Professor Matt HENN, Department of Politics and 
International Relations, can be contacted at matt.henn@ntu.ac.uk .  
 
7. What will happen with the results of the study?  
 
A report will be transcribed out of the audio-recording immediately after the focus groups. 
All data used directly from participants will be fully anonymised. The results of the study 
will be shared in reports, conferences, presentations and may be published in internal 
reports and in published journals. 
 
8. Who has reviewed this study?  
 
The study has been reviewed and approved by the Nottingham Trent University College 
of Business, Law and Social Sciences Ethics Committee. 
 
I certify that I have presented the above information to the participant. 
 
 
George Kyroglou, 
 
Nottingham, United Kingdom 
April, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
335 | P a g e  
 
B. Informed Consent Form: 
 
Thank you for attending this focus group organised by George Kyroglou, PhD Candidate in Politics 
and International Relations at Nottingham Trent University.  
 
The focus group will last about 60 minutes and we will be taking notes and audio recording the 
session. All the data collected is confidential and the results will be fully anonymised.  
The aims of the project will be explained to you and will have an opportunity to ask questions about 
the research. 
 
1.  I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet for the 
above study and I had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2.  I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time before or during the focus groups, without giving a reason. 
 
3.  I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in confidence. 
 
4. I agree to notes being taken and having the focus groups audio-recorded as part of 
the research project.  
 
5.  I agree to take part in the research project.  
 
 
Name of participant: ................................................................................……… 
  
Signature of participant: ..........................................................................………  
 
Email: .............................................................. Tel: .......................................... 
 
 
Name of Researcher:.................................................................................………  
 
 
Signature of researcher: ...........................................................................………  
 
 
Date/Place: 
...........................................................................................................……… 
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C. Guide for Focus Groups: 
 
a) Introduction: 
 
Good evening and welcome to our session. Thanks for taking the time to join us to talk 
about youth political engagement in the county. My name is George Kyroglou and assisting 
me is (…). We're both PhD Students at Nottingham Trent University. The supervisor of the 
study is Prof. Matt Henn, whose contacts you may find at the Informed Consent Form (5’ 
min) you will soon be asked to read and sign. The purpose of this study is to identify the 
reasons behind the perceived youth political dis-engagement and examine to which extent 
Political Consumerism (boycotting and buycotting for political, ethical or environmental 
considerations) may (or may not) be considered as an alternative form of youth political 
participation. In other words, we try to understand why some young people in the country, 
prefer to engage in alternative forms of political participation such as Political 
Consumerism, as opposed to voting in elections, and gain an insight with respect to what 
motivates their shopping decisions.  
 
You were invited because you belong to the groups of people that we want to talk to, 
namely young people 18-25 years of age, residing either in Britain or Greece. 
 
There are no wrong answers but rather differing points of view. Please feel free to share 
your point of view even if it differs from what others have said. Keep in mind that we're 
just as interested in negative comments as positive comments, and at times the 
negative comments are the most helpful. 
 
You've probably noticed the microphone. We're tape recording the session because we 
don't want to miss any of your comments. People often say very helpful things in these 
discussions and we can't write fast enough to get them all down. We will be on a first 
name basis today, and we won't use any names in our reports. You may be assured of 
complete confidentiality.  
 
For the next 5 minutes you are invited to read and sign the Informed Consent Form, you 
will find in front of you. 
 
Well, let's begin. We've placed name cards on the table in front of you to help us 
remember each other's names. Please take 2 minutes to write your first name on the 
name card (5’ min) and add a quick drawing or symbol that identifies you as a person. 
Let's find out some more about each other by going around the table. Please tell us your 
name and why you chose the specific symbol. 
 
Thank you! Now that we hopefully know a bit more about 
each other, we may proceed to our following activity which 
is named “The Tree of Life” (10’min). In this flipchart you 
can see we have drawn a tree. If this tree represents the 
current political system in your country, the roots of the 
tree represent our fears, or all those reasons we may be 
dissatisfied with the current political system. Likewise, the 
trunk represents our obligations and contributions, what 
we - as young citizens - need or should do in order to 
sustain and improve the existing political system. The 
upper part of the tree, the foliage, represents our hopes 
and dreams; how we expect to see this system changing 
in the future, or how we expect the current political system 
to evolve in the years to follow. In front of you, you will 
find three different post-it notes, the red for the roots, the 
yellow for the trunk and the green for the foliage. Please 
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take 2’ to write on each post-it your fears, contributions and expectations. When you think 
you are ready, please proceed to the flipchart and stick the note to the relevant part of 
the Tree of Life and tell us a few thinks about what you noted down on each section. 
 
b) Main Session: 
 
The following activity is called “Human Thermometer” (10’min) and intends on the one 
hand to identify our personal values on a scale, with regards to certain issues, and on the 
other to act as an energiser, an opportunity to stand up and move freely in the space  
provided. As you may have noticed, we have drawn a thermometer on the floor, which 
ranges from cold (highly disagree), to hot (highly agree). Please stand up, and as soon as 
I read some statements, please stand on the thermometer depending if you agree or 
disagree with the following statements: 
 
• I am very interested in Politics. 
• I will most likely vote in the next General Elections. 
• I believe I may be politically active even though I do not vote in the 
elections. 
• People should have more say in government decisions. 
• Most people should not have a say in government decisions since 
they are not adequately educated.  
• I consider the Order of the nation as a priority. 
• Most people can be trusted. 
• Most politicians can be trusted. 
• I am willing to pay more for food products knowing that more 
money is returning to the disadvantaged producers who have created it. 
• I am willing to pay more for food products that were produced 
under environmentally friendly conditions. 
• I am willing to pay more for products that were produced locally? How about 
nationally? (Please explain your position and give examples when possible). 
 
Here is a sample set of questions (25’ min) that could be used for many consumer 
products. The questions might be applicable to such products as: soap, breakfast cereal, 
fast food restaurants, automobiles, youth or other clubs, equipment, cosmetics, deodorant 
or a variety of other products. The following questions are intended to allow us a chance 
to start a discussion. There are no right or wrong answers to the focus group questions. 
We want to hear many different viewpoints and would like to hear from everyone. We 
hope you can be honest even when your responses may not be in agreement with the rest 
of the group. In respect for each other, we ask that only one individual speak at a time in 
the group and that responses made by all participants be kept confidential. 
 
• Suppose that you were in charge and could make one change that would make the 
world a better place. What would you do? 
• What can each one of us do in our daily lives to make the world a better place? 
• How have you been involved in the past in the decisions that pertain to you 
in your local community? 
• How often do you use organic or Fair Trade brands or products? 
• Who or what influences your personal decision to purchase a particular type 
of products? 
• When you decide to purchase certain products, what do you look for? Take 
a piece of paper and jot down three things that are important to you when 
you purchase food products? 
• Let's list these on the flip chart. If you had to pick only one factor that was 
most important to you, what would it be? You can pick something that you 
mentioned or something that was said by others. 
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• Would you be willing to pay more for food products knowing that more 
money is returning to the disadvantaged producers who have created it? 
(Please explain your position and give examples when possible). 
• Would you be to pay more for food products that were produced under 
environmentally friendly conditions? (Please explain your position and give 
examples when possible). 
• Would you be willing to pay more for products that were produced locally? 
How about nationally? (Please explain your position and give examples when 
possible). 
• Have you ever changed brands or types of products based on ethical or 
environmental considerations? What brought about the change? 
• Identify market based activities you have participated in or with which you 
are simply familiar with in your country, which in their opinion would fall 
under an expanded definition of political consumerism. 
• Of all the things we've talked about, what is most important to you? 
 
Letter to one’s self (5’ min): Now please imagine yourself in exactly one year from now. 
Imagine that your future self is being asked to invite your present self to participate in a 
boycott campaign, what would you say in the invitation? Please take a piece of paper and 
spend the next 5’ minutes to write down your invitation to your present self. Feel free to 
create a concrete example of a campaign, either real or imaginary. 
 
 
c) Summary question 
The moderator provides a brief oral summary: "Is this an adequate summary?" 
 
d) Final question 
 The moderator reviews the purpose of the study and then asks the participants: 
 "Have we missed anything?" 
 
(Total Duration: 65’) 
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Appendix II: Survey Questionnaire 
 
A. Participant's Information Sheet and Informed Consent Form.  
 
 Hello,  
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research. 
I am George Kyroglou and I am conducting my PhD research project in Politics and International 
Relations at Nottingham Trent University.  
I am studying why and how some young people get involved in Political Consumerism as a way of 
participating in politics. You will therefore be asked to respond to a set of questions on your 
computer screen. Your participation in this survey should take approximately 10 to 15 minutes. This 
consent form will be stored separately from your data. Your participation in this survey is entirely 
voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any time during the survey, or for 6 weeks after your 
submission, without specifying any reason. In order to protect your right to withdraw your data, you 
will be provided with a Unique Identification Code.  
Please retain this Identification Code, which will be used to identify your data so that it can be 
removed from the final analysis if you so wish. If, during the survey, you have any queries regarding 
your instructions, or if you have any questions regarding the nature of the research, please do not 
hesitate to contact me directly via email.  
I can be contacted via email here: georgios.kyroglou2016@my.ntu.ac.uk  
My supervisor, Professor Matt Henn at the Nottingham Trent University Department of Politics and 
International Relations, can be contacted on matt.henn@ntu.ac.uk. 
I certify that I have presented the above information to the participant.  
George Kyroglou, Nottingham, United Kingdom November, 2018  
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research project. If you are willing to continue, please 
confirm the statement below by ticking the box. * 
 
   
I voluntarily consent to participate in this study. In completing this form I certify that I am 18 
years of age or older. I can download a copy of this consent form and my responses to keep. 
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B. Survey Questionnaire 
 
Your Interest in Politics and Elections  
  
How much interest do you generally have in what is going on in politics? * 
 
   A great deal 
   Quite a lot 
   Some 
   Not very much 
   None at all 
   Don’t know 
 
When people talk about "politics", what does that mean to you, exactly? PLEASE WRITE 
IN THE SPACE BELOW.   
  
 
  
  
In political matters, people often talk of "the left" and "the right". Generally speaking, how 
would you place your views on this scale? (If 1 indicates "Left" and 10 indicates "Right") * 
 
Left 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10. Right 
                              
  
Some people think of themselves as usually being a supporter of one political party rather 
than another. Do you usually think of yourself as being a supporter of one particular party 
or not? * 
 
   Yes - a strong supporter 
   Yes - a fairly strong supporter 
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   No - not a supporter 
   Don’t know 
  
How confident are you that you know enough about politics and political parties when it 
comes to deciding how to vote at election times? * 
 
   Very confident 
   Fairly confident 
   Not very confident 
   Not at all confident 
   Don’t know 
  
Before voting, you might seek information from a variety of sources, such as the 
newspapers, the candidate's campaign or the internet. How satisfied would you say you 
are with the overall availability of information about the current political affairs? Please 
rate your views on this scale. * 
 
Not at all 
satisfied 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Absolutely 
satisfied 
                              
  
It takes too much time and effort to be adequately informed and active in politics and 
current affairs. * 
 
   Yes - I agree 
   No - I do not agree 
   Don't know - Not sure 
  
People should be allowed to organise public meetings to protest against the government. 
* 
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   Yes - I agree 
   No - I do not agree 
   Don't know - Not sure 
  
People often talk about the benefits and drawbacks of competition in the market. How 
would you place your views on the following scale? * 
 
Competition 
is harmful: 
It brings out 
the worst in 
people 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Competition 
is good: It 
stimulates 
hard work 
and new 
ideas 
                              
  
In your opinion, what is the single most important issue that influences your life at the 
moment? PLEASE WRITE IN THE SPACE BELOW WITH AS MUCH DETAIL AS YOU CAN.  
 
  
 
  
 
 
Democracy in my country  
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. 
 By voting, I feel as if I can really help to change the way my country is being governed. * 
   Strongly agree 
   Agree 
   Neither agree/ disagree 
   Disagree 
   Strongly disagree 
   Don’t know 
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Elections allow voters to express their opinions but don’t really change anything. * 
   Strongly agree 
   Agree 
   Neither agree/ disagree 
   Disagree 
   Strongly disagree 
   Don’t know 
 I would be seriously neglecting my duty as a citizen if I didn’t vote. * 
   Strongly agree 
   Agree 
   Neither agree/ disagree 
   Disagree 
   Strongly disagree 
   
Don’t know 
 
 
How active you are in politics and community affairs  
  
Thinking about the next few years, how likely is it that you will: * 
 
 
Very 
unlikely 
Unlikely 
Neither 
unlikely/ nor 
likely 
Likely Very Likely Don't Know 
Vote in the next 
General Election?                   
Work actively with a 
group of people to 
address a public issue 
or tackle a problem? 
                  
Be active in a 
voluntary 
organisation, like a 
community 
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Very 
unlikely 
Unlikely 
Neither 
unlikely/ nor 
likely 
Likely Very Likely Don't Know 
association, a charity 
group, or youth club? 
Participate in a 
protest, like a rally or 
a demonstration, to 
show your concern 
about a public issue 
or problem? 
                  
Contact your MP by 
email?                   
Sign an electronic 
petition?                   
Create a group or a 
page on a social 
networking site (such 
as Facebook), or a 
blog to inform others 
about an important 
social or political 
issue? 
                  
Share a link about an 
important social or 
political issue over a 
social networking site 
(such as Facebook)? 
                  
 
Consumer behaviour  
Now you will be asked about your behaviour and habits when you purchase products and 
services. 
  
How effective do you believe your consumer behaviour can be in bringing about the 
desired change for the world as a whole? * 
 
 
Very 
ineffective 
Ineffective 
Neither 
effective/ 
nor 
ineffective 
Effective 
Very 
effective 
Don't know 
Effectiveness of my 
consumer behaviour                   
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How effective do you believe your consumer behaviour can be in bringing about the 
desired change to your local community? * 
 
 
Vey 
ineffective 
Ineffective 
Neither 
effective/ 
nor 
ineffective 
Effective 
Very 
effective 
Don't know 
Effectiveness of my 
consumer behaviour                   
  
How responsible do you feel with regards to choosing the 'right' brand when you go 
shopping? * 
 
 
Not at all 
responsible 
Not 
responsible 
Neither 
responsible/ 
nor not 
responsible 
Responsible 
Very 
responsible 
Don't know 
Responsibility for 
choosing the right 
brand 
                  
  
In the past 12 months, did you actively purchase one product or brand over another for 
ethical, environmental or political reasons? * 
 
   
Yes, I have actively purchased a product or brand for ethical, environmental or political 
reasons. 
   
No, I have NOT purchased any products or brands for ethical, environmental or political 
reasons. 
   Don't know 
  
In the past 12 months, did you actively refuse to purchase a product or brand based on 
ethical, environmental or political considerations? * 
 
   
Yes, I have refused to purchase a product or brand for ethical, environmental or political 
reasons. 
   
No, I have NOT refused to purchase any products or brands for ethical, environmental or 
political reasons. 
   Don't know 
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 How often do you purchase, or avoid purchasing certain products, services or brands for 
ethical, environmental or political considerations? * 
 
 Hardly ever Not so often Often 
Nearly 
every time I 
go shopping 
Every time I 
go shopping 
Don't know 
Frequency                   
  
How much more would you be willing to pay for a brand or product, for any of the 
following reasons? * 
 
 
Not willing to 
pay more 
Not willing to 
pay very much 
more 
Willing to pay 
a little more 
Willing to pay 
quite a lot 
more 
Don't know 
Benefit my personal 
health                
Protect animal rights                
Support national 
economy                
Support local 
producers and 
improve social ties 
within my community 
               
Support fair trade and 
ethical production 
processes overseas 
               
Protect the planet and 
encourage 
environmentally 
responsible lifestyles 
               
 
Other:   
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 When buying an item, we usually have several choices regarding where to buy it from. 
Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with the variety of retailers, the range of 
products, and their price range available to you? Please rate your views on this scale. * 
 
 
Not at all 
satisfied 
Not satisfied 
Neither 
satisfied/ nor 
dissatisfied 
Satisfied Very Satisfied 
Range of products 
and/or services                
Range of prices of 
products and/or 
services 
               
Variety of retailers 
(Big corporations/ 
local businesses) 
               
  
Before making a purchase, you might seek information from a variety of sources, such as 
the product's label, the brand's advertising campaign or the internet. How satisfied would 
you say you are with the availability of information in the market about your products of 
choice? Please rate your views on this scale. * 
 
Not at all 
satisfied 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Absolutely 
satisfied 
                              
  
Do you often act alone or as part of an organised campaign, when you decide which 
product, service, brand, or company you will buy or refuse to buy? * 
 
   Alone 
   Organised campaign (Consumer groups, Local Purchasing Initiatives etc.) 
  
During the past 12 months, did you engage in any of the following activities?(Feel free to 
tick more than one answer). * 
 
   Brandalism or Culture Jamming 
   Alternative Consumption Festivals 
   Local Exchange Trading System (LETS) 
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   Participating in Solidarity Purchase Networks (GAS) 
   Time-Banks 
   Sharing Economy Initiatives (Carpooling, etc.) 
   Barter Networks 
   Intending to vote for a Political Party based on their environmental agenda. 
   Consume Less for De-growth purposes 
   Recycle, Reuse, Reduce. 
   Zero waste products 
   Zero miles Production 
   Vegetarianism/Veganism 
   None of the above/ Don't know/ Not familiar with the terms 
   
Other (please specify): 
  
 
 
Personal Values  
  
Generally speaking, on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means " You can’t be too careful" and 
5 means "Most people can be trusted", would you say that you can’t be too careful when 
dealing with people; or that most people can be trusted? * 
 
   1. You can’t be too careful 
   2. 
   3. 
   4. 
   5. Most people can be trusted 
   Don't know 
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On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "No trust at all" and 5 means "A great deal of 
trust", how much do you trust politicians in general? * 
 
   1. No trust at all 
   2. 
   3. 
   4. 
   5. A great deal of trust 
   Don't know 
  
On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "No influence" and 5 means "A great deal of 
influence", how much influence would you say you have on how your country is being 
governed? * 
 
   1. No influence 
   2. 
   3. 
   4. 
   5. A great deal of influence 
   Don't know 
  
People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Can you 
please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements 
about how you predominately see yourself? * 
 
 Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
I see myself as an 
individual.             
I see myself as part of 
my local community.             
I see myself as part of 
my nation             
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 Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
I see myself as 
European.             
I see myself as a world 
citizen.             
  
People have different views about the extent of government restraints on free enterprise 
in the country. Can you please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements?  
 
 
Completely 
disagree 
Agree a little 
Agree 
somewhat 
Agree a great 
deal 
Completely 
agree 
It would be a good 
idea to privatise all of 
the public enterprises 
               
The less government 
gets involved with 
business and the 
economy, the better 
off this country will be 
               
There should be more 
incentives for 
individual initiative 
even if this reduces 
equality in the 
distribution of wealth 
               
All high school and 
university education 
should be made 
private rather than 
controlled and 
supported by the 
government 
               
  
How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this 
scale where 1 means it is "not at all important" and 10 means "absolutely important" what 
position would you choose? * 
 
"Not at all 
important" 
        
"Absolutely 
important" 
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And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 
to 10, where 1 means that it is "not at all democratic" and 10 means that it is "completely 
democratic," what position would you choose? * 
 
"Not at all 
democratic" 
        
"Completely 
democratic" 
                              
  
People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten 
years. Below are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority to. 
Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? 
And which would be the next most important? * 
 
 First most important Second most important 
Maintaining order in the 
nation       
Giving people more say in 
important government 
decisions 
      
Fighting rising prices       
Protecting freedom of 
speech       
  
People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten 
years. Below are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority to. 
Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? 
And which would be the next most important? * 
 
 First most important Second most important 
A high level of economic 
growth       
Making sure this country 
has strong defence forces       
Seeing that people have 
more say about how 
things are done at their 
jobs and their 
communities 
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 First most important Second most important 
Trying to make our cities 
and countryside more 
beautiful 
      
  
People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten 
years. Below are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. 
Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? 
And which would be the next most important? * 
 
 First most important Second most important 
A stable economy       
Progress towards a less 
impersonal and more 
humane society 
      
Progress toward a society 
in which Ideas count more 
than money 
      
The fight against 
terrorism/crime       
 
Demographics and Personal Information  
All of the responses will remain confidential and will be used only for the purposes of the 
research. 
  
You identify yourself as: * 
 
   Male 
   Female 
   Prefer not to answer 
   
Other (please specify): 
  
 
  
Please indicate your country of residence. * 
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   Greece 
   United Kingdom 
   
Other (please specify): 
  
 
  
Can you tell me your year of birth, please? * 
 
  
Would you say you belong to any kind of minority, based on your racial, ethnic, religious 
or sexual orientation?(If Yes, please describe below): * 
 
   No, I do not belong in a minority. 
   
Yes, I belong to a minority, based on my racial, ethnic, religious or sexual orientation. 
(Please describe below) 
 
Please describe:   
  
 
  
  
What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if you are a student, 
please indicate the highest level you expect to complete soon]: * 
 
  
Which of these descriptions applies to your current status? (If you have more than one 
job please respond only for your main job). * 
 
 
If you chose "other", please define:   
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Are the tasks you do at work mostly manual or mostly intellectual? If you do not work 
currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale where 1 means "mostly 
manual tasks" and 10 means "mostly intellectual tasks" * 
 
Mostly 
manual 
        
Mostly 
intellectual 
                              
  
With this question, we would like to ask in what income group you would say your 
household is, compared to other households in your country. Please, indicate the 
appropriate number.(1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income 
group in your country). * 
 
Lowest 
income 
        
Highest 
income 
                              
  
Do you live with your parents? * 
 
   Yes 
   No 
  
Are you the primary wage earner in your household? * 
 
   Yes 
   No 
  
Which phrase best describes the area where you live?  
 
   Urban area 
   Rural area 
 
 
355 | P a g e  
 
Appendix III: Cumulative list of Chi-square crosstabulations in 
Chapters 10 and 11 
 
 
2. Who are the political consumers in Greece and in the UK? 
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3. Political consumerism  and young people’s views about, and engagement with  
politics 
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4. Political consumerism  and young people’s views about elections, politicians and 
democracy 
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5. Participation in politics and community affairs 
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6. Consumer behaviour pull-factors 
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7. Motivations of political consumerism 
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8. Personal orientation 
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9. Postmaterialism 
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